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Abstract 
Counterfactual representations refer to people’s imaginations about the 
alternative possibilities to the actual world (i.e., what might have been). The present 
thesis embraces the notion that the psychological impacts of those representations 
are dictated by the degree of certainty or uncertainty people assign to them, namely, 
their counterfactual probability judgments (i.e., “How likely could things have been 
different?”). The thesis reports six experiments investigating the determinants as 
well as the emotional consequences of counterfactual probability judgments. 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 found that both people’s conditional and unconditional 
counterfactual probability judgments were heightened when a past outcome was 
physically or numerically proximate to its alternative. Experiments 4 and 5 found 
that people’s counterfactual probability judgments were not only affected by the 
static proximity cue but also by its dynamic variations. When outcome proximity 
was equal, the shrinking physical distance towards a counterfactual outcome 
heightened one’s subjective likelihood of that outcome, compared to if the distance 
stayed constant. Experiment 6 found that the effect of “shrinking distance” could 
manifest itself as an antecedent temporal order effect on people’s counterfactual 
probability judgments. That is, a counterfactual outcome was deemed more likely if 
the factual outcome was preceded by a decisive event that occurred latter in the 
causal sequence rather than earlier. These results are broadly consistent with the 
theory of the simulation heuristic which posits that subjective probabilities are 
estimated by assessing the ease with which a relevant scenario can be mentally 
constructed.  
10 
 
The emotional consequences of counterfactual probability judgments were 
investigated within the theoretical framework of the Reflective and Evaluative 
Model of Comparative Thinking (REM). The evidence from Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 
5 suggests that the effect of counterfactual probability judgments on emotions are 
contingent on people’s temporal perspective – affective assimilation will be 
enhanced when future possibility is present (i.e., the outcome is indecisive or 
changeable) which encourages a reflective simulation while affective contrast will be 
enhanced when future possibility is absent (i.e., the outcome is decisive or 
unchangeable) which encourages an evaluative simulation. These findings suggest 
that the psychological impact of counterfactual thinking should be discussed in terms 
of a three-way interaction between its direction (upward or downward), probability 
(low or high), and simulation mode (reflection or evaluation). 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The Role of Reference Points in Judgments of Affect 
Our life consists of a stream of events. While some events are emotionally 
enhancing (e.g., getting admitted into a desirable university), others are aversive 
(e.g., losing loved ones). While some events are extreme and impactful (e.g., 
winning a lottery), others are mundane (e.g., having a cup of tea). The present thesis 
is aiming to give an insight into how people’s emotional experiences towards past 
events are shaped. The discussion will revolve around the critical role of 
counterfactual reference points, especially the degree to which people believe that a 
past event or outcome could have turned out differently.  To set the stage for the 
discussion, this chapter will begin with a brief review of the literature regarding a 
wide range of psychological reference points that people may use to reach affect 
judgments, before it narrows down the scope of discussion and focuses exclusively 
on counterfactual imaginations.   
It seems convenient to assume that one’s subjective experiences following an 
event should be an honest representation of its absolute valence and intensity. If this 
is true, winning £1 should always be more cheerful than losing £1 and getting a B in 
a math test should always be more pleasant than getting a C. However, recent 
research indicated that such a prediction has oversimplified real-life situations. 
Smiths and Kirby (2009), for example, made an important observation that “different 
individuals will often react to seemingly identical circumstances with very different 
emotions, and that the same individual will often react to very similar circumstances 
very differently at different times”(p. 1352).  
12 
 
This observation is consistent with the appraisal theory of emotions (Lazarus, 
1991) which posits that one’s emotional reactions to an event largely depend on the 
way that the event is appraised or evaluated. Contextual factors or individual factors 
that influence the results of the appraisal will influence the subsequent emotional 
experiences. A common characteristic of almost all the appraisal or evaluation 
processes is their susceptibility to comparison anchors or reference points.  For 
example, according to adaptation level theory, one’s past experiences with a 
perceptual stimulation form a psychological comparison anchor called adaptation 
level (or AL). The valence and the intensity of a subsequent similar stimulation will 
be judged on the basis whether it falls above or below the AL and by how much 
(Helson, 1947, 1964). The idea that the current sensory experience is relative to past 
experiences received support from a study by Sherif, Taub, and Hovland (1958), 
which demonstrated that, in a weight-lifting task, the same weight tended to be 
judged lighter if the judge had lifted a weight that was heavier than the weight being 
judged prior to the judgment, compared to if such an intervention was absent.  
The adaptation level theory was applied by Brickman and Campell (1971) to 
research on happiness. They postulated that people’s emotional reactions to good or 
bad events should follow the same principle as sensory experiences – the 
favourability of an event is judged on the basis of its discrepancy to past experiences. 
Based on this notion, they described what was called the hedonic treadmill – the 
tendency of one’s affective well-being to regress to its neutral status after emotional 
events. For example, Brickman, Coates, and Janoffbulman (1978) found that former 
lottery winners did not rate their current happiness significantly higher than the 
general population. In addition, they also found that a set of everyday mundane 
activities were rated less pleasurable by the former lottery winners than the general 
13 
 
population. For a lottery winner, the experience of winning might raise the 
adaptation level of pleasure, which makes the subsequent positive stimulations look 
mundane and tasteless and negative stimulations more repulsive.  
A reference point that is drawn to evaluate a past event or current state of 
affairs could also be a cognitive construct such as a desire/goal, belief, expectation or 
moral norm. Lazarus (1991), for example, identified goal congruence (or 
incongruence) as one of the primary appraisal components for emotions. That is, an 
event should be evaluated in relation to one’s predetermined desire (what he/she 
wants) – “It either thwarts or facilitates personal goals” and “Goal congruence leads 
to positive emotions; goal incongruence to negative ones” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 150). 
For example, a high school student who has set a goal of being admitted into a 
prominent university and hence needs an A in a maths test to boost his/her average 
grade might be more upset with getting a B than a student who can get by with a C.  
Another related but distinctive psychological construct is one’s expectancy, 
which has been defined as “beliefs about a future state of affairs” (Olson, Roese, & 
Zanna, 1996, p. 211). Compared to aspirations, desires and goals, which concern 
what people need or wish for, expectations are relatively more realistic and rational 
(Festinger, 1942; Irwin, 1944; Irwin & Mintzer, 1942). For example, someone might 
want to get an A in a maths test but consider him/herself only likely to get a B. 
Expectations are specific predictions about the future and must be derived from 
one’s prior beliefs or knowledge (Olson et al., 1996). A person who gets a B in a 
maths test and puts more effort in the subject since the test may expect to get a better 
mark next time. Such a prediction stems from the belief in the causal connection 
between “effort” and “academic performance”. Expectancies have impacts on a wide 
14 
 
range of cognitive activities. Miller and Ross (1975) suggested that people are more 
likely to attribute an expected outcome internally (e.g., to one’s own effort) but are 
more likely to attribute an unexpected event externally (e.g., to luck).  Evidence also 
shows that an event will be more memorable and better recalled when it is 
inconsistent with prior expectations than when it is consistent (see Stangor & 
McMillan, 1992, for a review).  
Expectancies also play important roles in people’s attitudes towards past 
occurrences or status. Generally speaking, confirmations of subjective expectancies 
reinforce the notion that one’s world is predictable and within one’s control and thus 
induce positive emotions like satisfaction (Mandler, 1975). The consequences of 
disconfirmations or violations of subjective expectancies might, however, depend on 
the direction of the disconfirmation. According to Expectation Disconfirmation 
Theory (Oliver, 1977, 1980), a sense of satisfaction is derived from positive 
disconfirmation of an expectation (e.g., when the quality or the performance of a 
consumer product exceeds what is expected) while a sense of dissatisfaction is 
derived from negative disconfirmation of an expectation (e.g., when the quality or 
the performance of a consumer product falls short of what is expected). On the other 
hand, a disconfirmed expectancy is an indicator that one’s environment is not fully 
understood and thus could induce feelings of insecurity or fear (Olson et al., 1996). 
A comparison anchor can also be drawn on an inter-individual basis. The 
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) posits that people evaluate the validity or 
the appropriateness of their attitudes, beliefs or abilities by making peer 
comparisons. Comparing oneself with an individual who is superior in abilities or 
better off may give rise to a sense of deprivation or lowered self-esteem (Morse & 
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Gergen, 1970). On the other hand, comparing oneself with an individual who is 
inferior in abilities or worse off may give rise to complacency or increased self-
esteem (Wills, 1981; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985).  
In summary, people’s emotional reactions towards a past event or the current 
state of affairs are often shaped in relation to reference points or comparison 
standards such as desires, expectancies and other individuals. The present thesis, 
however, casts interest on another kind of reference point which has been drawing 
increasing attention by psychologists. Consider a student who got a B in his/her 
maths test but later found out that if he/she had got one more question correct, he/she 
would have got an A instead. Now consider an alternative scenario in which the 
student still got a B but later found out that if he/she had got one more question 
incorrect, he/she would have got a C instead. In the two cases, the objective status of 
the student would have been equal and he/she would have born equal prior 
expectations regarding the result of the test. However, we might ask ourselves: 
Would the student feel differently in the two scenarios? If yes, why so? To answer 
these questions, the concept of the counterfactual reference point will be introduced. 
The rest of this thesis will focus on this particular comparison anchor.   
1.2 The Counterfactual Reference Point 
1.2.1 Counterfactual Thinking – A Brief Introduction 
An interesting phenomenon that has recently come to the attention of 
psychological researchers is that people are not only affected by what did happen but 
also by what did not happen. Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1990) sketched a 
scenario where a person A switched to a different flight only in the last minute 
before it took off and was killed as the plane crashed. The authors speculated that the 
16 
 
fate of this person would be considered somehow more tragic compared to another 
passenger B on the same flight who had booked his/her ticket some time ago, despite 
the fact that the final outcome is the same for the two individuals. It was argued that 
the different reactions to the stories of the two individuals could not be attributed to 
any pre-existing psychological comparison anchor like expectations because there is 
no reason to believe that passenger A who switched the flight in the last minute 
should have had a different probability judgment of an air accident from passenger 
B. To understand why people might act more strongly to the story of passenger A, a 
good starting point might be to explore the subject of counterfactual thinking.  
Counterfactual thinking, as its name suggests, refers to imaginations about 
alternatives to reality, namely, what could or might have been (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Roese & Olson, 1995). Perhaps what makes the story of passenger A, who 
switched to the doomed flight especially tragic is the compelling thought that 
“He/she would have survived if he/she had not changed the flight”. In this typical 
case of counterfactual thinking, both the real outcome (i.e., “being killed in a plane 
crash”) and one of its antecedents (i.e., “changing his/her flight) are mutated to a 
counterfactual state (i.e., “surviving” and “not changing his/her flight”, respectively), 
which leads to a an “if-then” conditional hypothetical statement. (i.e., “If he/she had 
not changed his/her flight then he/she would have survived”). Other examples 
include: “If I had brought an umbrella with me, (then) I would not have been soaked 
by the rain”; “I might have arrived at school on time if I had not overslept this 
morning”; “The US might not have entered the Second World War if Pearl Harbour 
had not been raided by Japan”; etc. However, a counterfactual statement does not 
always take a form of a conditional (e.g., “I could have finished my assignment 
earlier”). This is especially the case for a special branch of counterfactuals identified 
17 
 
by Kahneman and Varey (1990) called “close counterfactuals”, which typically take 
the format of “Something almost/nearly occurred”. A statement of this type does not 
specify any mutated antecedent but simply claims the fact that an alternative 
possibility could have easily been realised. 
Counterfactual thinking is not only a pervasive psychological phenomenon 
but a powerful one as well. It plays important roles in a wide range of cognitive tasks 
and social judgments. For example, counterfactual thinking was found to be closely 
related to causal reasoning (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; Spellman, 1997; Wells & 
Gavanski, 1989). Wells and Gavanski (1989) found that an antecedent to a tragic 
accident was considered to be the cause only to the extent that the mental undoing of 
this antecedent led to the undoing of the tragic outcome. In one of their experiments, 
a woman was described to have eaten a meal ordered by her boss and to have died of 
a food allergy. Participants were informed that her boss had another option for her 
meal. It was found that the boss was considered to be the cause of this incident to a 
greater extent when the unselected meal did not contain the allergic ingredient than 
when it also contained it, presumably because the information in the latter case made 
it difficult for the participants to undo the outcome of the event by undoing the 
boss’s choice of meal.  
Since causal inferences can be derived from imaginations about alternatives, 
it was believed that counterfactual thinking is an important tool for humans to learn 
from past experiences and regulate their behaviours in the future for the purposes of 
goal achievement. The functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008; Roese, 1994, 1997) posits that upward counterfactual thinking (i.e., 
thinking how things could have been better) can help people identify behavioural 
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paths leading to future successes. For example, the counterfactual “If I had put more 
effort into my revision, I would have got a higher mark in the maths examination” 
pinpoints a causal relationship between “effort” and “academic performance”, which 
might lead to behavioural intention (e.g., “I will put more effort into my revision so 
that I can get a higher mark in the maths examination next time”). Upward 
counterfactual thinking could also motivate corrective behaviours by heightening 
one’s future expectancies for success and self-esteem (Gleicher et al., 1995; Nasco & 
Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994, 1997, 1999; Roese & Morrison, 2009). For example, the 
counterfactual “I could have done better in the maths examination” highlights the 
possibility that “I can do better”. Such a self-inference might fuel the motivation for 
behavioural change (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1994, 1997).  
Downward counterfactual thinking (i.e., thinking how things could have been 
worse), on the other hand, is believed to be able to elicit feelings of complacency and 
thus serve an affect enhancing purpose (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & 
McMullen, 1993; Roese, 1994) and could help individuals cope with traumatic 
events (White & Leham, 2005). More recent research also suggests that downward 
counterfactual thinking sometimes serves as a warning alarm and helps prevent 
degenerative behaviours by flagging up the path to an undesirable state and eliciting 
negative emotions (e.g., “I could have failed the maths examination if I had not put 
this much effort in the revision. So I will work as hard in preparing for the 
examination next time.”) (McMullen & Markman, 2000).   
To serve the purpose of this thesis, it is the role that counterfactual thinking 
plays in peoples’ emotional experience to a past outcome that is of the utmost 
interest. It is believed that a counterfactual world can serve as a reference point 
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against which reality is appraised (i.e., comparing what did happen with what could 
have happened) (Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). 
However, unlike comparison anchors such as desires and expectancies, which are 
computed or established prior to the occurrence of an outcome, counterfactual 
comparison anchors are provoked after the occurrence (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), 
although the disconfirmation of prior desires or expectancies might facilitate the 
imagination of counterfactuals (Olson et al., 1996). It is important to understand 
when a counterfactual comparison standard is the most available and how it 
influences one’s emotions. The following sections will give a brief review of the 
existing research regarding both the antecedents and the emotional consequences of 
counterfactual thinking. 
1.2.2 Antecedents of Counterfactual Thinking 
Virtually every occurrence or status has its alternatives. The alternative of the 
sky being blue would be the sky being red or white; Being born as a boy would be 
being born as a girl; Having sausage for breakfast would be having bacon. However, 
people don’t spontaneously contemplate the alternatives to every past event and, 
even if they do, it is unlikely that they would exhaust all the alternative possibilities 
(E.P. Seelau, S.M. Seelau, Wells, & Windschitl, 1995). Some events seem to 
provoke thoughts about alternatives more readily and some alternatives seem to be 
easier to come to mind than others. Mutability and counterfactual availability are the 
terms frequently used by counterfactual researchers to describe the ease with which 
an event in reality can be mentally altered to a counterfactual state (e.g., Kahneman, 
1995; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Miller et al., 1990; Roese & Olson, 1995).   
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Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) made the first attempt to explain 
what aspects of the reality are likely to be mutated and also to what state they are 
likely to be altered. It proposed that the occurrence of each event would provoke its 
own comparison anchor or “norm”. A norm can be retrieved from one’s past 
experiences or constructed by mental simulation, reflecting how things should be. If 
an event has provoked a norm that is dissimilar to itself, this event will be deemed 
“abnormal” and elicit a sense of surprise. It is this sense of “surprise” that motivates 
a mental alteration process to restore the abnormal event to its normal status. On the 
other hand, if an event has provoked a norm that is similar to itself, this event will be 
deemed “normal” and become resistant to mental mutations. One factor that 
influences the normality of an event is its exceptionality - that is, the extent to which 
an event deviates from daily routine. The plane crash scenario at the beginning of 
this chapter is a good illustration to how an exceptional antecedent (i.e., “switching 
flight”) leads people to consider an alternative outcome to the tragic event (i.e., 
“He/she could have survived.”).  
Kahneman and Miller (1986) reported a study where participants were 
presented with a scenario, in which Mr Adams and Mr White were both described as 
being involved in an accident driving home from work. However, Mr Adams was on 
his typical route home when the accident occurred while Mr White was on an 
unusual route. Although the severities of the two accidents were described to be 
similar, 82% of the participants thought Mr White would feel more upset than Mr 
Adams, presumably because the unusual and hence abnormal action of Mr White 
made the tragic outcome more mutable for him than for Mr Adams. Miller and 
McFarland (1986) reported a similar finding.  In one of their studies, participants 
were told a story in which a male was described as being injured by a gun-shot as a 
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result of a robbery during his visit to a convenience store. It was found that 
participants assigned a greater amount of monetary compensation to the victim if the 
convenience store where the robbery took place had been rarely visited by the victim 
than if it had been frequently visited. (for similar findings, see Johnson, 1986; 
Macrae. 1992; Macrae & Milne, 1992; Macrae, Milne, & Griffiths, 1993).  
Evidence also indicates that events involving actions are more abnormal and 
thus more mutable than events involving inactions. In a scenario study reported by 
Kahneman and Miller (1986), Mr Paul and Mr George both invested in the stocks of 
company A and later found they would have earned $1,200 more if they had invested 
in company B. However, Mr Paul was described as having owned shares in company 
A initially and decided NOT to switch to company B while Mr George owned shares 
in company B initially but decided to switch to company A. Despite the fact that the 
two men lost the same amount of money, the majority of the participants thought that 
Mr George, who switched his stock, would be more regretful than Mr Paul, who 
failed to switch his stock.  
Roese and Olson (1995, 1997), on the other hand, proposed that the 
construction of the counterfactual world consists of two stages – counterfactual 
activation refers to “whether the process of counterfactual thinking is turned on or 
off” while semantic content refers to “the specific avenue by which a focal outcome 
is undone” (Roese & Olson, 1997, p. 5). For example, after taking a taxi to the 
airport but missing his/her flight, a person might start to wonder whether this adverse 
incident could have been prevented (i.e., “Could I have caught the plane?”).  The 
person might come up with several counterfactual scenarios in which different 
aspects of the incident are mutated (e.g., “If I had not overslept this morning/If I had 
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used public transportation/If the taxi driver had taken a different route, I could have 
caught the flight.”). While counterfactual activation concerns the question of when a 
counterfactual outcome is considered, the semantic content of counterfactual 
thinking concerns the question of what element(s) of the reality are mutated in a 
counterfactual representation.  
Based on this two-stage model of counterfactual construction, the two authors 
criticised the existing evidence for the normality-counterfactual availability 
relationship (as reviewed above). They pointed out that it was ambiguous from the 
results of those studies whether the normality of antecedents was influencing the 
dependent variables (i.e., negative emotions or victim compensations) by having an 
effect on the activation of counterfactual thinking or its semantic content, because 
none of those experiments had directly evaluated the cognitive process of 
counterfactual thinking in any way. By comparison, Roese and Olson (1996, 1997) 
presented a series of studies which measured the counterfactual activation and its 
semantic content separately. It was found that, while the antecedent normality has an 
effect on the content of the counterfactual thoughts that participants generated (i.e., 
abnormal antecedents were more likely to be mutated in the counterfactual thoughts), 
its effect on counterfactual activation (i.e., the number of counterfactual thoughts 
generated) was unreliable.  
For example, in one of their studies, participants were asked to solve a series 
of anagrams, before which they made decisions about the configurations of the task 
(e.g., topic area, difficulty level, etc.). Normality was manipulated by providing 
participants with false feedbacks as to whether their decisions were typical (normal) 
or atypical (abnormal) of other participants. The extent of counterfactual activation 
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was inferred from participants’ response time to a counterfactual proposition after 
the task (e.g., “My score could have been much different”) (Roese & Olson, 1997, p. 
21). Presumably, the greater the extent to which participants had engaged in 
counterfactual thinking, the faster they would respond “yes” or “no” to this 
proposition. The semantic content of counterfactual thinking, on the other hand, was 
measured by coding people’s written counterfactual thoughts. It was found that the 
decisions which were believed atypical were more frequently mutated in 
participants’ counterfactual thoughts than typical decisions. However, the 
manipulation of normality did not significantly affect participants’ response time to a 
counterfactual proposition. These results suggest that the normality of antecedents 
only influences the semantic content of counterfactual thinking but not its activation.  
In contrast, Roese and Olson (1997) demonstrated a potent effect of affect on 
counterfactual activation. In one of their studies, for example, participants read a 
scenario in which Sarah performed either well (Outcome valence: positive) or poorly 
(Outcome valence: negative) in an examination. More counterfactual statements 
were recorded in a thought-listing task from the participants who received the 
Outcome valence: negative version than those who received Outcome valence: 
positive version. As argued by Roese and Olson (1995), the reason why negative 
affect triggers counterfactual thinking could be because the events with negative 
outcomes may be treated as signals that the environment of an organism is not 
mastered and thus they are more attention drawing and more likely to receive close 
scrutiny than positive outcomes.  
Outcome closeness is another potential factor that influences the mutability 
of a past outcome. Evidence suggests that emotional reactions to a negative outcome 
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will be intensified if the distance between the real outcome and its alternatives is 
short. For example, in one study by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), participants 
were given a scenario, in which Mr Crane and Mr Tees both arrived at the airport 
half an hour late for their scheduled flight. Mr Crane found that his flight had 
departed on time while Mr Tees was told that his flight had been delayed and just 
departed five minutes before. It was found that the majority of the participants (96%) 
thought that Mr Tees should be more upset than Mr Crane. Presumably, the short 
temporal distance between “catching the flight” and “missing the flight” made the 
counterfactual “I could have caught the plane” more available. Similar effects were 
documented by other research featuring temporal proximity (Macrae et al., 1993), 
spatial proximity (Johnson, 1986; Miller & McFarland, 1986) and numerical 
proximity (Medvec, Gilovich, & Madey, 1995; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997, Turnbull, 
1981). 
More direct evidence for the effect of outcome closeness on counterfactual 
availability comes from Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran (1992) and Roese and Olson 
(1996, Study 3). In both studies, participants wrote down more spontaneous 
counterfactual thoughts in a free-style thought-listing task after reading a story in 
which a factual outcome was temporally close to its alternative (e.g., apartment 
ravaged by fire three days, as opposed to six months, after someone signed up the 
insurance policy but forgot to send it), indicating outcome closeness triggered 
counterfactual simulation. The relationship between outcome closeness, 
counterfactual thinking and emotions will receive further scrutiny in this thesis. It is 
argued that, besides counterfactual activation, the degree of certainty or uncertainty 
in the counterfactual generated also plays an important part in the relationship 
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between outcome proximity and emotions. This point will be elaborated in Section 
1.3 
1.2.3 Emotional Consequences of Counterfactual Thinking 
One of the reasons why psychologists are interested in counterfactual 
thinking is that, like those comparison anchors introduced in Section 1.1, 
counterfactuals can affect one’s judgments and attitudes towards past events. 
Moreover, Markman and McMullen (2003) suggested that the introduction of a 
counterfactual comparison anchor can result in two opposing effects. “Contrast 
effects occur when judgments are displaced away from a comparison standard, 
whereas assimilation effects occur when judgments are pulled toward a comparison 
standard” (p. 245).  
Recall an aforementioned study by Sherif et al. (1958), which found that the 
same weight tended to be judged lighter if the judge had lifted a weight that was 
heavier than the weight being judged prior to the judgment, compared to if such an 
intervention was absent. This finding illustrates a contrast effect following the 
introduction of a comparison anchor (i.e., the heavier weight). However, in the same 
study, it was also found that when the weight of the comparison anchor was close to 
(but still heavier than) the weight that was being judged, an opposite pattern would 
occur. That is, the same weight tended to be judged heavier when preceded with a 
heavier comparison anchor than when the anchor was absent This finding illustrates 
an assimilation effect.  
The two effects of a comparison anchor might also emerge in the context of 
social judgments. Markman and McMullen (2003) gave a vivid illustration that “a 
moderately attractive individual” among “highly attractive people” could be judged 
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either less attractive (contrast effect) or more attractive (the assimilation effect) (p. 
245). In a similar way, the mental construction of counterfactual representations, 
could also result in these two effects, the evidence for which will be reviewed 
separately in the next two sub-sections 
1.2.3.1 Contrast Effect 
Section 1.1 has reviewed the psychological effects of several psychological 
reference points on one’s retrospective evaluations and emotional experiences. Those 
effects reflect the general principle of the contrast effect. That is, the favourability of 
an event or status is judged higher when it surpasses a comparison standard and 
judged lower when it falls short. The early findings regarding the psychological 
consequences of counterfactual thinking concur with this principle. It was believed 
that the emotional reactions after counterfactual thinking could be understood by 
considering the direction of comparison (Roese 1994, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995, 
1997). While comparing reality to a more desirable alternative can worsen one’s 
mood (upward counterfactual comparison), comparing reality to a less desirable 
alternative can improve one’s mood (downward counterfactual comparison). To 
illustrate, getting a B in a maths test may look less attractive if someone realizes that 
he/she could have got an A instead, eliciting negative emotions like dissatisfaction or 
disappointment. By comparison, getting a B may look more attractive if someone 
realizes that he/she could have got a C instead, eliciting positive emotions like relief 
and gratefulness.  
Direct evidence of the contrast effect comes from the study by Markman et 
al. (1993), in which the players of blackjack were found to report more negative 
affect after tying the dealer if a better alternative was made salient than if a worse 
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alternative was made salient. Similarly, in two experiments by Roese (1994), 
participants were asked to recall a negative event from their memory and half of the 
participants were subsequently instructed to imagine how things could have been 
better while the other half how things could have been worse. It was found that the 
participants in the former group reported poorer ratings on affect than the latter 
group.  
Other evidence for the contrast effect comes from research on near-misses 
(Johnson, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Macrae et al., 1993; Meyers-Levy & 
Maheswaran, 1992; Miller & McFarland, 1986). Most notably, Medvec and her 
colleagues (Medvec et al., 1995; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997) demonstrated what was 
called the satisfaction reversal, where the people who objectively performed better 
in a sports competition or an academic examination did actually feel worse. For 
example, in two of their experiments (Medvec & Savitsky, 1997, Study 2 and 3), 
students who got an exam score that was close to the boundary for a higher grade 
reported lower levels of satisfaction than those whose score was in the same grade 
but close to the boundary for a lower grade. The two authors argued that this is 
because being close to a better grade provoked the students to think about how things 
could have been better while being close to a worse grade provoked the thinking 
about how things could have been worse.  
1.2.3.2 Assimilation Effect 
Despite the accumulating evidence for the contrast effect after counterfactual 
thinking, doubts have been casted on whether the contrast effect alone is adequate to 
explain the emotional reactions to counterfactual thinking (Markman & McMullen, 
2003). Those doubts could be partly due to the evidence for the assimilation effect 
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found in other related areas of comparative thinking. For example, the Affective 
Expectation Model (AEM) (T.D. Wilson, Lisle, Kraft, & Wetzel, 1989) posits that 
the contrast effect only occurs when the discrepancy between the actual experience 
and a prior expectation is noticed. When the discrepancy between the two is trivial 
and unnoticed, the experience will be pulled toward prior expectations. That is, 
sometimes, people see what they expected to see. In one of their studies, it was found 
that people rated a cartoon video clip funnier if they had been led to believe that the 
cartoon was funny beforehand than if such an intervention was absent.   
Similar findings also arose from research on attitude change, temporal 
comparison and social comparisons.  For example, in their account of Social 
Judgment Theory, Sherif and Hovland (1961) postulated that when a persuasive 
message falls within the “latitude of acceptance”, it is more likely to be judged as 
being closer to one’s own viewpoint than it actually is (assimilation effect). 
However, if the message falls in the “latitude of rejection”, persuasion is unlikely 
due to the contrast effect. A.E. Wilson and Ross (2001), on the other hand, found 
that people can maintain a favourable self-image by “disparaging their distant and 
complimenting their recent past selves” (p. 572), presumably because a comparison 
anchor that is temporally far away from the present (distant self) is more likely to 
provoke the contrast effect while a comparison anchor that is temporally close to the 
present (recent self) is more likely to provoke the assimilation effect. It was also 
found that sometimes upward social comparisons (comparing oneself with other 
individuals that are better-off in social or economic status or superior in abilities) can 
be self-enhancing (Collins, 1996) and downward social comparisons self-deflating 
(Lockwood, 2002), both reflecting a quality of the assimilation effect.  
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Some real life observations also led researchers to question the single contrast 
effect prediction regarding the psychological impact of counterfactual thinking. 
Famously, McMullen (1997) cited the real life incident of the crash of USAir Flight 
427. The researcher noted that those air passengers, who had bought tickets for that 
flight but didn’t get on the plane, invariably expressed negative emotions like fear 
and anxiety when interviewed by the media after the incident.  Those emotional 
reactions violated the principle of the contrast effect, which would predict that those 
lucky survivors of USAir Flight 427 should feel positive because a downward 
counterfactual comparison has been made salient to them (i.e., “I feel lucky because 
I could have been killed.”). Instead, their emotional reactions seemed to indicate the 
prevalence of the assimilation effect (“I feel terrible because I could have been 
killed.”). 
In attempt to account for the psychological underpinnings of the contrast and 
assimilation effects in the presence of a comparison ancher, Mussweiler (2003) 
proposed the Selective Accessibility Model, which posits that evaluating a target 
(e.g., the athletic ability of the self) against a comparative standard (e.g., a highly 
athletic classmate) may render accessible in memory either the standard-consistent 
information relevant to the evaluation target (e.g., “Like him/her, I also have won a 
few races before”) or the standard-inconsistent information (e.g., “I haven’t won as 
many races as him/her did before”). The activation of the standard-consistent 
information gives rise to the assimilation effect, whereas the activation of the 
standard-inconsistent information gives rise to the contrast effect. While this model 
can explain why the assimilation and contrast effects can occur in the context of self 
evaluations or social comparisons, it is unable to account for why the two effects can 
arise in the context of counterfactual thinking - It is difficult to conceive how 
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constructing a counterfactual comparison standard (e.g., “I could have been killed in 
the air crash) can activate target-relevant information from memory.  
Markman and McMullen (2003), on the other hand, proposed the Reflection 
and Evaluation Model of Comparative Thinking (REM), according to which the 
relative strengths of the contrast and assimilation effects are determined by the extent 
to which people engage in either a “reflection” mode of mental simulation or an 
“evaluation” mode. The argument follows that the assimilation effect will be 
enhanced (i.e., positive emotions following upward counterfactual thinking and 
negative emotions following downward counterfactual thinking) when people adopt 
a reflective or experiential “as if” mode of mental simulation which involves 
“vividly simulating that information about the comparison standard is true of, or part 
of, the self” (p. 248). On the other hand, the contrast effect will be enhanced (i.e., 
negative emotions following upward counterfactual thinking and positive emotions 
following downward counterfactual thinking) when people adopt an evaluative mode 
of mental simulation, which is characterized by “the use of information about the 
standard as a reference point against which to evaluate reality” (p. 248). Compared 
to the Selective Accessibility Model (Mussweiler, 2003), the REM makes the novel 
proposition that when evaluating the self or an event against a comparison standard, 
“standard–consistent cognitions need not be based in fact. Instead, they may be 
imagined” (p. 248). This proposition may explain why the affective experiences of 
the lucky passengers of the incident of USAir Flight 427 seemed to mainly reflect 
the quality of the assimilation effect. That is, instead of appreciating the difference 
between the reality and a worse possible world (e.g., “I could have been killed but 
I’m still alive!”), they immersed themselves in the imagination of what could have 
been (e.g., “What if I had been killed”?).  
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McMullen (1997) provided direct evidence for the REM by instructing 
participants to recall recent events from memory and think of either better or worse 
alternatives to those events. The assimilation effect was enhanced when participants 
were asked to focus on the counterfactual alone (reflection) while the contrast effect 
was enhanced when they were asked to focus on the difference between the real 
event and the counterfactual event (evaluation).  
Some contextual factors can also influence the activations of the two 
simulation modes. For example, as predicted by the REM, reflective simulation 
should be more likely when the evaluation of one’s performance is based on the 
quality of the process via which an outcome is achieved instead of the valence of the 
outcome itself. In a study by Markman and Tetlock (2000), participants were asked 
to make an investment decision between two stocks. They received feedback 
afterwards about the performance of the stock they had chosen in relation to the 
other stock. Evidence for the dominance of the assimilation effect was found when 
participants were told that the experimenter was going to evaluate the quality of their 
decision making by the reason they used to come to the decision (process 
accountable condition). Participants were in a better mood and more satisfied when 
the chosen stock was beaten by a small margin than by a big margin but they were in 
a worse mood and less satisfied when the chosen stock beat the unchosen stock by a 
small margin than by a big margin. However, this effect was not found when the 
participants were told that their decision was going to be evaluated on the grounds of 
the performance of their stock.  
In summary, the existing research has demonstrated that counterfactual 
thinking is primarily activated by negative affect or outcome proximity while the 
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semantic content of counterfactual thinking is primarily determined by the normality 
of antecedents. What’s more, counterfactuals might affect people’s emotional 
reactions to past events via either a contrast effect or an assimilation effect, to the 
extent that people engage in an evaluative simulation or a reflective simulation. 
However, as noted by some recent research (e.g., Petrocelli, Sherman, & Tormala, 
2011; Sanna & Turley-Ames, 2000), what seems to be missing from the current 
research is the notion that counterfactuals differ not only in the extent of their 
activation but also in their strength. The present thesis focuses on one potential 
factor that influences the strength of a counterfactual, which is the degree of 
certainty (or uncertainty) that people assign to a particular counterfactual possibility, 
namely, counterfactual probability.   
1.3 Uncertainties in Counterfactual Thinking 
1.3.1 Counterfactual Activation versus Counterfactual Certainty 
Most of the previous research on the determinants of event mutability (or 
counterfactual availability) has exclusively focused on the factors that activate 
counterfactual thinking. For example, in a typical study that examined the antecedent 
of counterfactual thinking and its emotional consequences (e.g., Meyers-Levy & 
Maheswaran 1992; Roese & Olson, 1996, 1997), participants were firstly exposed to 
the manipulation of a potential variable that affects counterfactual generation (e.g., 
outcome closeness). Then their spontaneous thoughts were recorded in a free-style 
thought-listing task. The number of counterfactual thoughts generated by each 
participant were then counted and treated as an indicator of the extent to which the 
counterfactual simulation had been activated. However, questions have been raised 
whether the activation of counterfactual thinking process alone can fully account for 
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counterfactual availability. As Sanna and Turley-Ames (2000) have found out, 
people who generate the same amount of counterfactual representations do not 
necessarily experience equally intense emotions, suggesting that counterfactual 
representations may differ not only in the extent of activation but also in strength. 
Research on semi-factuals also renders a similar indication. Compared to a 
typical counterfactual representation in which both the factual outcome and one of its 
antecedents are mutated to a counterfactual state (e.g., “If I had put more effort into 
my revision, I would have passed the examination.”), a semi-factual only mutates the 
antecedent, leaving the factual outcome in status quo (e.g., “Even if I had put more 
effort into my revision, I would still have failed the examination.”)(Byrne, 2007). 
Counterfactuals and semi-factuals both indicate a mental departure from reality, and 
hence, an activation of counterfactual thinking. However, they end up at completely 
different destinations – one confirms the mutability of a past outcome while the other 
disconfirms it. Further evidence suggests that inducing people to generate upward 
“even-if” semi-factual thoughts following a negative outcome could actually 
improve one’s psychological well-being (McCloy & Byrne, 2002), which is the 
opposite to what is expected from the generation of an upward “only-if” 
counterfactual representation. 
Thus, it seems that the availability of a counterfactual can still be weak even 
if the counterfactual has been mentally constructed (i.e., counterfactual activation). 
There might be therefore some other properties of a counterfactual that contribute to 
the strength of its psychological impact. The metaphor of “distance” has been 
adopted by some philosophers (e.g., Bennet, 2003; Lewis, 1973) as well as 
psychologists (e.g. Kahneman, 1995) to describe the relationship between reality and 
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its counterfactual worlds. “There is a compelling intuition that some counterfactual 
alternatives are ‘closer’ to reality than others and that the close alternatives are more 
available and therefore more likely to evoke counterfactual emotions such as 
frustration or regret” (Kahneman, 1995, p. 385). As one might notice, there is an 
inherent connection between the conception of “distance” and the subjective 
certainty or probability. The expression of “a remote possibility” might bear the 
meaning that the possibility in question is improbable while “a close possibility”, on 
the other hand, might mean a very probable one. The two concepts are so closely 
related to each other in human reasoning that sometimes people directly infer 
probabilities from distances (Teigen, 1998, 2005). Thus, the strength of a 
counterfactual possibility could partly be determined by the degree of certainty or 
subjective probability that people assign to it.  
Certainty has already been identified as an important property of the 
comparison standard of future expectancies (Olson et al., 1996). The way that people 
express their expectations often reflects a particular degree of belief (e.g., “It will 
rain tomorrow” reflects a higher degree of certainty or belief than “It might rain 
tomorrow”). Similarly, people can assign different levels of certainty towards 
counterfactuals, which might be important to the subsequent judgment of affect. It is 
worth noting that, like expressions of future expectancies, almost all counterfactual 
statements are probabilistic in nature and reflect different levels of belief. For 
example, the counterfactual thought “If I had studied hard in high school, I would 
have entered college” might reflect a higher certainty or a stronger belief in the 
counterfactual world than “If I had studied hard in high school, I might have entered 
college”.  
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Kahneman and  Tversky (1982) argued that one of the primary functions of 
counterfactual simulation is to assess the credibility of counterfactual assertions. For 
example, to evaluate the credibility of the counterfactual assertion “If Nazi Germany 
had developed nuclear weapons, the outcome of World War II would have been 
changed”, people would need to run a mental simulation in which Nazi Germany has 
indeed developed nuclear weapons and the ease with which the factual outcome of 
the war can be undone is assessed. Thus, apart from the mental generation of a 
counterfactual, the credibility or the certainty that people assign to that 
counterfactual possibility is also important for the availability of the counterfactual. 
When pressed, one can use one’s imaginations to think of numerous alternatives 
possibilities to a past outcome. However, it is those alternatives which are deemed 
probable or credible that may have the strongest implications for one’s emotional 
experiences.  
The importance of the credibility in a counterfactual was stressed by Gleicher 
et al. (1990), who proposed that counterfactual thinking consists of four basic stages. 
Firstly, a negative or unusual outcome motivates people to contemplate on the 
alternative outcomes to reality. This stage clearly refers to the activation of the 
counterfactual simulation process. Secondly, possible routes which could lead to the 
alternative outcomes are imagined. In this stage, counterfactual representations are 
established. Thirdly, the likelihoods of the occurrence of the counterfactual outcomes 
are estimated. Finally, affective experiences are determined by the likelihoods of the 
counterfactuals. If the likelihoods of the counterfactual outcomes are high, the actual 
negative outcome will be deemed mutable and the initial emotional reaction to the 
negative outcome will be worsened. If the likelihoods of the counterfactual outcomes 
36 
 
are low, the actual negative outcome will be deemed inevitable and the initial 
emotional reactions will be attenuated.  
To illustrate, consider the story of John (Roese & Olson, 1995, p. 10), who 
had a long night drinking and failed an exam the next day. The adverse outcome 
would motivate John to think about the alternative to the reality (i.e., “Could I have 
passed if I had done something differently?”). The exceptional antecedent of 
drinking would come forward as a likely candidate for mental mutation. However, 
the mental simulation does not end there. The plausibility of the counterfactual has 
not yet been evaluated. John may ask the question “If I had not got drunk the other 
night, would I have passed the exam?” The answer to this question could be crucial 
to his subsequent emotional reactions. Suppose John had a good record of academic 
performance and had been doing revision for the exam for weeks. In this case, it 
seems plausible to think he could have passed the exam if he had not got drunk. 
Thus, the actual outcome (i.e., failing the exam) will look mutable and the negative 
emotional reactions will be intensified. However, suppose John had a history of 
difficulty with the subject before or did not quite prepare for the exam. The thought 
“Even if I had not got drunk, I would have still failed” might easily slip into mind, 
which will make failing the exam look inevitable and the negative emotional 
reactions will be eased.  
Although these early theorizations have emphasized the importance of the 
certainty in a counterfactual representation to the determination of its availability and 
emotional consequences, little research has followed these recommendations and 
provided empirical evidence, except for a recent study by Petrocelli et al. (2011), 
who proposed that the counterfactual potency of an “if-then” counterfactual 
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conditional is jointly determined by two likelihood judgments – the likelihood of the 
mutation of the antecedent (if-likelihood) and the likelihood of the mutation of the 
actual outcome, given the antecedent is mutated (then-likelihood). For example, the 
potency of the counterfactual “If I had not got drunk, I would have passed the exam 
the next day” would depend on the judgments about “How likely was it that I did not 
get drunk?” and “How likely was it that I could have passed the exam given that I 
had not got drunk?”.  
In one of their experiments, participants read a tragic story of Mr Jones, who 
was severely injured in a traffic accident on his way home from work. They were 
then asked to write down one, three or five “if-only” thoughts, using the details 
provided by the story. More importantly, they rated the if-likelihood and the then-
likelihood for each of the counterfactual conditionals they had generated. The 
counterfactual potency was then calculated by multiplying the two likelihoods. For 
participants who generated multiple counterfactuals, a combined counterfactual 
potency was calculated by averaging the counterfactual potencies for all 
counterfactuals. It was found that the counterfactual potency significantly predicts 
the judgment of affect for Mr Jones, (i.e., the higher the counterfactual potency, the 
more intensely Mr Jones was judged to experience negative emotions like regret, 
bitterness and disgust) but the number of generated counterfactuals did not. To our 
knowledge, their work provided the first piece of evidence that the degree of 
certainty in a counterfactual plays an important role in one’s subsequent emotional 
reactions.   
However, Petrocelli et al. (2011) focused exclusively on the contrast effect 
when examining the emotional impacts of counterfactual potency. Also, it is still 
38 
 
unclear from their results how people actually make each of the two likelihood 
judgments. The present thesis addresses these limitations. More specifically, it 
provides a systematic investigation on the determinants and consequences of 
counterfactual certainty. However, as an indicator of counterfactual certainty, we 
favour the use of the term “counterfactual probability” which has been used in 
research on subjective probability by Teigen (1998) over the term “counterfactual 
potency”. We believe counterfactual probability better captures the uncertain nature 
of counterfactual thinking and in this thesis it is used to refer to either a conditional 
probability (e.g., “If I had studied hard, how likely could I have passed the exam?”) 
or an unconditional probability (e.g., “How likely could Brazil have won the 1998 
world cup?”).  
The remaining sections of the chapter will first give a brief introduction to 
counterfactual probability judgments and then review the theories and the findings 
regarding its determinants and consequences. New predictions will be developed 
based on those findings and the content of the next three experimental chapters will 
be sketched out.  
1.3.2 An Introduction to Counterfactual Probability Judgments 
Teigen (1998) has used the term counterfactual probability to refer to the 
subjective likelihood of an event or an outcome that did not actually happen. For 
example, for John who survived a train crash, the counterfactual probability 
judgment would be the likelihood of him being killed while in fact he survived. 
Counterfactual probability could either be conditional (e.g., “If John had missed that 
train, how likely could he have been killed in the train crash?”) or unconditional 
(e.g., “How likely could John have been killed in the train crash?”).  
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It is worth noting that to-date counterfactual probability judgment is a subject 
that has been rarely explored in psychology (for exceptions, see Over, 
Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007; Teigen, 1998, 2005), probably 
because, as retrospective probability judgments, they are deemed less useful than 
prospective ones. Probability estimates regarding future occurrences can directly 
inform decision making.  For example, knowing the probability of whether it will 
rain in the afternoon will help us with the decision whether or not to carry an 
umbrella heading out. In contrast, it is less obvious what benefit it would be to know 
today whether the probability of rain yesterday was high or low. Yesterday is now 
history and we already know whether it rained or it didn’t and whether we got caught 
without an umbrella if it did. However, counterfactual probability judgments might 
be able to instruct decision making indirectly by influencing prospective probability 
judgments since future predictions are frequently based on past experiences (Feeney 
& Heit, 2007). Research on gambling has found that near-win outcomes encourage 
persistent gambling behaviour (Dixon, Nastally, Jackson, & Habib, 2009; Gilovich 
& Douglas 1986). This may be because the perception that “My likelihood of 
winning was high” can be translated into “My likelihood of winning is high” 
(McMullan & Markman, 2002). What’s more, as argued in the last section, 
counterfactual probability judgments are crucial to the credibility and hence the 
emotional impact of counterfactual representations.  
As a retrosptive evaluation, counterfactual probability judgments may 
involve mental time travel (Over et al., 2007; Teigen, 1998). When people infer 
counterfactual probabilities, they might simply wind back the clock to a particular 
temporal position in the past and make prospective judgments as if the outcome of an 
event did not occur or was unknown. Thus, the statement “His/her probability of 
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being killed in the train crash was very high” while he/she actually survived simply 
means that at some point in the past, his/her probability of being killed was very 
high.  
It can be practically difficult to make an accurate calculation of this type of 
probability. For example, to infer the counterfactual probability of a person A being 
killed in a train crash, one might need to firstly decide which temporal point one 
should mentally travel back to in order to make that judgment (e.g., before person A 
boarded the train or before person A chose a seat to sit down). Then, to make a 
prospective probability judgment at that particular temporal point might require one 
to consider the frequency of train crashes in the past as well as their death tolls. One 
might also need to list different possible scenarios in which person A was actually 
killed in the train crash as well as those in which person A actually survived, assign a 
probability to each of these scenarios and integrate those probabilities into a global 
evaluation. Nonetheless, counterfactual probability judgments in real life seem to 
occur frequently, quickly and effortlessly (Teigen, 1998), indicating that people’s 
judgments of this type of probability in everyday life mostly rely on intuitive 
estimations rather than deliberate calculations. As will be elaborated in the next 
section, estimations of counterfactual probability might be reached by the frugal 
strategy of mental simulation and they might be susceptible to event cues in the 
causal script of an outcome like proximity and progression. 
1.3.3 The Determinants of Counterfactual Probability Judgments 
We’ll start the discussion of the determinants of counterfactual probability 
judgments by introducing a type of event which has been fascinating researchers in 
counterfactual thinking for years. That is, the events that people refer to as “near-
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misses” or “close-calls”, which often spawn “close counterfactuals” like “It nearly 
happened” or “It almost happened” (e.g., Kahneman & Varey, 1990; McMullen & 
Markman, 2002; Miller et al., 1990). One common characteristic of near-misses is 
that they always implicate a counterfactual outcome. To say “John was nearly killed 
in the train crash” implies that “John could have been killed if something different 
had happened”. Another characteristic of near-misses, which is the reason why it 
particularly interests the current thesis, is that they also indicate a high counterfactual 
probability. That is, a near-miss does not only indicate a possible alternative to the 
reality, it also indicates a very probable one. As argued by Kahenman and Varey 
(1990), the use of word “almost” or “nearly” must be backed-up by a high perception 
of propensity or probability of a focal outcome that did not happen. Thus, to say 
“John was nearly killed in the train crash” implies that it was very likely that John 
could have been killed. Hence, near-misses can be regarded as the “extreme cases” 
in counterfactual thinking, where counterfactuals are the most credible, robust and 
impactful. To understand how people establish counterfactual probability judgments, 
a natural first step is to examine when people qualify an outcome as a near-miss.  
An important observation from Kahneman and Varey (1990) is that a close 
counterfactual can be justified by a high perception of propensity, which refers to 
people’s online judgments of the subjective probability of the occurrence of a target 
outcome as the causal episode unfolds itself. For example, a spectator of a football 
match may make judgments about the chance of his/her team winning during the 
course of the game. This perceived likelihood may go up and down depending on the 
events that occur during the game (e.g., the team taking a lead). According to the two 
authors, the propensity of the counterfactual outcome (e.g., “the team winning”) 
must be very high during the course of the development of the event for a statement 
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“Outcome X almost happened” to be valid. Two cues were proposed to be important 
to the perception of propensity – proximity and progression. It is speculated that the 
counterfactual probability should be closely related to the perception of propensity 
and its judgment should also be susceptible to these two event cues. 
1.3.3.1 Proximity and Counterfactual Probability Judgment 
There could be various factors underpinning people’s qualification of near-
misses or close-calls. However, one important factor is indicated by the name itself. 
That is, an alternative must be “near” or “close” to the reality by some measure. As 
noted by Roese and Olson (1995), the psychological perception that “something was 
close to happening” can be derived from the physical or the temporal distance that 
separates the reality and its alternatives. For example, avoiding being hit by an 
incoming car by a few inches (physical proximity) and missing a flight by just a few 
minutes (temporal proximity) can both be qualified as near-misses. Other cues like 
numerical proximity (e.g., failing an examination by one point) could also give rise 
to the perception of closeness.  
As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, proximity has already been identified as a 
factor in the activation of counterfactual thinking. It is possible, however, that 
proximity could also heighten counterfactual probability judgments and hence 
enhance people’s certainty in the counterfactuals that are constructed earlier in the 
process. This proposition has its theoretical roots in research on intuitive judgments. 
The heuristic and biases approach towards judgments in uncertainty (Gilovich, 
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) posits that when 
people are asked to make judgment about a less accessible attribute (e.g., the 
probability of a specified outcome in a complex event), they often replace the 
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attribute in question with another more accessible attribute and use it as a proxy from 
which the assessment on the target attribute is inferred. This is called attribute 
substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the attributes being substituted are 
called heuristics. For example, as demonstrated by Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, 
Layman, and Combs (1978), when making a judgment about the frequency of death 
from a specific cause (e.g., suicide), people may use what’s called the availability 
heuristic and base their frequency judgments on how easily instances of death from 
that cause can be retrieved from memory. Thus, a person with a recent experience or 
being recently exposed to the media coverage about the death from that cause might 
rate the frequency quite high. 
Instead of being retrieved from memory, the instances of a target event can 
also be constructed in mind via mental simulation. For example, in a risk-
assessment, one might evaluate how likely it is that things will go wrong by 
assessing how easily a scenario can be imagined where things do go wrong. This 
evaluation strategy was called the simulation heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982). Carroll (1978) found evidence that asking participants to imagine the 
occurrence of an event (e.g., a person winning a presidential election or a football 
team performing well in a season) could raise their subjective probability of that 
event occurring (for similar findings see Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982). A 
more recent study by Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, and Reynolds (2002) 
provided stronger evidence for the simulation heuristic, in which it was not only 
demonstrated that letting people imagine a scenario which is easy to imagine can 
heighten one’s probability judgments regarding that scenario, but also that letting 
people imagine a scenario which is difficult to imagine can actually lower one’s 
probability judgments.  
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The simulation heuristic might also be adopted in the case of counterfactual 
probability judgments, where the ease with which a counterfactual scenario can be 
imagined is used as a heuristic to the probability of the occurrence of that particular 
counterfactual scenario. For example, to evaluate the credibility of the counterfactual 
assertion “If I had not got drunk the night before the examination, I would have 
passed it”, people would run a mental simulation in which they indeed did not get 
drunk and the ease with which the factual outcome can be undone is assessed. The 
shorter the distance between the real outcome and the counterfactual outcome, the 
less effort people have to devote in order to mentally mutate the real outcome to its 
counterfactual states. Thus, proximity to a counterfactual outcome should be able to 
heighten retrospective probability estimates regarding that counterfactual outcome. 
In an aforementioned study by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), the majority of 
participants judged that a man who missed his flight by five minutes would be more 
upset than another man who missed by 30 minutes, despite the fact that their 
outcomes were identical and they both expected to miss the flight. It was argued by 
the author that it is easier to imagine how a man could have arrived at the airport five 
minutes earlier than 30 minutes earlier. More direct evidence for the proximity-
counterfactual probability judgments relationship comes from a study by Tykocinski 
and Steinberg (2005), in which participants were presented with a story that was 
similar to the flight-missing scenario. It was found that the likelihood of arriving at 
the airport on time was judged higher if one missed the flight by 10 minutes rather 
than 50 minutes.   
It should be noted that the assessment of the ease of the construction of a 
counterfactual does not require the observer to actually engage in the mental 
simulation. Event cues like outcome proximity could suffice the judgment about how 
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easy or difficult an imaginary world can be brought to mind. Teigen (1998, 2005) 
proposed what is called the proximity heuristic, which is a frugal strategy where 
people use information of outcome proximity to directly inform their counterfactual 
probability evaluation.  In his studies, the proximity-counterfactual probability 
judgment relationship was still robust even if little detail was given to the 
participants regarding the development of a story other than the proximity of the 
final outcome. For instance, in one study, the following scenario was presented to the 
participants in one group: 
Bjarne and Gunnar are top-level cross-country skiers who 
have competed for many years. It is difficult to say 
whether one is better than the other. Before an important 
race Bjarne feels especially energetic and on top form. It 
turns out that he wins the 30km race ahead of Gunnar by 
some tenths of a second. After the race he thinks: 
What was my probability of being beaten by Gunnar 
today?    
The participants rated the question on a 9-point scale and were then presented 
the second part of the story: 
Suppose he had won with a margin of several minutes. Do 
you think he would have estimated the probability of being 
beaten by Gunnar as: lower/higher/the same.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Only 25% of the participants expressed that the chance would be the same, 
indicating that counterfactual probability judgments were affected by the information 
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of outcome closeness. Interestingly, the same study also found that the reliance on 
proximity cues seems to be a unique feature for counterfactual probability judgments 
because the participants in another group who were asked to estimate the probability 
of the factual outcome (i.e., likelihood of Bjarne beating Gunnar) exhibited a weaker 
suscepitability to the information of winning margines.  
In his other study featuring numerical distances, participants were presented 
the results of a handball game between the national women’s handball teams of 
Norway and Germany. It was found that participants gave higher ratings on 
counterfactual probabilities (i.e. Could have won/lost) when the team lost or won by 
a small margin (23-24/24-23) than by a large margin (20-25/25-20).  
A limitation of existing research is that the judgmental tasks that were 
assigned to the participants featured only unconditional counterfactual probability 
judgments. It is expected that people should make conditional counterfactual 
probability judgments in a similar way because the simulation heuristic might be 
used in both types of judgments. However, empirical evidence for this speculation is 
undoubtedly needed. This limitation will be addressed by the research reported in 
Chapter 2. Another limitation, more importantly, is that the previous research has 
exclusively focused on how people infer probability from a single, static distance 
cue, while the possibility was left unexplored that people can also infer probability 
from the way the distance changes over time. This point is elaborated in the next 
section. 
1.3.3.2 Progression and Counterfactual Probability Judgment 
Research on the determinants of counterfactual probability judgments has 
been so far restricted to the situation where only a single cue of proximity is 
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available for the judgment of probability (e.g., in Teigen’s 1998 experiment only the 
difference in the final results between the two skiers were given for people to infer 
counterfactual probability). However, in real life, as an event unfolds, the spectators 
or the experiencers may receive feedback that is far richer than the mere end results 
and that feedback may influence their perception of proximity and their 
counterfactual probability judgments as well.  
As noted by Kahneman and Varey (1990), besides proximity, there is another 
cue which is very important for the judgment of propensity, which is the sense of 
progression towards the focal outcome. A sense of progression might be derived 
from variations in proximity. For example, shrinking distance might provoke a sense 
that one is moving towards the goal, which will inflate one’s judgment of propensity 
and counterfactual probability. On the other hand, expanding distance might provoke 
a sense that one is moving away from the goal, which will deflate probabilistic 
judgments. For example, during the race of the two skiers in Teigen’s (1998) 
experiment, the gap between them might have been increasing or decreasing. This 
dynamic feedback on their proximity throughout the race could also contribute to the 
perception that one skier almost or nearly won in the end. 
The sense of progression can also be derived from the shrinking of causal 
distance. For example, if a gambler needs to draw five cards from a deck with 
identical suits in order to win, every card that’s been drawn matching the suit of the 
previous card would provoke a the sense that the player is getting closer to winning. 
In the case of causal distance, the effect of progression could therefore manifest itself 
as a temporal order effect. That is, counterfactual probability estimates might be 
higher if the decisive event in the causal sequence comes later rather than earlier. 
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The effect of progression on counterfactual probability has not yet been 
tested by previous research and will be one of the focuses of the present thesis.  
1.3.4 Emotional Consequences of Counterfactual Probability 
The counterfactual probability judgment is believed to be an indicator of the 
credibility of a counterfactual. It is expected that a counterfactual with high 
probability should result in more intense emotional reactions compared to the same 
counterfactual with low probability. As noted in Section 1.3.1, Petrocelli et al. 
(2011) has provided evidence that counterfactual probability estimates are good 
predictors for one’s negative emotional reactions to upward counterfactuals. 
However, as argued earlier, this finding only covers the situation when the contrast 
effect is dominating one’s affective experiences.  
The REM (Markman & McMullen 2003) discussed in Section 1.2.3.2 posits 
that either the contrast or the assimilation effect can dominate one’s affective 
experience after counterfactual thinking to the extent that the evaluative (i.e., 
comparing the reality with what might have been) or the reflective (i.e., imagining 
what might have been as if it was true) simulation mode is adopted. In line with the 
proposition of the REM, we therefore adjusted the predictions regarding the 
emotional consequences of counterfactual probability judgments in the following 
way: An increase in counterfactual probability judgment should enhance both the 
contrast and the assimilation effect of a counterfactual comparison standard. When 
people take a reflective mode of mental simulation, the assimilation effect should be 
dominating one’s affective experiences and thus counterfactual probability 
judgments should be positively related to one’s emotional reactions in the case of 
upward counterfactual thinking but be negatively related to one’s emotional 
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reactions in the case of downward counterfactual thinking. On the other hand, when 
people take an evaluative mode of mental simulation, the contrast effect should be 
dominating one’s affective experiences and thus counterfactual probability 
judgments should be negatively related to one’s emotional reactions in the case of 
upward counterfactual thinking but be positively related to one’s emotional reactions 
in the case of downward counterfactual thinking.  
1.4 Summary of Chapter 1 and Overview of the Experimental Chapters 
The present thesis emphasizes the critical role of counterfactual reference 
points in people’s appraisals of past events and their subsequent emotional reactions. 
We embrace the idea that the psychological impacts of counterfactuals are mediated 
by the counterfactual probability judgments that are assigned to them. The 
predictions regarding counterfactual probability judgments are summarised in Figure 
1.1. Firstly, the two event cues that had been proposed by Kahneman and Varey 
(1990) to be crucial to judgments of propensity and counterfactual probability – 
proximity and progression, were examined by the present thesis. Higher 
counterfactual probability estimates were expected to be documented when (1) the 
real outcome is close to, rather than far away from an alternative state; and (2) when 
the event has been progressing, rather than not progressing towards a focal outcome.  
Meanwhile, the emotional consequences of counterfactual probability 
judgments were examined in the framework of the REM (Markman & McMullen, 
2003). Higher counterfactual probability judgments should lead to more intense 
contrast and assimilation effects in one’s emotional reactions. The thesis tested 
people’s temporal perspective as a potential moderator of the relative strengths of the 
two effects. According to the REM, the absence of future possibility (i.e., when an 
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outcome is decisive or unchangeable) should promote an evaluative simulation mode 
and therefore enhance the contrast effect whereas the presence of future possibility 
(i.e., when an outcome is indecisive or changeable) should promote a reflective 
simulation mode and therefore enhance the assimilation effect (the rationale behind 
this prediction is outlined in Section 2.1).  
These propositions were tested in six experiments presented in the next three 
chapters. The experiments reported in Chapter 2 investigated the psychological 
consequences of being proximate to a counterfactual outcome. It was expected that 
the total effect of outcome proximity on emotions would be moderated by people’s 
temporal perspective. More importantly, this moderated total effect should be partly 
explained by people’s counterfactual probability judgments.  
 
 
Contrast 
Effect 
Assimilation 
Effect 
Proximity Progression 
Counterfactual 
Probability 
Judgment 
 
Affect 
 
Figure 1.1 Summary of Predictions 
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The experiments reported in Chapters 3 and 4, on the other hand, investigated 
the impacts of progression on counterfactual probability judgments and emotions. 
Progression was operationalized in Chapter 3 by adjusting the pattern of the variation 
in the perceived proximity to a focal outcome over the course of an event and in 
Chapter 4 by altering the temporal position of the decisive antecedent in a causal 
chain. Again, the total effect of progression on emotions was expected to be 
moderated by people’s temporal perspective and this moderated total effect should 
be partly explained by people’s counterfactual probability judgments.  
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Chapter 2 The Effect of Proximity on Counterfactual Probability 
Judgments and Emotions 
2.1 Introduction 
The research reported in the present chapter investigates the mediating role of 
the counterfactual probability judgment in the relationship between outcome 
proximity and emotions. The benefit of this investigation is two-fold: Firstly, it 
provides explanations to the existing findings regarding the emotional impact of 
outcome closeness from a probabilistic point of view. Secondly and more 
importantly to the research purpose of this thesis, the mediation analysis gives us an 
insight into the determinants and the emotional consequences of counterfactual 
probability judgments. This section will begin with a brief review of the literature on 
the subject of outcome closeness and emotions, which is followed by a discussion 
about the mediating role of the counterfactual probability judgment in this 
relationship. Relevant predictions as well as the layout of the experiments will be 
summarised at the end of this section.   
2.1.1 Emotional Consequences of Being Close 
The sense that “something was close to happening” is a powerful 
psychological phenomenon. A good illustration is the classic scenario study cited 
earlier in Section 1.2.2 from Kahneman and Tversky (1982), where Mr Tees, who 
missed his flight by five minutes, was judged by the majority of the participants to be 
more upset than Mr Crane, who missed his flight by half an hour. Other research also 
reported similar findings suggesting that people’s emotional reactions to a factual 
outcome will be worsened (or improved) when the outcome is temporally (Macrae et 
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al., 1993; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992), physically (Miller & McFarland, 
1986) or numerically proximate (Medvec & Savitsky, 1997) to a more (or less) 
desirable counterfactual state.  
These findings were largely discussed and explained within the conceptual 
framework of counterfactual thinking. It was believed that being proximate to an 
alternative outcome prompts people to think about the counterfactual alternatives to 
the real world (see Section 1.2.2 for a review). These counterfactual representations, 
which are provoked as comparison standards against which the reality is being 
evaluated, give rise to the affective contrast effect (Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 
1994, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). Thus, being close to a desirable but unrealized 
outcome, which encourages people to compare the reality to what could have been 
better (i.e. upward counterfactual comparison), worsens one’s initial emotional 
reactions to the real outcome by bringing about negative emotions like frustration 
and disappointment. On the other hand, being close to an undesirable but averted 
outcome, which encourages people to compare the reality to what could have been 
worse (i.e. downward counterfactual comparison) improves one’s mood, by bringing 
about positive emotions like relief and thankfulness. The early evidence reviewed in 
the previous paragraph is consistent with this general principle. 
Nonetheless, more recent research and theorizing has highlighted an 
alternative way people may react emotionally to close counterfactuals – through the 
affective assimilation effect whereby people focus on the consequences or the 
implications of actually having experienced the counterfactual event (Markman & 
McMullen, 2003; Markman & McMullen, 2005, Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 
2008; Markman, McMullen, Elizaga, & Mizoguchi, 2006; Markman & Tetlock, 
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2000; McMullen, 1997; McMullen & Markman, 2000; McMullen & Markman, 
2002). In the aforementioned real life incident of USAir Flight 427 (McMullen, 
1997), the emotional reactions of the lucky survivors of the air crash didn’t seem to 
be dominated by happiness or belief derived from the downward counterfactual “I 
could have been killed”. On the contrary, such a salient downward counterfactual 
seemed to have plunged them into a state of deep fear and anxiety, which indicates 
the prevalence of the affective assimilation effect.  
As introduced in Section 1.2.3.2, the mental simulation processes 
underpinning the contrast and assimilation effects have been formalised by Markman 
and McMullen (2003) within the Reflection and Evaluation Model (REM). In this 
unified model of comparative thinking the contrast and assimilation effects are 
produced through two distinct forms of mental simulation – evaluation is 
characterized by “the use of information about the standard as a reference point 
against which to evaluate the reality” (p. 248) whereas reflection involves “vividly 
simulating that information about the comparison standard is true of, or part of, the 
self” (p. 248). 
Within this framework, Markman and McMullen (2003) proposed a number 
of factors that influence the relative strength of the evaluative and reflective 
simulation processes including the temporal perspective - which is the focus of 
interest in this chapter.  The temporal perspective refers to “whether an event is 
perceived as a final and completed event or as part of a series of events that will 
continue into the future” (p. 256). If an event or an outcome is perceived to be final, 
the future possibility to change the outcome is closed and people might be 
encouraged to focus on the past implications of a counterfactual, which is the 
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difference between the reality and the counterfactual comparison standard (e.g., “I 
could have got a higher/lower grade but I didn’t”). This should evoke evaluative 
simulation, enhance the contrast effect and bring about disappointment or relief. On 
the other hand, if an event is perceived as part of a series of events that will continue 
into the future, the future possibility to change the outcome remains open and people 
might be encouraged to focus on the future implications of a counterfactual, which 
are the possibilities that the counterfactual signals for the future (e.g., “I could have 
got a higher/lower grade and I will next time”) (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Gleicher et 
al., 1995; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994, 1997, 1999; Roese & Morrison, 2009), 
which should evoke reflective simulation, enhance the assimilation effect and bring 
about hopefulness (Roese & Olson, 1995) or fearfulness (McMullen & Markman, 
2000). 
There is a small body of research which has shown that people’s temporal 
perspective, can influence counterfactual generation and have consequences for 
affect (Boninger, Gleicher, & Strathman, 1994; Markman et al., 1993; McMullen & 
Markman, 2002; Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990; Sanna, 1997). However, the findings 
have not provided definitive support for the predictions derived from the REM that 
contrast effects are weakened or reversed by assimilation effects when future 
possibilities remain open.  
Markman et al. (1993) for example found that when the outcome of a 
blackjack game (tying the dealer) was not final and participants were given a chance 
to repeat the game they tended to generate upward “if-only” counterfactuals and 
were less satisfied with the outcome of the game, compared to if they had not been 
given a chance to repeat the game, in which case participants tended to generate 
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downward counterfactuals and feel more satisfied. The authors argued that people 
strategically generate upward counterfactuals to prepare for the future when 
possibility for future improvement is still present and generate downward 
counterfactuals to enhance emotions when possibility for future improvement is 
absent. A later analysis showed a negative correlation between emotions and the 
proportion of upward counterfactual statements participants generated, suggesting a 
strong contrast effect.  
The reason why the assimilation effect was not found in the blackjack 
experiment could be that the counterfactuals in this case failed to raise people’s 
expectations for future winning. Research by Sanna (1997) implied that the 
repeatability effect may depend upon people’s expectations of performing well or 
poorly on the second try. In their study participants who had high self-efficacy 
towards an anagram task actually felt better by generating upward counterfactuals 
then downward counterfactuals when the anagrams were repeatable – a finding 
which is indicative of the affective assimilation effect. 
Indeed, to trigger a strong assimilation effect in emotion, an event has to be 
perceived as being not only repeatable but also achievable. The blackjack game may 
have failed to provide a strong signal that the players had the potential to win 
subsequent rounds. Such a signal, however, can be compelling after close outcomes. 
As noted by McMullan and Markman (2002), a close counterfactual like “I almost 
did it” or “I almost failed” could be easily translated into “I will do it/I could fail 
next time”. This feature could make emotional reactions after close outcomes 
especially prone to affective assimilation.  
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In their second study, McMullen and Markman (2002) provided participants 
with a play-by-play account of a basketball game and were asked to imagine they 
were the supporters of one of the two teams. The two teams ended up either with 
very close scores (1-point difference) or scores that were far apart (15-point 
difference). A domination of affective contrast was observed when participants were 
told they were reading the account of the second half of the game (low future 
possibility) - the supporters of the losing (or winning) team reported worse (or better) 
moods if the scores were very close than if it was a blow out. However, the reverse 
pattern was found when the participants were told they were reading the account of 
the first half of the game (high future possibility), where a domination of affective 
assimilation emerged – the supporters of the losing (or winning) team reported worse 
(or better) moods if the scores were a blow out than if they were very close. Also 
intriguingly, they found that the assimilation effect at half-time was strong enough to 
cause the team which was one point ahead to feel worse than the team which was 
one point behind - an “assimilation-based satisfaction reversal”, as opposed to the 
“satisfaction reversal” caused by the contrast effect that has been found in the often 
cited studies by Medvec and her colleagues (Medvec et al., 1995; Medvec & 
Savitsky, 1997) (see Section 1.2.3.1). 
Although the results of this study support the temporal perspective hypothesis, 
they are open to alternative interpretations. To be more specific, the assimilation 
effect found in the half-time condition might be the result of the confounding effect 
of the teams’ objective situations. Taking the losing team in the first half for instance, 
the fact that the players who were one point down at half time were judged to feel 
more positive than the players who fell behind by a lot could be simply due to that 
the players in the former case were objectively better off – they had smaller gap to 
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close between their score and the opponent’s in the second half and, hence, 
objectively, had better chance to win the game than the players in the latter case. 
This limitation is addressed in the three experiments presented in this chapter. 
The scenarios in those experiments (Experiment 1 – football (soccer) game; 
Experiment 2 – Job entry examination; Experiment 3 – TV game show) were 
configured in such a way that closeness did not indicate the objective chance of 
achieving a desirable or undesirable outcome in the future. More importantly, the 
previous findings are also developed by investigating the mediating role of 
counterfactual probability judgments in the predicted effects of proximity and future 
possibility on emotions, as elaborated in the next section.  
2.1.2 The Mediating Role of Counterfactual Probability Judgments 
Although it has been widely accepted that outcome proximity influences 
people’s emotional experiences through the mental process of counterfactual 
thinking (see Roese & Olson, 1995 for a review), it is not entirely clear in what way 
counterfactual thinking is linking outcome proximity and emotions. Indeed, 
participants were found to have written down more counterfactual thoughts after 
reading a story where the distance that separated reality and its alternatives was set to 
be short rather than far (Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; Roese & Olson, 1996, 
Study 3). However, it is doubtful that the counterfactual activation alone could fully 
account for the emotional consequences of the outcome proximity because people 
could react strongly or weakly to the same counterfactual (Sanna & Turley-Ames, 
2000).  
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As emphasized earlier in Section 1.3, one aspect of counterfactual thinking 
that seemed to be neglected by the previous researchers is that counterfactuals differ 
in credibility or strength. For example, the statements “If I had studied harder, I 
might have gone to college” and “If I had studied harder, I would have gone to 
college” implicate the same counterfactual world (i.e. “I went to college”) but they 
clearly reflect different degrees of belief and certainty in this counterfactual 
imagination. The emotional impacts of a particular counterfactual could partly rest 
on the degree of belief or certainty that people assign to it. For example, the 
counterfactual thought “I would have gone to college” should stir up more intense 
emotional reactions than “I might have gone to college”. Counterfactuals only 
indicate unrealized possibilities. Only those which are considered probable would 
have significant psychological impacts.  
Thus, it is possible that the relationship between outcome proximity and 
emotions are mediated by counterfactual probability judgments. First of all, being 
proximate to an alternative outcome could heighten one’s counterfactual probability 
judgment regarding that outcome. As reviewed in Section 1.3.3.1, this proposition 
has already received support from Teigen (1998, 2005) as well as Tykocinski and 
Steinberg (2005), who observed increased counterfactual probability judgments 
when the actual outcome got temporally, physically, or numerically proximate to an 
alternative state.  
Secondly, the heightened counterfactual probability judgment should have an 
effect on one’s emotional experiences. As introduced in Section 1.3.1, Petrocelli et 
al., (2011) have found in their studies that counterfactual probability judgments 
positively predicted participants’ judgments of negative affect (e.g., regret, disgust). 
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However, their results may have only shown one side of the coin. That is, they only 
demonstrated a contrast-dominant relationship between counterfactual probability 
judgments and emotions. According to the REM, the heightened estimates of 
counterfactual probability after a close outcome should have dual effects on one’s 
affective experiences. On one hand, the past implications of a counterfactual will 
give rise to the contrast effect. That is, a high probability estimate regarding a 
desirable alternative outcome will be deemed as a sign of a lost opportunity and 
therefore worsen one’s emotional experiences (e.g. “We had a good chance of 
winning but we lost!”) and a high probability estimate regarding an undesirable 
alternative outcome will be deemed as a sign of an averted misfortune (e.g. “I had a 
big chance of being killed but I’m still alive!”) and therefore improve one’s 
emotional experiences. On the other hand, the future implications of a counterfactual 
will give rise to the assimilation effect. That is, a high probability estimate regarding 
a desirable alternative outcome signifies hopes and will therefore improve one’s 
emotional experiences (e.g. “We had a good chance of winning and we will!”) and a 
high probability estimate regarding an undesirable alternative outcome signifies 
threats (e.g. “I had a good chance of being killed and I will be!”) and will therefore 
worsen one’s emotional experiences.  
Given a particular counterfactual, the rise in the counterfactual probability 
estimate should lead to the rise in the strengths of both the contrast effect and the 
assimilation effect. However, the net output of this counteraction, as predicted by the 
REM, should be determined by the level of future possibility. When future 
possibility is low, people should focus on the past implications of a counterfactual, in 
which case the contrast effect should be enhanced and dominate one’s affective 
experiences as a result of the evaluative simulation. Thus, the probability estimate of 
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an upward counterfactual (downward counterfactual) should be negatively 
(positively) related to one’s emotions. In comparison, when future possibility is high, 
people should focus on the future implications of a counterfactual, in which case the 
assimilation effect should be enhanced and dominate one’s affective experiences as a 
result of the reflective simulation. Thus, the probability estimate of an upward 
counterfactual (downward counterfactual) should be positively (negatively) related 
to one’s emotions. 
2.1.3 Summary of Predictions 
Overall, we have the following predictions regarding the emotional 
consequences of near-miss incidents and its underlying mechanisms, which are 
summarised by Figure 2.1 and 2.2. First of all, it was predicted that the overall effect 
of the perceived proximity to a focal outcome on affect (by path c in Figure 2.1) 
depends on the level of the perception of future possibility. The contrast effect will 
be enhanced and dominate one’s affective experiences when the future possibility is 
low (i.e., being proximate to a desirable outcome should worsen one’s mood while 
being proximate to an undesirable outcome should improve one’s mood) while the 
assimilation effect will be enhanced and dominate one’s affective experiences when 
the future possibility is high (i.e., being proximate to a desirable outcome should 
improve one’s mood while being proximate to an undesirable outcome should 
worsen one’s mood) This proposition was tested in all three of the experiments 
presented in this chapter. What’s more, Experiment 3 also tested whether the 
“assimilation-based satisfaction reversal” (McMullen & Markman, 2002) would 
arise when future possibility is high as a result of the affective assimilation, where 
people who are objectively worse off but perceive themselves to be close to a 
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desirable state are predicted to feel better than those who are objectively better off 
but perceive themselves to be close to an undesirable state.  
The predicted total effect of proximity on emotions should be explained in 
part by the mediating effect of counterfactual probability. This mediating effect, 
which should also be moderated by the perception of future possibility, was denoted 
by path ab in Figure 2.2. First of all, proximity to a focal outcome should heighten 
people’s counterfactual probability estimates (path a, Figure 2.2). In turn, 
counterfactual probability estimates should exert effects on one’s emotional 
experiences (path b, Figure 2.2), the nature of which should be determined by 
perceived future possibility.  
c 
Proximity Affect 
Future possibility 
c’ 
b a 
Proximity Affect 
Counterfactual 
Probability 
Estimates 
Future possibility 
Figure 2.2 Total Effect of Proximity on Affect Moderated by Perceived 
Future Possibility 
Figure 2.1 Mediating Effect of Counterfactual Probability Estimates Moderated 
by Perceived Future Possibility 
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More specifically, when the perception of future possibility is low, the 
contrast effect should dominate one’s affective experience. Thus, the higher the 
counterfactual probability estimates regarding a more desirable alternative than the 
reality, the more negative the emotional reactions should be. In comparison, the 
higher the counterfactual probability estimates regarding a less desirable alternative 
than the reality, the more positive the emotional reactions should be. These patterns 
should be reversed when the perception of future possibility is high, where the 
assimilation effect is dominating one’s affective experience. That is, the higher the 
counterfactual probability estimates regarding a more desirable alternative than the 
reality, the more positive the emotional reactions should be. In comparison, the 
higher the counterfactual probability estimates regarding a less desirable alternative 
than the reality, the more negative the emotional reactions should be. Finally, the 
path c’ denotes the direct effect of proximity on affect, when the mediating effect of 
counterfactual probability estimates is controlled for. The mediating role of 
counterfactual probability estimates in the relationship between proximity and 
emotions (path ab in Figure 2.2) was partially tested in Experiment 1 and fully tested 
in Experiments 2 and 3.  
Finally, Experiments 1 and 2 also tested the existence of an attention-
switching mechanism, which is critical to the proposed moderating role of the 
perception of future possibility but has not been tested by the previous research. That 
is, after a near-miss incident, the presence of future possibility should divert people’s 
attention from the past implications of a counterfactual (the difference between what 
could have happened and what did happen) to its future implications (What can 
happen in the future).  
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2.2 Experiment 1 
This experiment tested the effect of perceived future possibility on people’s 
emotional reactions to close outcomes. It also tested whether proximity to a focal 
outcome would heighten one’s estimates of counterfactual probability and whether a 
future possibility encourages people to divert their focus from the past implications 
of the counterfactual after a near-miss incident to its future implications.  
Participants were presented with a short story, which depicted a near-miss 
incident during a football (soccer) match – that is, one team gets very close to 
scoring a goal but fails to do it. Because the proximity to scoring (or conceding) a 
goal should heighten the counterfactual probability estimates of the players, it was 
predicted that the sense “things could have been better” (upward counterfactual 
thinking) should be more salient for the attackers who were close to scoring a goal 
while the sense “things could have been worse” (downward counterfactual thinking) 
should be more salient for the defenders who were close to conceding a goal.    
The past implications of those probable counterfactuals would be a missed 
opportunity for the attacking team (“We could have scored a goal but we didn’t!”) 
but an averted misfortune for the defending team (“We could have conceded a goal 
but we didn’t!”). Meanwhile, those highly probable counterfactuals also have 
implications for the future. The sense “We could have scored a goal” should lead to 
the expectation that “We will score goals” and “We will win”, while the sense “We 
could have conceded a goal” should lead to the expectation that “We will concede 
goals” and “We will lose”.  
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The past implications of the probable counterfactuals should give rise to the 
affective contrast effect, bringing about negative emotions to the attackers (e.g., 
frustration) but positive emotions to the defenders (e.g., relief), while their future 
implications should give rise to the affective assimilation effect, bringing about 
positive emotions to the attackers (e.g., hopefulness) but negative emotions to the 
defenders (e.g., fearfulness). It was predicted that the degree to which the past-
oriented contrast effect and future-oriented assimilation effect impacted on the 
emotional experiences of the players would depend upon the timing of the near-miss 
incident during the game. When the near-miss occurs at the end of the game (future 
possibility low - FP: Low), people should focus on the past implications of the near-
miss and the emotional experiences of the players should be dominated by the 
contrast effect. Thus, participants should judge that the attackers (who almost scored 
a goal) would feel worse than the defenders (who almost conceded a goal). However, 
this pattern should be reversed when the near-miss incident occurs at the beginning 
of the game (future possibility high - FP: High), when people focus more on the 
future implications of the near-miss. In this case, the assimilation effect should be 
promoted and override the contrast effect.  
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Design. 
The experiment took a between-participant design in which the effect of the 
independent variable Future Possibility (FP: High/Low) on participants’ judgments 
of affect was tested. 
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2.2.1.2 Participants 
Thirty five Durham University students (16 males, 18 females and 1 failed to 
report gender) were recruited in the lounge of the university library. The experiment 
was run in a small group of two to five and participants were paid £3 to take part. 
2.2.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were given an oral briefing 
about the purpose and the basic procedure of the experiment. They were told that the 
experiment was to investigate how people respond to successes and failures and their 
task involved reading a short story and answering some questions afterwards. They 
were also offered opportunities to raise any questions before commencing the 
experiment. If they agreed to proceed, a questionnaire was handed to them, which 
consisted of a consent form as a cover page, a short story and some follow-up 
questions. Participants were asked to sign the consent form before they moved on to 
read the story.  
There were two versions of the story corresponding to the two levels of the 
independent variable (FP: High/Low). Prior to the experiment, a random sequence 
was generated by a computer, consisting of two digits (0 and 1). The different 
versions of the questionnaires were distributed to the participants according to this 
random sequence, where 0 denoted FP: Low condition and 1 denoted FP: High 
condition.  The story for FP: High condition read as follows: 
The Brazilian National Championships Série A is the 
highest division of Brazilian football, which is composed of the 
20 most competitive football clubs in the country. Football teams 
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Flamengo and Sao Paulo are both the top clubs in the 
championships. They are now confronting each other in the 
national stadium and the game is about to begin. It is hard to 
predict which team will win because both teams showed top form 
in previous matches against other opponents. According to the 
rules set by the Brazilian Football Confederation, the team who 
wins the match obtains 3 points and the team who loses obtains 
none. If the scores are tied at the end of the full time (90 minutes 
plus injury time), the game ends in a draw, in which case both 
teams obtain 1 point. Since Flamengo and Sao Paulo currently 
hold equal points in the championship ranking table and it is near 
the end of the season, the result of this match will be critical to 
both teams.  
After kicking-off, both teams have managed to exert some 
pressure on the opponent’s defense line but no real threat was 
caused by either team. Now it is roughly eight minutes into the 
first half of game and the scores are still 0-0.  
Flamengo starts to build up their attack on the edge of the 
opponent’s penalty area. They are showing excellent skills and 
teamwork. The defense line of Sao Paulo is torn apart while the 
Flamengo midfielder Lenon breaks into the penalty area with the 
ball. Lenon then passes the ball to his teammate Adriano (striker 
of Flamengo), who is currently in a good shooting position.  
Adriano gives it a powerful shot. But the ball hits the goal post 
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and is deflected back into the pitch. A Sao Paulo defender clears 
the ball. The scores remain 0-0.   
The story in the FP: Low condition was the same in every aspect except for 
that the italicized part was replaced by “Now the game has entered injury time of the 
second half and it will be roughly two minutes before the referee ends the whole 
game. The scores are still 0-0.” 
Immediately after reading the story, participants were asked to make a 
judgment of the global affective states of the players:  
Which players do you think are in a better mood right now? ____ 
A) The players of Flamengo              B) The players of Sao Paulo 
Then participants were asked to provide open-ended reasons for their choices 
(which were coded according to whether they reflected a focus on the past or future 
implications of the near-miss): 
 Could you tell us why you think they are in a better mood? 
Participants’ counterfactual probability estimates were measured by two 
questions: 
At this moment, one of the players is thinking: “things could have been 
better.” Who do you think it is? ____  
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
At this moment, one of the players is thinking: “things could have been 
worse.” Who do you think it is? ____ 
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A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
To check whether the participants had a grasp of the key elements of the 
story, participants were asked to choose the players of which team would be more 
likely to think “we almost scored a goal” and which team would be more likely to 
think “we almost conceded a goal”.  
The questionnaire also included some measures whose purpose digress from 
the main theme of the thesis and hence were not introduced in the main body of the 
thesis. However, a complete sample of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 
A.   
The experimenter left the participants to work on the questionnaires by 
themselves. After around 15 minutes, the experimenter returned and collected the 
finished questionnaires. Participants were debriefed in a written form and were paid 
and thanked for their contribution to the study. 
2.2.2 Results 
2.2.2.1 Comprehensibility Check 
All participants (N=35) reported that the content of the story, the instructions 
as well as the questions were easy to understand. Moreover, 97% of the participants 
(34 out of 35) thought the players of Flamengo (the attacking team who nearly 
scored a goal) were more likely to think “We almost scored a goal” and 86% of the 
participants (30 out of 35) thought the players of Sao Paulo (the defending team who 
nearly conceded a goal) were more likely to think “We almost conceded a goal”.  It 
was concluded that all participants understood the story quite well and no action was 
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taken to exclude any case from the analysis due to the problem of the 
comprehensibility of the story or the questions
1
. 
2.2.2.2 Affect 
As predicted the results showed that participants’ global affect judgments 
were significantly affected by the future possibility manipulation. A significantly 
higher proportion of participants thought Flamengo (the attacking team who nearly 
scored a goal) would be feeling better than San Paulo (the defending team who 
nearly conceded a goal) in the FP: High condition (goal nearly scored/ conceded 8 
minutes into the first half of the game) than the FP: Low condition (goal nearly 
scored/ conceded 2 minutes from the end of the game): χ2(1, N=35) = 5.04, p = .025, 
w = .38. Moreover, the proportion of participants who chose San Paulo dropped from 
a significant majority of 76.5% (13 out of 17, χ2(1, N=17) = 4.77, p = .029, w = .53) 
in the FP: Low condition to a non-significant minority of 38.9% (7 out of 18, χ2(1, 
N=18) = 0.89, p = .346, w = .22) in the FP: High condition. The result therefore 
supports the suggestion that the contrast effect, which dominates the affective 
experience when the near-miss occurs at the end of the game, is cancelled out, 
although not overridden, by the rise of the assimilation effect when the near-miss 
incident occurs at the beginning of the game. 
                                                             
1 Although there were a few participants gave erroneous answers to one of the two questions (e.g. 
chose Flamengo to be the team who are more likely to think “we almost conceded a goal”), all of 
these erroneous choices conflicted with their own for the other question (e.g. chose Flamengo as 
the team who is more likely to think “we almost scored a goal” and the team “we almost conceded a 
goal” at the same time). Thus, it was believed that the reason for those incorrect responses might be 
that the participants had difficulties in understanding the meaning of the phrase “conceded a goal” 
in the second question or other errors other than the poor understanding of the story. Since there 
was no participant giving incorrect answers to both of the two questions, it was concluded that all 
the participants understood the story quite well.  
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2.2.2.3 Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
Because being proximate to a focal outcome would heighten one’s 
counterfactual probability estimates regarding that outcome, being close to a 
desirable state should provoke the sense that “things could have been better”, while 
being close to a undesirable state should provoke the sense that “things could have 
been worse”. The results confirmed this prediction.  Regardless of FP conditions, the 
majority of participants (28 out of 35 participants, 80%) thought the players of 
Flamengo were more likely to think “things could have been better” than of Sao 
Paulo, χ2(1, N=35)=12.60, p<.001, w=.60; On the other hand, the majority of 
participants (32 out of 35 participants, 91.4%) thought the players of Sao Paulo were 
more likely to think “things could have been worse” than of Flamengo, χ2(1, 
N=35)=24.03, p<.001, w=.83. 
2.2.2.4 Attention Focus 
One assumption that underlies the proposed effect of future possibility is that 
people’s focus is switched from the past to the future implications of a highly 
probable counterfactual. Evidence for this attention-switching mechanism was 
obtained from participants’ responses to the open-ended question, which were coded 
by the two authors into one of three categories (see Table 2.1 for examples): Past 
implication (what did happen or what could have happened in the past); Future 
implication (the impacts of the counterfactual on the players’ confidence or their 
perceived chance of scoring or winning); Others (neither of the two former 
categories). The coders were blind to experimental conditions and their inter-coder 
reliability was high (Agreement = 91.4% and Cohen’s Kappa = 85.5%). 
Disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
72 
 
Table 2.1 Examples of Coding Categories used in Content Analysis 
Category Examples 
Past Implication Because they (Sao Paulo) nearly lost the game at the last 
minute but didn’t. The Flamingo players will be annoyed they 
missed the last chance 
 They (Sao Paulo)manage to get 1 point out of a game they 
could have lost 
 Because they (Sao Paulo) were close to losing in the last few 
minutes and they stayed strong and defended. 
 They (Sao Paulo)have weathered an offensive play without 
conceding a goal 
Future 
Implication 
They (Flamengo) gained the advantage, breaking the defense 
showing it can be done scoring the opponents. Though they 
missed, they know it can be done . 
 Despite having narrowly missing the target their team 
(Flamengo) effort was successful at breaking through the 
defense and taking a shot. This would give confidence to try to 
do it again. Also Sao Paolo may be nervous from the near miss 
and frustrated because of being outmaneuvered by the 
opposition. 
 Whilst most of the game was even, the slight edge in better play 
at the end for the Flamengo players will allow then to feel they 
are the better side and give a psychological boost going into 
other games, and for the remainder of this game 
 Because they (Flamengo) shows promising signs of winning the 
match. Their team is on the offense and with high spirits may 
well have another attack 
Others Because they (Flamengo)are in the fighting mode, which makes 
Sao Paulo get in a panic 
 They (Flamengo) are showing excellent skill and teamwork. 
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It was predicted that a higher proportion of future-implication statements and 
a lower proportion of past-implications statements should be found in the FP: High 
condition compared to the FP: Low condition. The data supports this prediction – a 
significantly higher proportion of future perspective responses were found in FP: 
High (9 out of 18, 50%) than FP: Low (1 out of 17, 6%) (χ2(1, N=35) = 8.34, p 
= .004, w = .49), while a significant lower proportion of past perspective responses 
were found in FP: High (7 out of 18, 39%) than FP: Low (13 out of 17, 77%) (χ2(1, 
N=35) = 5.04, p = .025, w = .38).  
2.2.3 Discussion 
The experiment provided an initial demonstration of the moderating effect of 
perceived future possibility on the emotional reactions to close outcomes.  In a 
football match, after one of the teams came close to scoring a goal, participants’ 
judgments of affect regarding the players of the two teams were dependant on the 
temporal position in the game when the near-miss incident occurs – a domination of 
the contrast effect was only observed when the near-miss was said to have occurred 
at the late stage of the match (i.e., the perception of future possibility was low).  
Some components of the proposed psychological mechanism behind the 
observed effect of future possibility were also put to test in the experiment. First of 
all, the proposition that proximity would lift one’s counterfactual probability 
estimates received support from the results. Being close to a desirable state provoked 
the thought “things could have been better”, while being close to an undesirable state 
provoked the thought “things could have been worse”. Secondly, the presence of 
future possibility was found to have encouraged people to cast their eyes into the 
future. In participants’ free responses, more statements reflecting future perspectives 
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and less statements reflecting past perspectives towards the close counterfactuals 
were recorded when the future possibility was high than low.  
Nonetheless, there are a few limitations about the study that need to be noted. 
First of all, although the results indicate that the presence of future possibility 
enhanced the strength of the assimilation effect when the near-miss occurred at the 
beginning of the game, the effect did not seem to be strong enough to reverse the 
contrast-effect-dominated emotional experience when future possibility was low. 
However, this could be partly due to the low power of the chi-square test applied to 
our categorical data. Thus, higher level of measurements should be introduced in 
future experiments to allow for more powerful statistical tests to be applied. 
Secondly, participants’ counterfactual probability estimates were not measured 
explicitly, which renders the results open to other interpretations. For example, there 
is ambiguity in the two questions measuring counterfactual probability judgments 
whether they actually measures counterfactual probability estimates or 
counterfactual activations. Finally, the mediating effect of counterfactual probability 
estimates has not been tested using formal statistical procedures. The applications of 
those statistical procedures will also require emotions and counterfactual probability 
estimates to be measured in a more refined manner.  
2.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 provided an initial demonstration how the perception of future 
possibility moderates people’s emotional reactions to outcome closeness. Evidence 
was also found that the proximity to a focal outcome (e.g. scoring a goal in a football 
match) lifted people’s estimates of counterfactual probability and the presence of 
75 
 
future possibility switched one’s focus from the past implications of a counterfactual 
following a near-miss incident to its future implications.  
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate those findings and examine the proposed 
psychological mechanism under the moderating effect of future possibility more 
comprehensibly. To be more specific, Experiment 2 employed more refined 
measures of emotions and counterfactual probability estimates (e.g., affective states 
were measured by multi-item scale with nine levels of measurement for each item), 
which allowed the mediating role of counterfactual probability estimates to be tested 
by a parametric statistical method. What’s more, to fill a gap in existing research on 
the proximity-counterfactual probability relationship, this experiment investigated 
people’s conditional, rather than unconditional, counterfactual probability judgments. 
For simplicity, the experiment exclusively focused on the situation where a desirable 
goal is narrowly missed and upward counterfactuals are prominent. 
In the experiment, participants were asked to imagine themselves as a 
graduate student who spends his/her whole evening in a bar and fails a job-entry 
examination the day after. Note that the exceptional antecedent (i.e., “drinking in the 
bar”) featured in the story would enable us to phrase the question regarding the 
counterfactual probability judgment as a conditional one (e.g., “How likely could 
you have passed the examination if you hadn’t spent so much time in the bar”). 
Proximity was manipulated by varying the numerical distance between the student’s 
marks and the passing benchmark (1 point versus 45 points). The perception of 
future possibility was manipulated by granting or not granting a chance of resit in the 
story. 
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An interaction between proximity and future possibility on the student’s 
emotional experiences was predicted. More specifically, a domination of the contrast 
effect should be observed when future possibility is low. That is, the student should 
be judged to feel worse if he/she failed the examination by 1 point than if he/she 
failed by 45 points. However, this pattern should be reversed when the future 
possibility is high, where the assimilation effect should override the contrast effect 
and the student should be judged to feel better if he/she failed the examination by 1 
point than if he/she failed by 45 points.  
It was also predicted that the counterfactual probability estimates (i.e., the 
likelihood of passing the examination if not drinking) should mediate the effect of 
proximity on emotions and the nature of this mediation should be contingent on 
people’s perception of future possibility. Firstly, overall, probability should be 
judged higher if the student failed the examination by 1 point than 45 points. 
Secondly, this probability judgment should be negatively correlated with emotions 
(contrast-dominant) when future possibility is low but positively correlated with 
emotions (assimilation-dominant) when future possibility is high. This moderated 
mediation was tested by a method recommended by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 
(2007), the detail of which will be given in the results section. 
Finally, consistent with the finding of Experiment 1, it was predicted that the 
presence of future possibility should divert people’s focus from the past implications 
of the counterfactual (e.g. “I could have passed the examination but I didn’t”) to its 
future implications (e.g. “I can pass the examination”). 
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2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1 Design  
The experiment investigated the effects of two independent variables – 
proximity and perceived future possibility (FP) on counterfactual probability 
judgments and emotions. It adopted a 2 (Proximity: Close/Far) × 2 (FP: High/Low) 
between-participant design.   
2.3.1.2 Participants 
A total of 115 psychology undergraduates of Durham University were 
recruited to take part in the experiment. The experiment was run in three separate 
sessions on three different occasions. The sample for the first session consisted of 64 
first-year psychology undergraduates, who were recruited as participants during their 
induction lecture at the beginning of one academic term. The other two sessions took 
place one week later at two second-year research methods lectures, with 20 and 30 
psychology undergraduates respectively. All participants received participants’ credit 
in return and the ones in the last two sessions received additional monetary incentive 
(£3) for their contributions. One participant failed to respond to any question in the 
questionnaire and was excluded from the analysis, which left the sample with 114 
participants.     
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2.3.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
In the experiment, participants completed a questionnaire which consisted of 
(a) a consent form as the cover page and (b) two short stories with questions 
following each
2
. 
The first story depicted a graduate student who gets drunk in a bar and fails a 
job-entry examination the day after. Participants read one of the four versions of the 
story depending on conditions. Here is the story for the Proximity: Close/FP: Low 
condition: 
Please vividly imagine that you were applying for a job that you 
have been longing for. After the job interview, you were told that 
you had won the eligibility for the final entrance test. You would 
have to score at least 80 out of 100 points or your job application 
would be rejected.  
You only have one chance to pass the test. 
You had been preparing for the test for the whole month and you 
were planning to revise the whole material one last time the night 
before the test to “recharge” yourself. However, in the afternoon 
before the day of the test, you came across an old friend you 
hadn’t seen for quite a while on your way home from the library. 
You decided to buy him or her a drink in the local bar. Being 
aware that you would have a test the very next morning, you 
promised yourself to get back home no later than 7pm so you 
                                                             
2 The second story and its questions pertained to the experiment reported in Chapter 3.  
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could do some study before going to bed. However, you two were 
having such a good time that neither of you were ready to call it 
an end until very late. It was already midnight when you 
eventually got home. Being too tired to study, you slammed 
yourself into bed. 
You got up a little bit late the next morning. You grabbed your 
stuff and rushed out. You managed to arrive at the test venue on 
time and dashed onto your seat only seconds before the test began. 
You regained your breath and started working on the questions. 
Two hours later, you finished the test. 
You got the results one week later by mail. [You opened the mail 
only to find you’ve got 79 on your result sheet – you failed the 
test by 1 point.] Therefore your job application would be rejected. 
In the Proximity: Far condition, the words in square brackets were replaced 
by “You opened the mail only to find you’ve got 35 on your result sheet – you failed 
the test by 45 points”. In the FP: High condition, the two italicised sections were 
replaced in order by “You have two chances to pass the test. If you fail the test on 
your first attempt you will have a chance to resit the test 2 weeks later” and “But you 
would have a chance to take the resit 2 weeks later”.  
The story was followed by a number of questions. To measure participants’ 
temporal perspective (i.e., the extent to which their thoughts were oriented to the past 
implications of the counterfactual as opposed to its future implications), an open-
ended question was presented to participants where they were prompted to list five 
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thoughts that most easily came to their mind regarding what had happened in the 
story. 
Participants’ emotional responses were then measured by asking them to rate 
on 9-point scales (1=Not at all, 9=Extremely) the extent to which each of the 
following emotions had described their feelings after receiving the result of the exam: 
“happy”, “satisfied”, “pleased”, “delighted”, “content”, “relieved”, “glad”, “proud”, 
“determined”, “annoyed”, “frustrated”, “miserable”, “sad”, “depressed”, “gloomy”, 
“disappointed”, “guilty”, “regretful”.  The ratings were rescored from 0 (1=not at all) 
to -8 (9=extremely) for the negative emotions and 0 (1=not at all) to +8 
(9=extremely) for the positive emotions. Hence, on both positive and negative scales, 
0 represents a lack of emotion (neutrality) with higher scores representing better 
moods and lower scores worse moods.  
Afterwards, to provide complementary measures of people’s temporal 
perspective, the participants were presented with six statements and were asked to 
rate on 9-point scales how likely each of those thoughts would come to their mind 
given what had happened in the story (1=Extremely unlikely, 9=Extremely likely). 
As Table 2.2 demonstrates, among those statements, three reflected a focus on the 
past implications of the counterfactuals. The other three reflected a focus on their 
future implications. These thoughts were picked from the free-responses of a 
different group of participants in a pilot study conducted earlier which adopted the 
same scenario.  
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Table 2.2 Items for Measuring Temporal Perspective 
Category Statements 
Past-Implications 
1: If only I had studied the night before the test instead of 
having so many drinks. 
2: Why did my friend have to show up the night before the 
test? 
3: I shouldn’t have gone out with my friend. 
Future-Implications  
1: I nearly passed the test this time and I believe I will have 
a very good chance if a resit opportunity is given. 
2: It’s good to know I’ve got the potential to pass the test 
and I’m competent for the job. 
3: I feel bad because I don’t seem to be competent for the 
job. 
 
Participants’ counterfactual probability estimates were measured by asking 
them to rate on a 9-point scale as to “How likely you think you would have passed 
the test if you hadn’t spent so much time in the bar the night before?” (1=Extremely 
unlikely, 9=Extremely likely). 
To check if the manipulation on proximity was successful, participants were 
asked to rate how close or far away they were to passing the test (1=Extremely far 
away, 9=Extremely close)
3
.  
The questionnaire also included some measures whose purpose digress from 
the main theme of the thesis and hence were not introduced in the main body of the 
thesis. However, a complete sample of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.   
                                                             
3 Only the participants in the last two sessions (N=50) were presented with this question. 
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In all three sessions, the experimenter walked into the classroom at the end of 
a lecture and gave a brief introduction to the class as to the purpose (which was said 
to investigate how people respond to success and failure) and the procedure of the 
study. Then a questionnaire was handed out to each participant. After signing the 
consent form on the front page, participants moved on to read the first story. 
Participants were randomly assigned to four different conditions (Proximity: 
Close/Far x FP: High/Low) in a similar way as in Experiment 1. All participants 
worked on the questionnaire at their own paces. After they had all finished and 
handed in the questionnaire, the experimenter gave the whole class an oral debriefing 
about the theoretical background of the study. 
2.3.2 Results 
2.3.2.1 Manipulation Check 
To check if the manipulation on proximity was successful, 50 participants in 
the last two sessions rated how close or far away they were to passing the test 
(1=Extremely far away, 9=Extremely close). A proximity × future possibility (FP) 
two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of proximity on participants’ 
ratings (F(1,46) = 104.77, p < .001, r = .83). As Figure 2.3 demonstrates, the 
participants in the Proximity: Close condition perceived that they had been closer to 
passing the examination (M = 8.36, SD = 0.95) than those in the Proximity: Far 
condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.99).  
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Surprisingly, while the main effect of FP was not significant (F(1,46) = 3.22, 
p = .080, r = .26), the analysis found a significant interaction (F(1,46) = 11.33, p 
= .002, r = .45). As Figure 2.3 depicts, the difference in perceived closeness between 
the Proximity: Close and Far conditions was bigger in the FP: Low condition (F(1, 
20) = 105.79, p < .001, r = .92) than in the FP: High condition (F(1, 20) = 22.60, p 
< .001, r = .68). A simple main effect analysis further revealed that while 
participants’ perception of closeness in the Proximity: Close/FP: High condition did 
not significantly differ from that in the Proximity: Close/FP: Low condition (F(1, 26) 
= 2.94, p = .098, r = .32, the ratings in the Proximity: Far/FP: High condition was 
significantly higher than that in the Proximity: Far/FP: low condition (F(1, 26) = 
7.16, p = .015, r = .51). The reason for this interaction was unclear but it was 
Figure 2.3 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Perception of Closeness 
across all Conditions  
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speculated that some participants in the FP: High condition might have 
misinterpreted the question. That is, while the question was intended to measure their 
perception of closeness to passing the just-finished examination, they might have 
interpreted the question to be about their perceived closeness to passing the whole 
test, in which case the closeness to passing the resit might also be taken into account. 
This should have caused the overall ratings in the FP: High condition to be higher in 
the FP: Low condition. However, the ratings in the FP: High/Proximity: Close 
condition had already hit the upper end of the scale and thus could not be raised 
further due to a ceiling effect. Therefore, a significant interaction was observed. 
Overall, the manipulation of proximity was deemed to be successful because on each 
level of future possibility, proximity had significant effect on people’s perception of 
closeness.  
2.3.2.2 Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
Confirming the prediction, a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of proximity on counterfactual probability estimates (F(1,110) = 5.15, p = .025, 
r = .21) (see Figure 2.4). More specifically, participants reported higher 
counterfactual probability estimates (i.e., chance of passing) when they read that they 
failed the test by 1 point (M = 7.51, SD = 1.36) than if they failed by 45 points (M = 
6.89, SD = 1.46). Figure 2.4 suggested an interaction between proximity and FP – 
the effect of outcome proximity on counterfactual probability judgments appeared to 
be weaker in FP: Low than in FP: High condition. However, analysis revealed that 
this interaction was not significant (F(1,110) = 1.03, p = .312, r = .09). What’s also 
within expectation is that the main effect of FP was not significant (F(1,110) = 0.06, 
p = .813, r = .03).  
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Figure 2.5 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Affect Ratings 
across all Conditions 
Figure 2.4 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Counterfactual 
Probability Estimates across all Conditions 
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2.3.2.3 Affective States 
The 18-item affect measures yielded a high internal reliability (Cronbach’s α 
= .86). However, the item “determined” was found to be poorly correlated to the 
total score (r = .06) and was excluded from the scale. As a result, the internal 
reliability was improved (Cronbach’s α = .88). The scores of the remaining items 
were averaged as a measure of the global affective state of each participant. Figure 
2.5 shows the average levels of the global affective states across the four conditions. 
A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of future possibility (F(1,110) 
= 9.60, p = .002, r = .28). That is, overall, participants reported better mood when a 
chance of a resit was rendered (M = -2.25 SD = 0.95) than when it was not (M = -
2.81 SD = 0.98). This is unsurprising because generally, the failure in the FP: high 
condition should not be perceived as severe as in the FP: Low condition and thus 
should cause less intense emotional reactions.  
However, as shown by Figure 2.5, the data displays a pattern of interaction 
that is inconsistent with the prediction. When FP was low, instead of reporting worse 
mood as predicted, participants in the Proximity: Close condition reported better 
mood (M = -2.61, SD = 1.17) than those in the Proximity: Far condition (M = -3.01, 
SD = 0.73). When FP was high, on the other hand, instead of reporting better mood 
as predicted, participants in the Proximity: Close condition reported nearly as bad 
mood (M = -2.25, SD = 0.96) as those in the Proximity: Far condition (M = -2.25, SD 
= 0.95). Nevertheless, the analysis showed that this interaction was not significant 
(F(1,110) = 1.28, p = .261, r = .10). In fact, the mean affect ratings did not 
significantly differ with respect to the proximity manipulation in either the FP: Low 
(F(1,110) = 2.34, p = .132, r = .20) or the FP: High condition (F(1,110) < .01, p 
= .974, r < .01). The main effect of proximity on affect was not significant, either 
87 
 
(F(1,110) = 1.18, p = .280, r = .10). These results therefore fail to support the 
hypothesis that the presence of future possibility would enhance affective 
assimilation and the absence of future possibility would enhance affective contrast. 
Separate analyses on the means of positive emotions and negative emotions as well 
as on each individual emotion yielded the same pattern of results and hence they are 
not reported here. This is also the case for all other experiments reported in the thesis 
which use multi-item affect measure.  
2.3.2.4 The Mediating effect of Counterfactual Probability Estimates  
Because the overall effect of proximity on emotions was not significant in 
either the FP: Low or the FP: High condition, the hypothesis that counterfactual 
probability estimates mediates the effect of proximity on emotions was not supported. 
Thus, from this point on, counterfactual probability estimates will be treated as a 
potential intervening variable instead of mediating variable. As pointed out by 
Preacher and Hayes (2004, p. 719), “A mediated effect is usually thought of as the 
special case of indirect effects when there is only one intervening variable.” 
However, an independent variable (e.g., proximity) could exert indirect effects on a 
dependent variable (e.g., emotions) through several paths or intervening variables. 
Those indirect effects are not necessarily operating in the same directions and they 
could dilute the effects of each other and result in a null overall effect. Thus, in the 
present experiment, it is still possible that proximity did exert an indirect effect on 
emotions via the intervening variable of counterfactual probability estimates but this 
effect was washed out by other unidentified intervening variables. This possibility 
was examined by the strategy of coefficient product verified by bootstrapping, which 
is recommended by Preacher et al. (2007) as a method of testing conditional indirect 
effects (the indirect effect examined in our experiment is “conditional” because it 
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was predicted to be contingent on the different level of FP). Before this conditional 
indirect effect was tested, participants’ proximity conditions were coded as 0 (far) or 
1 (close) and their FP conditions were coded as 0 (FP: High) and 1 (FP: Low).  
Firstly, path a in Figure 2.2 was examined by running a simple regression on 
the proposed mediator (i.e., counterfactual probability estimates) with outcome 
proximity as the predictor. Confirming the earlier results of the two-way ANOVA 
analysis, it was found that outcome proximity significantly predict the counterfactual 
probability estimate (β = .21, t = 2.32, p = .022). Secondly, to investigate path b, a 
multiple regression was conducted on the dependent variable (i.e., emotions) with 
outcome proximity, counterfactual probability estimates, FP as well as the product of 
counterfactual probability estimates and FP as the predictors. The results in Table 2.3 
show that the product of counterfactual probability estimates and FP significantly 
predicted emotions, which implies an interaction between counterfactual probability 
estimates and FP on emotions. This also indicates that there was a conditional 
indirect effect of outcome proximity on emotions via counterfactual probability 
estimates.  
Table 2.3  Regression on Emotions 
Predictor  β t value p - value 
Constant - -2.83 0.006 
Proximity 0.15 1.77 0.080 
CTP 0.19 0.75 0.453 
FP 0.71 1.60 0.114 
CTP × FP -1.14 -2.29 0.024 
Note: Key: CTP = Counterfactual Probability Judgments; FP = Future Possibility 
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Thus, we continue to examine the indirect effect on each level of FP. Those 
indirect effects (path ab) are tested by comparing the ratio of ab and SEab (i.e., the 
standard error of ab) to a critical value in the standard normal distribution given an 
alpha level. The Analysis revealed that the indirect effect was only significant in the 
FP: Low condition (Z = -2.01, p = .045; Bootstrap (5000 samples) 95% CI: {-0.5155, 
-0.0427}) but not in the FP: High condition (Z = -1.41, p = .159; Bootstrap (5000 
samples) 95% CI: {-0.2754, 0.0121}). Further analyses show that this conditional 
indirect effect was caused by the fact that, when controlling for outcome proximity, 
counterfactual probability estimates only have a negative effect on emotions in the 
FP: Low condition (β = -.55, t = -4.89, p < .001) while this effect was reduced to a 
non-significant level in the FP: High condition (β = -.21, t = -1.53, p =. 131).  
Overall, these results suggest that outcome proximity has an indirect effect on 
emotions via counterfactual probability estimates and this indirect effect is 
moderated by the perception of future possibility. While counterfactual probability 
estimates influenced emotions in the direction of the contrast-domination when 
future possibility is low, this effect seemed to be cancelled out, although not reversed, 
by the enhancement in the assimilation effect when future possibility is high.   
2.3.2.5 Attention Focus 
To measure participants’ temporal perspective, their free responses to the 
thought listing task were coded as to whether they reflected a focus on the past 
implications of the counterfactuals or their future implications. The coding scheme 
followed similar protocols as in Experiment 1 and the inter-coder reliability was high 
(Agreement percentage = 98%; Cohen’s Kappa = 86%). Examples for the statements 
that reflected a past perspective are: “Should have been prepared”; “Annoyed that I 
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was only 1 point away” and “Disappointed with my test performance – I probably 
could have done better”. Examples for the statements that reflected a future 
perspective are: “Hopeful for next time”; “Happiness that I scored so well even 
though I had not prepared.  Probably a good sign for the resit” and “You can still get 
the job”. 
Table 2.4 summarises the number of past and future-perspective statements 
generated by participants in the two future possibility conditions. It is noticeable that 
only a small proportion of the total statements can be categorised as either past or 
future oriented statements. For example, participants in FP: Low condition only 
generated four future-perspective statements all together and most paritcipants in this 
condition generate no such statements. This rendered the parametric tests on the 
average number of past/future-perspective statements per case inappropriate. Thus, 
the non-parametric Chi-square test was conducted on the total number of statements 
in each category. In total, participants generated a slightly smaller proportion of past-
perspective statements in the FP: High condition (34 out of 291, 11.7%) than in the 
FP: Low condition (40 out of 267, 15.0%), although this difference was not 
significant (χ2(1, N=558) = 1.32, p = .251, w = .05). On the other hand, participants 
generated a bigger proportion of future-perspective statements in the FP: High 
condition (47 out of 291, 16.2%) than in the FP: Low condition (4 out of 267, 1.5%). 
This difference was significant (χ2(1, N=558) = 36.00, p < .001, w = .25).   
Ratings were also obtained towards statements which reflected either a focus 
on the past implications of the counterfactual or its future implications. The ratings 
on the three past-perspective statements displayed a good inter-item reliability 
(Cronbach’s α = .70). Against the prediction, a two-way ANOVA revealed no 
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significant main effect of future possibility (F(1,110) = 0.22, p = .641, r = .04). That 
is, the amount of past-implication statements generated in the FP: Low was not 
significantly more (M = 6.87, SD = 1.95) than in the FP: High condition (M = 7.02, 
SD = 1.52). However, a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
future possibility on the ratings of future-perspective statements (Cronbach’s α = .71) 
(F(1,110) = 11.79, p = .001, r = .31). On average, participants rated the three future-
implication statements higher in the FP: High condition (M = 6.07, SD = 1.60) than 
the FP: Low condition (M = 5.04, SD = 2.04), indicating that the participants in the 
FP: High condition were more future-oriented than those in the FP: Low condition.  
Thus, consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, the results from both 
participants’ free written responses and their ratings on the past and future-
implication statements confirmed the proposition that the presence of future 
possibility encouraged people to focus more on the future implications of a 
counterfactual.  
Table 2.4 The Number of Past and Future-perspective Statements Generated by 
Participants across FP: Low and FP: High condition 
Category FP: Low (N = 55) FP: High (N = 59) 
Future-perspective 4 (0.07) 47 (0.8) 
Past-perspective 40 (0.73) 34 (0.58) 
Total 267 (4.85) 291 (4.93) 
Note: Figures in brackets in row 2, 3 and 4 indicate the average number of statements per 
participant in that particular category and condition. 
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2.3.3 Discussion 
The experiment failed to demonstrate the predicted interaction of proximity 
and future possibility on emotional responses.  In fact, the manipulation of proximity 
had non-significant effects on emotions both when the perception of future 
possibility was low and high. This finding not only fails to support the hypothesis 
regarding the moderating effect of future possibility on emotional reactions to close 
outcomes, but also contradicts the findings of previous research which demonstrated 
a domination of the contrast effect after being close to a focal outcome (Johnson, 
1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Macrae et al., 1993; Medvec et al., 1995; 
Medvec & Savitsky, 1997; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; Miller & McFarland, 
1986). Despite the non-significant total effect of outcome proximity on emotions, 
analyses show that outcome proximity did have an indirect effect on emotions via 
counterfactual probability estimates. More importantly, being consistent with the 
prediction, the nature of this indirect effect was moderated by perceived future 
possibility. The examination on this indirect effect renders some indications why 
those null effects were obtained, as will be elaborated below.  
Proximity-Probability Relationship Confirming the findings of Experiment 1 
and previous research (Teigen, 1998, 2005; Tykocinski & Steinberg, 2005), the 
present experiment demonstrates that outcome closeness has an effect on 
counterfactual probability estimates. Failing a test by merely 1 point provoked higher 
estimates of the chance of passing than failing by 45 points. The present experiment 
also extended the previous findings by showing that conditional counterfactual 
probability judgments are also susceptible to outcome proximity in a similar manner 
as unconditional probability judgments. However, it should be noted that the effect 
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found in the present experiment was quite weak compared to previous research (e.g., 
r = .21 in the present experiment compared to r = .56 in one study reported by 
Teigen (1998, Study 2)) – it might not be strong enough to be translated into any 
difference in people’s emotional reactions. 
This weak effect highlights the possibility that besides proximity, one’s 
conditional counterfactual probability estimates might be influenced by other factors. 
It was speculated that the perceived impact of undoing the antecedent on the factual 
outcome might also be taken into account when probabilities are computed.  For 
example, for a person who missed the train by half an hour, the thought “If I had not 
been stuck in the traffic jam, I would have caught the train” might sound more 
plausible if he/she was stuck in the traffic for half an hour than for 15 minutes. In the 
two cases, proximities to catching the train were equal. It is the higher impact of the 
mutation of the antecedent in the former case (i.e. advancing the journey by half an 
hour) that boosts the counterfactual probability estimation.  More importantly, it is 
possible sometimes that the mutation of an antecedent is considered so impactful on 
the factual outcome that it overshadows the effect of proximity. For example, if 
someone was stuck in a traffic jam for as long as an hour, the estimate of the 
conditional counterfactual probability will be high whether he/she missed the train 
by five minutes or half an hour. In the same way, in our examination scenario, the 
impact of the mutation of the exceptional antecedent (i.e. “not drinking in the bar”) 
might have been considered so big on the factual outcome that the effect of 
proximity was diluted.  
What’s more, the between-participant setup of the experiment might also 
have weakened the effect of proximity. In one study by Teigen (1998, Study 2), the 
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effect of physical proximity on counterfactual probability estimates was only found 
to be significant in a within-participant setup but not in another study adopting the 
same scenario but using a between-participant setup. This suggests that the 
counterfactual probability judgments might be more sensitive to the manipulation of 
proximity in a within-participant design than in a between-participant design, 
presumably because the variation in proximity is more salient in the former case.  
Probability-Affect Relationship As predicted, counterfactual probability 
estimates were negatively correlated with emotions in the FP: Low condition, 
exhibiting a quality of the domination of the contrast effect. However, this 
correlation was reduced to a non-significant level in the FP: High condition, which 
supports the proposition that the emotional consequences of counterfactual 
probability judgments are contingent on the perception of future possibility. Also, 
the nature of the observed moderation was consistent with the prediction of the REM 
that the absence of future possibility enhances the contrast effect and the presence of 
future possibility enhances the assimilation effect. This principle also received some 
support from the examinations on people’s temporal perspectives in the two future 
possibility conditions. Confirming the findings of Experiment 1, evidence from both 
participants’ free written responses and their ratings on future and past-oriented 
statements indicates that people focused on the future implications of a 
counterfactual to a greater extent when future possibility was high than it was low.   
However, it seems that although the presence of future possibility has 
promoted the affective assimilation effect, it only managed to cancel out the contrast 
effect – it failed to override it. For the strength of the assimilation effect to exceed 
that of the contrast effect, the perception of future possibility might need to be very 
95 
 
high. In the present experiment, the student in the story in the FP: High condition 
had only one more chance to take a resit, which might not be able to provoke a 
perception of future possibility that was strong enough to make the assimilation 
effect dominate one’s emotional experiences.  
What’s more, the effects of counterfactual probability judgments on emotions 
might have been dampened by the existence of the exceptional antecedent. Drinking 
before examinations might be deemed to be socially unacceptable or morally wrong, 
which could have provoked negative emotions like shame and guilt which were 
unrelated to counterfactual thinking. These negative emotions might have dominated 
one’s affective experiences and made the effects of counterfactual probability 
judgments fail to stand out.  
To sum up, the experiment successfully demonstrated that (1) outcome 
proximity has an effect on conditional counterfactual probability judgments; and (2) 
the emotional consequences of these judgments are contingent on the perception of 
future possibility. However, the experiment failed to demonstrate the predicted 
interaction of proximity and future possibility on people’s emotional experiences. 
This could be due to: (1) the impactful antecedent in the story and the between-
participant setup dampened the effect of proximity on participants’ counterfactual 
probability estimates; and (2) the manipulation of future possibility was not strong 
enough to cause the assimilation effect to override the contrast effect; and (3) 
participants’ affective experiences were dominated by the negative emotions arising 
from participants’ moral judgments towards the abnormal behaviour (i.e., drinking) 
and thus the effects of counterfactual probability judgments were washed out. Those 
methodological limitations were addressed in Experiment 3. Finally, it should also 
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be noted that the observed effect of numerical proximity on probability judgments in 
this experiment is subject to alternative interpretations. That is, the reason why 
participants who failed the examinations by a small margin gave higher 
counterfactual probability ratings than by a big margin could be simply because they 
got higher score in the former case (79 versus 35). A similar criticism could be raised 
regarding Teigen (1998)’s study 3, which used a similar manipulation of numerical 
proximity. This limitation was also addressed in Experiment 3. 
2.4 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 continued to examine the moderating effect of future 
possibility on the emotional consequences of close outcomes and the mediating role 
of counterfactual probability judgments. Compared to its predecessor, the present 
experiment made the following adjustments: (1) To eliminate the unwanted effect of 
impactful antecedents on people’s counterfactual probability judgments and 
emotions, the present experiment exclusively concentrated on unconditional 
counterfactual probability estimates and employed a new scenario where exceptional 
antecedents were excluded; (2) The present experiment treated proximity as a 
within-participant variable to enhance its effect on probability judgments; (3) A 
special score arrangement was used by the present experiment to rule out the 
confounding effect of the absolute value of scores; (4) The manipulation of future 
possibility was enhanced by increasing the number of opportunities to mutate the 
final outcome; and (5) This experiment tested the hypotheses more thoroughly than 
Experiment 2 by examining both situations where people get close to a desirable 
outcome as well as get close to an undesirable one. This would also enable us to test 
the “assimilation-based satisfaction reversal” demonstrated by McMullen and 
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Markman (2002), where being objectively better off but close to an undesirable state 
could lead to worse mood than being objectively worse off but close to a desirable 
state, as a result of the affective assimilation effect.  
In this experiment participants were presented with a short story where two 
contestants were taking part in a TV game show competition to win big monetary 
prizes. Proximity was manipulated by varying the numerical differences between the 
contestants’ scores in the game (Proximity: Close/Far).  Participants were asked to 
focus on either the loser or the winner of the game (Outcome: Lose/Win) and 
provide judgments of counterfactual probability and affect ratings.  
The perception of future possibility (FP) was manipulated by varying the 
decisiveness of the result of the game to the final outcome of the contest. The 
perception of future possibility would be high if the final outcome of the contest was 
determined by the results of several games put together and the players had only 
finished the first game (FP: High). In comparison, the perception of future possibility 
would be low if the final outcome of the contest was determined by this one game 
alone (FP: Low). Overall, a moderating effect of perceived future possibility on 
people’s emotional reactions to outcome closeness was predicted. More specifically, 
when the result of the game was decisive (FP: Low), the loser (or the winner) of the 
game should be judged to be feeling worse (or better) if the difference between the 
scores was small rather than large. However, this effect should be reversed when the 
result of this particular game was not decisive (FP: High). The “assimilation-based 
satisfaction reversal” was tested by comparing the emotions of the winners and 
losers in the FP: High/Proximity: Close condition. In this condition the winners 
should be judged to be feeling worse than the losers.   
98 
 
The degree to which the counterfactual probability estimates can explain this 
pattern of results was tested by examining the mediating effect of counterfactual 
probability estimates in the relationship between proximity and emotions in the FP: 
Low and the FP: High conditions. First of all, proximity to a focal outcome should 
increase the counterfactual probability estimates regarding that outcome in all 
conditions. Secondly, counterfactual probability estimates should be able to predict 
emotions. In the FP: Low condition, such a relationship should be reflecting the 
domination of the contrast effect. That is, the higher the counterfactual probability 
estimates, the worse the mood for the losers but the better the mood for the winners. 
By comparison, in the FP: High condition, such a relationship should be reflecting 
the domination of the assimilation effect. That is, the higher the counterfactual 
probability estimates, the better the mood for the losers but the worse the mood for 
the winners. 
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Design 
The experiment investigated the effects of three independent variables 
(outcome valence, proximity and future possibility) on people’s counterfactual 
probability estimates and emotions. It employed a 2 (Outcome: win/lose) × 2 
(Proximity: close/far) × 2 (FP: high/low) mixed design with outcome valence and 
future possibility being treated as between-participant variables and proximity as a 
within-participant variable. 
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2.4.1.2 Participants 
A total of 96 undergraduate students (74 females and 22 males) of Durham 
University participated in the study. Among them, 35 students were recruited from 
the Department of Psychology, who took participant credits as an exchange for their 
participation. The remaining 61 were recruited in the lounge area of the university 
library, each of whom received a £2 monetary reward for their contribution.  
2.4.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to read and answer questions on one of 
the four versions of a story about a TV game show. The four versions varied 
according to whether the contestant they were asked to focus on was a winner or a 
loser of the game (Outcome: Win/Lose) and whether or not there was a future 
possibility of changing the final outcome of the show (FP: High/Low). There were 
two sections of the story. Participants answered questions in sections one and two 
about two different players – one who had won or lost by a small margin (Proximity: 
Close), the other who had won or lost by a large margin (Proximity: Far). The order 
in which participants were exposed to “close” and “far” treatments was 
counterbalanced.  
Section one started with the following background story: 
“Split Second” is an evening TV game show in America, which 
features a rich variety of mental and physical challenges in which 
the contestants try to outperform and eliminate their opponents in 
order to win big monetary prizes. Each episode of “Split Second” 
often features more than one arena. Those arenas are located in 
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different cities across the country. The competitions in different 
arenas go on separately yet at the same time. At the end of each 
episode, one winner will be born in each arena and those winners 
will advance to the next stage of the competition.     
In this episode of “Split Second”, 12 contestants will be 
competing in two separate arenas located in Los Angeles and 
Philadelphia respectively (six in each arena). The winner of each 
arena will win a cash prize of $50,000 and advance to next week’s 
show, with the potential to win an additional $100,000. The losers 
will leave empty-handed.  
Here is what happened in the Los Angeles Arena: 
After the first few rounds of competition, two contestants, Kelly 
and Susan, who have the highest scores among the six, stay in the 
game. Now, the two contestants are facing their final challenge. 
They have to beat their opponent in this challenge to be the Los 
Angeles winner of this episode of “Split Second”. 
In the final challenge, a basketball shooting machine is introduced 
to the contestants (as pictured below), which has two bottomless 
baskets bolted side-by-side on a metal panel at one end of the 
machine. When the whistle goes off, the two contestants race 15 
metres to the machine, pick up balls from the pool and start 
shooting the balls at the basket which has been pre-assigned to 
them. They score one point for each ball they throw in. If they 
101 
 
accidentally throw a ball into the wrong basket, their opponent 
will score one point instead of them. The objective is to outscore 
their opponent within the time limit of two minutes. 
The story was illustrated using a picture of a basketball shooting machine 
(see Appendix C). The manipulation of future possibility came on a separate page.  
FP: Low - The two contestants will play just one round of this 
game. The contestant who outscores their opponent in this single 
round will be the winner of Los Angeles Arena in this episode of 
“Split Second”. 
FP: High - The two contestants will play up to five rounds of this 
game. The contestant who outscores their opponent in 3 of these 
rounds will be the winner of Los Angeles Arena in this episode of 
“Split Second”. 
Then, on a separate page, the scores of the round were presented, which 
revealed that Kelly was defeated by Susan. In the Proximity: Close versions one of 
three pairs of scores with a difference of 1 point was randomly presented (21-22, 17-
18 or 13-14 in Outcome: Lose; 28-29, 24-25 or 20-21 in Outcome: Win). In the 
Proximity: Far versions one of three pairs of scores with a difference of 15 points 
was randomly presented (21-36, 17-32 or 13-28 in Outcome: Lose; 14-29, 10-25 or 
6-21 in Outcome: Win). Please note that in the Outcome: Lose conditions, the 
absolute scores of the losers are the same across the Proximity: Close and Far 
conditions (i.e. 21, 17 or 13). Likewise, in the Outcome: Win conditions, the 
absolute scores of the winners are the same across the Proximity: Close and Far 
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conditions (i.e. 29, 25 or 21). Thus, any difference in counterfactual probability 
estimates as well as the emotional reactions found between the two proximity 
conditions can only be attributed to the closeness of the scores rather than their 
absolute values.  
All the questions that followed concerned either the loser of the game (Kelly) 
or winner of the game (Susan) depending on whether the questionnaire was an 
Outcome: Lose or Outcome: Win version. 
Judgments of affect were measured by both a single-item and a multi-item 
affect scale, the purpose of which was to check if two types of measures would 
produce the same pattern of results. Thus, participants were firstly asked to make 
judgments about the global affective states of the contestant by rating on a 9-point 
scale about how negative or positive they thought the contestant would be feeling 
after the game” (1=extremely negative, 9=extremely positive).  
In the multi-item affect measure, participants were asked to rate the extent to 
which the contestant experienced each of 12 emotions (“happy”, “annoyed”, 
“satisfied”, “frustrated”, “pleased”, “miserable”, “content”, “relieved”, 
“disappointed”, “proud”, “elated”, “discouraged”) on 9-point scales (1=not at all, 
9=extremely). Like in Experiment 2, the ratings were rescored from 0 (1=not at all) 
to -8 (9=extremely) for the negative emotions and 0 (1=not at all) to +8 
(9=extremely) for the positive emotions. Hence, on both positive and negative scales, 
0 represents a lack of emotion (neutrality) with higher scores representing better 
moods and lower scores worse moods. Then positive and negative affect indices 
were established by averaging the positive emotions (Cronbach’s α = .97 for both 
Proximity: Close and Far conditions) and negative emotions (Cronbach’s α = .95 for 
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Proximity: Far and .94 for Proximity: Close). An average was then taken of the 
positive and negative affect indices to establish a Global Affect Index (Cronbach’s α 
= .93 for the Proximity: Far condition and .91 for the Proximity: Close condition). 
Counterfactual probability estimates were measured by eliciting ratings of 
how likely they thought that Kelly (or Susan) could have won (or lost) the round that 
had just finished (1=extremely unlikely, 9=extremely likely).  
As a manipulation check, participants’ perceptions of closeness were 
measured by asking them to rate how close or far away they thought that Kelly (or 
Susan) had been from winning (or losing) the finished round (1=Extremely far away, 
9=extremely close) 
The questionnaire also included some measures whose purpose digress from 
the main theme of the thesis and hence were not introduced in the main body of the 
thesis. However, a complete sample of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix C.   
Section two told a story about another pair of contestants: 
Meanwhile, in the Philadelphia Arena, Fiona and Christina are the 
two contestants who have the highest scores among the six in their 
group and make it to the final challenge. They take on the same 
challenge as Kelly and Susan do in the other arena.   
Again, a table followed which presented the result of this round. The 
configurations for the Proximity: Close and Far conditions were the same as in 
section one. However, the participants who received the Proximity: Close treatment 
in section one received the Proximity: Far treatment in section two (and vice versa). 
The questions asked were the same as in section one.  
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2.4.2 Results 
2.4.2.1 Manipulation Check 
Because the questions for the participants in the Outcome: Lose and Win 
conditions were different in that they concerned different outcomes, all the analyses 
were done separately for the two outcome conditions. A 2 (Proximity) × 2 (Future 
possibility) mixed ANOVA was conducted on both the ratings in the Outcome: Lose 
and Win conditions and revealed significant main effects of proximity on people’s 
perception of closeness in both conditions (F(1, 46) = 179.82, p < .001, r = .89 in the 
lose condition; F(1, 46) = 334.89, p < .001, r = .94 in the win condition). That is, in 
the lose condition, participants thought the loser had been closer to winning when the 
scores were close (M = 7.90, SD = 1.52) rather than when they were far apart (M = 
3.38, SD = 1.51). Likewise, in the win condition, participants thought the winner had 
been closer to losing when the scores were close (M = 7.79, SD = 1.17) rather than 
when they were far apart (M = 3.06, SD = 1.21). These results suggested that the 
manipulation of proximity was successful in both outcome conditions. As expected, 
the analyses did not find significant main effect of future possibility (F(1, 46) = 0.28, 
p = .600, r = .08 in the lose condition; F(1, 46) = 0.20, p = .654, r = .06 in the win 
condition), or proximity x future possibility interaction (F(1, 46) = 2.02, p = .162, r 
= .20 in lose condition; F(1, 46) = 0.01, p = .936, r < .01 in win condition). 
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2.4.2.2 Global Affect 
Participants’ ratings on the single-item and multi-item affect scales produced 
the same pattern of results. Thus, only the analyses on the multi-item affect ratings 
are reported here. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the mean (with 95% CIs) of the global 
affect index measure for the losers and winners in the FP: Low/High and Proximity: 
Close/Far conditions. 
A mixed ANOVA on the loser’s affect revealed an unsurprising significant 
main effect of future possibility (F(1, 46) = 5.10, p = .029, r = .32). The loser was 
judged to be feeling better when the result of the game was not decisive to the final 
outcome of the episode (M = -1.24, SD = 2.69) than when it was (M = -2.02, SD = 
2.69). Also, as expected, the main effect of proximity was not found to be significant 
(F(1, 46) = 0.02, p = .895, r < .01). More importantly, being consistent with the 
prediction, the analysis revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 46) = 5.81, p = .020, r 
= .33). As Figure 2.6 illustrates, when the result of the round was decisive (FP: Low), 
the losers of the game were thought to be feeling worse if the scores were close than 
if they were far apart, indicating a dominance of the contrast effect. However, when 
the result was not decisive (FP: High), a reversed pattern surfaced - those who lost 
by 1 point were considered to be feeling better than those who lost by 15 points. It 
should be noted however that these cross-over effects were not large enough to 
produce statistically significant simple main effects - F(1, 23) = 3.35, p = .080, r 
= .36 and F(1, 23) = 2.50, p = .127, r = .31 in the FP: Low and FP: High respectively.  
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Figure 2.6 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Affect Ratings in 
Outcome: Lose Condition 
Figure 2.7 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Affect Ratings in 
Outcome: Win Condition 
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A significant main effect of future possibility was also found for the winner’s 
affect (F(1, 46) = 20.55, p < .001, r = .56). The winner was judged to be feeling 
better when the result of the game was decisive to the outcome of the episode (M = 
3.24, SD = 1.08) than when it was not (M = 2.28, SD = 1.08). The main effect of 
proximity was also significant which was not expected (F(1, 46) = 29.91, p < .001, r 
= .63). The winner was judged to be feeling better when the scores were far apart (M 
= 3.09, SD = 0.66) than when the scores were close (M = 2.43, SD = 1.23). However, 
under the surface of these main effects the proximity × FP interaction was also 
significant although it did not fully fit the expected pattern (F(1, 46) = 9.69, p = .003, 
r = .42). As Figure 2.7 illustrates, in both future possibility conditions, winning by 
15 points (Proximity: Far) was judged to be better than winning by 1 point 
(Proximity: Close) – although this difference was smaller and not quite statistically 
significant when the result of the game was decisive - F(1, 23) = 4.25, p = .051, r 
= .40 in the FP: Low condition; F(1, 23) = 27.34, p < .001, r = .74 in the FP: High 
condition. There is therefore no evidence that the smaller difference in scores 
increased the winner’s pleasure when the game was decisive, although as shown in 
Figure 2.7, it did reduce their pleasure when the game was not decisive. This latter 
effect is therefore consistent with our expectations that the affective assimilation 
effect would be stronger when the perception of future possibility is high.  
What’s more, an “assimilation-based satisfaction reversal” would predict that 
when the future possibility was high and the scores were close, the losers should be 
judged to feel better than the winners. This prediction was not however supported by 
the results. On the contrary, the results revealed an opposite pattern: in the FP: High 
and Outcome: Close condition the winners were judged to feel significantly better 
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(M = 1.76, SD = 1.25) than the losers (M = -1.03, SD = 1.64) - F(1, 46) = 43.94, p 
< .001, r = .70. 
2.4.2.3 The Mediating effect of Counterfactual Probability 
It was hypothesized that counterfactual probability estimates would mediate 
the relationship between proximity and emotions and that the nature of that 
mediation would depend upon the perception of future possibility. Following the 
recommendation by Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001), counterfactual probability 
estimates would be deemed as a mediator between proximity and emotions if the 
following criteria were satisfied: (1) Proximity has effects on counterfactual 
probability estimates; (2) Proximity has effects on emotions;  (3) Counterfactual 
probability estimates were related with emotions in each proximity condition; and (4) 
The difference in emotions between the two proximity treatments (close/far) could 
be predicted by the difference in counterfactual probability estimates. These four 
criteria were examined in order. The predictions derived from these four criteria for 
the FP: Low condition and the FP: High condition were summarised in Tables 2.5 
and 2.6 respectively.  
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Table 2.5 Predictions and Results regarding the Four Criteria to Identify 
Counterfactual Probability Estimates as Mediating Variable (FP: Low condition) 
Criterion Prediction 
Lose Condition Win Condition 
Descriptives P-value Descriptives P-value 
1 CC > CF CC > CF < .001 CC > CF < .001 
2 AC > AF AC > AF = .080 AC < AF = .051 
3 CC predicts AC  
CF predicts AF 
β = -0.14 
β = -0.24 
= .518 
= .267 
β = -0.06 
β = -0.05 
= .787 
= .812 
4 CD predicts AD β = -0.32 = .151 β = -0.14 = .531 
Note: The prediction was made on the basis that the affect ratings in the lose condition has 
been reversely coded to keep the predicted effects of proximity on counterfactual 
probability estimates and emotions on the same direction. 
Key: A = Affect Ratings, C = Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
Key for subscript letters: C = Close Condition, F = Far Condition, D = Difference between 
Close and Far Condition 
Table 2.6 Predictions and Results regarding the Four Criteria to Identify 
Counterfactual Probability Estimates as Mediating Variable (FP: High condition) 
Criterion Prediction Descriptives p-value 
1 CC > CF CC > CF < .001 
2 AC > AF AC > AF < .001 
3 CC predicts AC  
CF predicts AF 
β = 0.34  
β = 0.37  
= .017 
= .009 
4 CD predicts AD β = 0.14 = .349 
Note: The prediction was made on the basis that the affect ratings in win condition has 
been reversely coded to keep the predicted effects of proximity on counterfactual 
probability estimates and emotions on the same direction. 
Key: A = Affect Ratings, C = Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
Key for subscript letters: C = Close Condition, F = Far Condition, D = Difference between 
Close and Far Condition 
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First of all, the relationships between proximity and counterfactual 
probability estimates were examined. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the mean 
counterfactual probability estimates (with 95% CIs) assigned to the losers or winners 
in the FP: Low/High and Proximity: Close/Far conditions. Our expectation that 
counterfactual probability estimates would be higher in the Proximity: Close than the 
Proximity: Far condition was confirmed. Significant main effects of proximity were 
found in both the Outcome: Lose (F(1, 46) = 117.16, p < .001, r = .85) and Outcome: 
Win conditions (F(1, 46) = 129.07, p < .001, r = .86). In the Outcome: Lose 
condition participants thought the loser had been more likely to win if the scores 
were close (M = 7.23, SD = 1.46) than far apart (M = 3.92, SD = 1.53). Likewise, in 
the Outcome: Win condition, participants thought the winner had been more likely to 
lose when the scores were close (M = 6.92, SD = 1.49) rather than far apart (M = 
3.56, SD = 1.38).  
However, while there was no significant interaction between proximity and 
future possibility in the Outcome: Win condition (F(1, 46) = 0.12, p = .726, r = .05), 
the interaction was close to significance in the Outcome: Lose condition (F(1, 46) = 
3.90, p = .054, r = .28). However, simple main effects tests confirmed that 
participants still gave significantly higher counterfactual probability ratings to the 
losers when the scores were close rather than far apart in both future possibility 
conditions – although the differences were larger in the FP: Low condition (F(1, 23) 
= 103.48, p < .001, r = .90) than in the FP: High condition (F(1, 23) = 32.40, p 
< .001, r = .76). Thus, overall, the first criterion of mediating effect was satisfied. 
 
111 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Counterfactual 
Probability Estimates in Outcome: Lose Condition 
Figure 2.9 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Counterfactual 
Probability Estimates in Outcome: Win Condition 
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Because future possibility was expected to moderate the effect of proximity 
and the counterfactual probability estimates on emotions. The last three criteria were 
examined separately for the FP: Low and the FP: High condition.  
FP: Low  
The affect scores in the Outcome: Lose condition were reversely scored so 
that the predicted effect of proximity on affect ratings and the counterfactual 
probability estimates would be in the same direction, as in the Outcome: Win 
condition. Thus, overall, proximity to a focal outcome should increase the affect 
ratings, reflecting a domination of contrast effect. However, the results show that the 
ratings on emotions were not found to differ significantly between the close and far 
conditions (F(1, 47) = 0.37, p = .574, r = .09). This could be because the difference 
in the affect rating in the win condition was in an unexpected direction (which is 
opposite to that in the lose condition) and diluted the global effect of proximity on 
emotions in the FP: Low condition. Thus, it is believed to be the most sensible to 
examine the mediating effect of counterfactual probability estimates in the lose and 
the win conditions separately.  
Lose Condition The earlier analysis has revealed that the total effect of 
proximity on emotions was not significant (see Table 2.5), which violates criterion 2. 
However, mediation analysis was still carried on because the total effect was close to 
reach a significant level. Regressions were run in both the close and the far condition 
with Af (Affect – far condition) or Ac (Affect – close condition) as the dependent 
variable and Cf (counterfactual probability estimates – far condition) or Cc 
(counterfactual probability estimates – close condition) as the predictor. As a result, 
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Cf was not found to significantly predict Af and Cc was not found to significantly 
predict Ac, either (see Table 2.5). 
In accordance with Judd et al. (2001), a regression was also run with the 
difference in the affect ratings between the close and far condition as the dependent 
variable (Ad) and the difference in counterfactual probability estimates (Cd) as the 
predictor. It was found that Cd did not significantly predict Ad (see Table 2.4). Those 
results indicate that in the FP: Low/Outcome: Lose condition, counterfactual 
probability estimates were not mediating the effect of proximity on emotions. 
Win Condition As Table 2.5 shows, contrary to the prediction, the effect of 
proximity on emotions reflects a domination of the assimilation effect and was 
marginally significant. Mediation analysis was still carried on because the total effect 
was close to reaching a significant level. However, in line with the direction of the 
total effect found in this condition, it was expected that counterfactual probability 
estimates should negatively predict the affect ratings. Same regressions were run in 
the win condition as in the lose condition. In individual proximity conditions, Cf was 
not found to significantly predict Af  and Cc was not found to significantly predict Ac 
(See Table 2.5), either. What’s more, Cd did not significantly predict Ad (See Table 
2.5), indicating that in the FP: Low/Outcome: Win condition, counterfactual 
probability estimates were not mediating the effect of proximity on emotions.  
To sum up, in the FP: low condition, counterfactual probability estimates did 
not mediate the relationship between proximity and emotions, the reason being that 
counterfactual probability estimate had no significant effect on people’s emotional 
experiences.  
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FP: High  
The affect scores in the Outcome: win condition were recoded so that the 
predicted effect of proximity on emotions and the counterfactual probability 
estimates would be in the same direction, as in the Outcome: lose condition. That is, 
proximity should increase the affect ratings. This time, such a relationship would 
reflect a domination of the assimilation effect. Overall, in the FP: high condition, 
proximity had significant effect on emotions (F(1, 47) = 18.30, p < .001, r = .53). 
Unlike the FP: Low condition, the effects of proximity on emotions were in the same 
direction in both lose and win conditions. Therefore, the data from the two 
conditions was pooled and submitted to the mediation analysis.  In individual 
proximity conditions, Cf was found to significantly predict Af  and Cc was found to 
significantly predict Ac (see Table 2.6), indicating that counterfactual probability 
estimates were related with emotions in each proximity condition and those 
correlations reflect a quality of the assimilation effect.  
However, surprisingly, the differences in those variables between the close 
and the far condition were not significantly related - Cd did not significantly predict 
Ad (see Table 2.6). Also, this correlation coefficient is not significantly different 
from that of the FP: Low/Outcome: Lose condition (Z = 0.64, p = .522) or that of the 
FP: Low/Outcome: Win condition (Z = 0.01, p = .992). It is notable that the affect 
ratings in the far condition and those in the close conditions were highly correlated 
(r(48) = .65, p < .001), indicating that at an individual level, participants’ affect 
ratings in the far condition shared much common variance with those in the close 
condition. Thus, the non-significant results could be caused by the restricted range in 
the dependent variable (the difference in the affect ratings between the close and the 
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far condition) (Range = 4 on the scale from 0 to16, when excluding three outliers). 
This could be due to the inherent nature of the within-participant design, where 
individual differences were controlled between the two measures of affect and thus 
the difference between the two measures lacks variance. This problem would be the 
most prominent if the effect of proximity on emotions was consistent in magnitude 
across different individuals.  
Thus, although the results indicate that counterfactual probability estimates in 
the FP: High condition were influencing the emotions in the direction of the 
assimilation effect, no definitive evidence was found that counterfactual probability 
judgments mediate the relationship between proximity and emotions in the FP: High 
condition. The reason could be that the difference in the affect ratings between the 
close and the far condition lacks variation because of the within-participant design. 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Confirming the finding of Experiment 1, a moderating effect of future 
possibility on people’s emotional reactions to close outcomes was demonstrated by 
the present experiment. After losing or winning a basketball throwing game in a TV 
game show, the effect of the closeness of the scores on emotions was found to be 
dependent on the decisiveness of the game. For the losers, an indication of the 
contrast effect domination was found when the game was decisive (future possibility 
was low) but an indication of the assimilation effect domination was found when the 
game was not decisive (future possibility was high). For the winners, an indication of 
the assimilation effect domination was found when the game was decisive (future 
possibility was low) but this effect was enhanced to an even greater extent when the 
game was not decisive (future possibility was high). Although the interaction of 
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proximity (closeness of the scores) and future possibility displayed different patterns 
across the lose and win conditions, the predicted common principle of the effect of 
future possibility was confirmed: a high level of future possibility promotes affective 
assimilation while a low level of future possibility promotes affective contrast. 
Indicative evidence was also found that counterfactual probability estimates 
were mediating the effect of proximity on emotions and the nature of the mediation 
was moderated by the perception of future possibility. While proximity to a focal 
outcome was found to increase one’s counterfactual probability estimates in all 
conditions, the effect of counterfactual probability estimates on emotions appeared to 
depend on the perception of future possibility. When the future possibility was high, 
counterfactual probability estimates significantly predicted participants’ emotions in 
the direction that reflected a domination of the affective assimilation, in both the 
close and far conditions. Note that this was the first time that evidence has been 
found that people’s counterfactual probability judgments can  influence one’s 
emotional experiences in the direction of the assimilation effect. On the other hand, 
when the future possibility was low, counterfactual probability estimates had no 
significant effect on emotions, either in the far or close condition. Although 
counterfactual probability estimates did not influence emotions in a contrast-effect-
dominant direction as predicted, the null results do suggest that in this condition, the 
strength of the contrast effect was promoted and cancelled out the assimilation effect 
- it’s just that the contrast effect did not seem to be enhanced to a point where it was 
strong enough to overcome the assimilation effect and dominate one’s emotional 
experiences as predicted.  
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It should also be noted the results in the FP: High condition only provided 
suggestive, rather than definitive evidence for the mediating role of counterfactual 
probability estimates because not all criteria to identify a mediation effect were 
fulfilled. Although on a between-participant basis, counterfactual probability 
estimates were found to influence emotions in each of the two proximity conditions, 
on a within-participant basis, the difference in the counterfactual probability 
estimates between the far and close conditions did not significantly predict the 
difference in the affect ratings. As argued earlier, this could be caused by the 
restricted range of the dependent variable (difference in affect ratings) because of a 
within-participant design. The effect of counterfactual probability estimates on 
emotions should receive further examinations in experiments using between-
participant layout.    
2.5 General Discussion 
2.5.1 The Total Effect of Proximity on Emotions 
Narrowly missing a goal could be frustrating and narrowly escaping from a 
misfortune could be relieving. The early research on counterfactual thinking 
confirmed those beliefs by demonstrating the affective contrast effect after near-miss 
incidents. However, more recent research has amassed increasing evidence of 
affective assimilation, indicating that narrowly missing a goal could also be uplifting 
and narrowly escaping from a misfortune could also be alarming. Consistent with the 
Reflective and Evaluation Model (REM), McMullen and Markman (2002) 
demonstrated that emotional experiences after a near-miss depended upon temporal 
perspective – i.e., whether people perceived a future possibility to mutate the 
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outcome of an event. The results of Experiment 1 and 3 provide additional evidence 
for this proposition. 
Our results are more convincing than previous research because they ruled 
out the confounding effect of objective situations on people’s emotions – in both 
scenarios, being close to an outcome did not increase the actual chance of achieving 
that outcome in the future and thus did not affect one’s objective situation (e.g., in 
Experiment 3 being close by one point to beating the opponent in a basketball-
throwing game would not affect the player’s objective chance of winning in future 
games, although it was expected to lift their subjective expectation for future 
winning).  
In summary, Experiment 1 and 3 found that the impact of a near-miss 
incident on people’s emotions was contingent upon their perception of future 
possibility. Moreover, those effects were broadly consistent with our expectation that 
an affective contrast effect was more likely to be dominant when people were past-
oriented (i.e., if a goal was nearly scored or conceded at the end of the football game 
or if the basketball throwing game was decisive to the final outcome of the 
competition), whereas an affective assimilation effect was more likely to be 
dominant when people were future-oriented (i.e., if the goal was nearly scored or 
conceded at the beginning of the football game or the basketball throwing game was 
not decisive to the final outcome of the competition). 
More specifically, in Experiment 1, we demonstrated that people’s judgments 
of the global affective experiences of the two teams in a football match after one 
team got close to scoring a goal depended on the temporal position of this near-miss 
incident. The majority of participants thought the attackers who almost scored a goal 
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should feel worse than the defenders who almost conceded a goal, but only if the 
near-miss incident occurred near the end of the game, when the perception of future 
possibility was low. Similarly, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the effects of 
proximity on emotions were contingent upon future possibilities. If the loser of a 
basketball-throwing game lost by only a point they did not feel so bad about it if that 
game was not decisive to the final outcome of the competition whereas the winner of 
that close game felt less enjoyment in their win. The effect was not however strong 
enough to cause an “assimilation-based satisfaction reversal”. That is, the losers of 
the game did not feel better than the winners when the game ended with close scores 
and was not decisive – they just felt less bad than they would have done if the game 
had been decisive.  
It is worth noting however that the interaction patterns in the win and lose 
conditions did not exactly mirror one another. In particular in the win condition the 
differences in mean global affect ratings between the proximity conditions were 
indicative of a domination of the assimilation effect in both future possibility 
conditions – not just when the future possibility was high (although the assimilation 
effect was bigger in this condition). In comparison, in the lose conditions the 
differences in mean ratings between the proximity conditions were indicative of 
either a domination of the contrast effect in the low future possibility condition, or a 
domination of the assimilation effect in the high future possibility condition. 
This asymmetric pattern indicates that downward counterfactuals, provoked 
by getting close to an undesirable outcome in the win condition, are more prone to 
the assimilation effect and less prone to the contrast effect than upward 
counterfactuals, provoked by getting close to a desirable outcome in the lose 
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condition. This pattern is consistent with the speculation of McMullen and Markman 
(2002). The reason they provided for this asymmetry is that negative outcomes, 
which are often the contents of the imagination of downward counterfactuals, are 
more attention grabbing than positive outcomes. A considerable number of 
literatures have demonstrated that people allocate disproportionately more mental 
resources to negative stimuli than to positive or neutral stimuli (see Taylor, 1991, for 
a review). C.H. Hansen and R.D. Hansen (1988), for example, found that it is 
quicker and more accurate for people to identify an angry face among a crowd of 
happy faces than to identify a happy face among angry faces, presumably because 
negative stimuli are more likely to come to one’s attention.  
Similarly, with downward counterfactuals, people could be more likely to 
focus on the message of what can happen instead of what did happen than with 
upward counterfactuals, which will in turn make them more prone to the assimilation 
effect. Despite the speculation, their results did not show an asymmetrical pattern as 
ours, the reason for which is unclear. However, a potential cause of the asymmetry in 
our results could be that the scenario used in our experiment featured a more severe 
outcome (i.e., losing $50,000) and thus were even more attention grabbing than 
theirs (i.e., losing a college basketball game).  
2.5.2 The Mediating Effect of Counterfactual Probability Judgments 
The presented chapter also investigated the determinants and the emotional 
consequences of the counterfactual probability judgment by examining its mediating 
role in the relationship between outcome proximity and emotions. All three 
experiments provided evidence that people’s counterfactual probability estimates 
mediate the emotional consequences of near-misses and the nature of the mediation 
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depend on the perception of future possibility. First of all, the proximity to a focal 
outcome was found to boost one’s counterfactual probability estimates in all three 
experiments. Those results confirm and advance the previous demonstration of the 
effect of proximity on counterfactual probability judgments by showing that both 
conditional and unconditional counterfactual probability judgments are affected by 
proximity cues. Also, Experiment 3 ruled out the potential confounding of the 
absolute value of scores in the effect of numerical proximity on probability 
judgments.  
However, the effect of proximity on counterfactual probability estimates was 
quite weak in Experiment 2, where participants were asked to do a conditional 
counterfactual probability estimation (i.e., “How likely you think you would have 
passed the test if you hadn’t spent so much time in the bar the night before?”). This 
highlights the possibility that other factors (e.g., the perceived impact of the mutation 
of antecedents) will also be taken into account and interact with outcome proximity 
in determining the probability of a conditional counterfactual.  
Secondly, in Experiment 2 and 3, evidence was found that counterfactual 
probability estimates influence one’s emotions and those influences can be 
moderated by the level of the future possibility. More specifically, in Experiment 2, 
when future possibility was low, the counterfactual probability estimates were found 
to exert impacts on one’s emotional experiences. This reflects a contrast-dominant 
quality (i.e., higher counterfactual probability estimates regarding passing the 
examination led to worse mood). However, the counterfactual probability estimates 
had no significant effect on emotions when future possibility was high. In 
comparison, in Experiment 3, the counterfactual probability estimates had no 
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significant effect on emotions when perceived future possibility was low. However, 
evidence suggests that, when perceived future possibility was high, counterfactual 
probability estimates can exert impact on one’s emotional experiences which reflects 
an assimilation- dominant quality (i.e., higher counterfactual probability estimates 
regarding winning or losing a game led to worse or better mood).  
Although the results in neither experiment fit the prediction perfectly - that 
the variation of the future possibility should be able to reverse the effect of 
counterfactual probability estimates on emotions, they did show that (1) 
counterfactual probability judgments can influence one’s emotional experiences in 
either the direction of the contrast-effect-domination (Experiment 2) or the 
assimilation-effect-domination (Experiment 3), which is an important development 
from the finding of Petrocelli et at. (2011); and (2) the moderation of future 
possibility follows the proposed general principle of the REM that a low level of 
future possibility promotes the affective contrast effect while a high level of future 
possibility promotes the affective assimilation effect. This finding was also backed 
up by the evidence from Experiment 1 and 2 that participants paid attention to the 
future implications of a counterfactual to a greater extent when future possibility was 
high rather than low.  
2.5.3 Summary 
To conclude, our results are consistent with the proposition of the REM that 
the perception of future possibility would moderate the effect of outcome closeness 
on emotions – the presence of future possibility promotes the assimilation effect 
while the absence of future possibility promotes the contrast effect. However, no 
definitive evidence was found that the effect of future possibility can be strong 
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enough to reverse one’s emotional reactions to outcome proximity from being 
contrast-dominant to assimilation-dominant or vice versa.  
Suggestive evidence was also found that the moderated total effect of 
proximity on emotions can be accounted for by the mediating factor. First of all, 
outcome proximity was found to have an effect on both conditional and 
unconditional counterfactual probability estimates. Secondly, evidence suggests that 
the effect of counterfactual probability judgments on emotions is contingent on the 
perception of future possibility. The observed moderating effect was also consistent 
with the principle of the REM. However, like the total effect of proximity, the effect 
of counterfactual probability estimates on emotions was not found to be able to be 
reversed by the level of future possibility from being contrast-dominant to 
assimilation-dominant or vice versa, although evidence for the contrast domination 
and the assimilation domination was found in two separate experiments.  
The discussion so far concerning the effect of proximity on counterfactual 
probability and emotions has been restricted to the situation where only the 
information regarding the proximity of the final outcome is available. In real life, 
however, it is often the case that people receive multiple feedbacks of proximity 
during the episode of an event before the final outcome is revealed. This issue will 
be addressed in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 3 Multiple Proximity Cues: The Effect of Progression on 
Counterfactual Probability Estimates and Emotions 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 examined the effect of proximity on counterfactual probability 
judgments and emotions. However, the discussion so far has been restricted to the 
situation where people’s perception of closeness and counterfactual probability 
estimates were derived from only one cue of proximity, which is the proximity of the 
final outcome.  For example, in Experiment 1, the perception of closeness was 
provoked by the final physical distance by which the football missed the goal; in 
Experiment 2, it was provoked by the numeric distance between a student’s final 
result of an examination and the passing benchmark; and in Experiment 3, it was 
provoked by the difference in the final scores of the two players in a basketball 
throwing game.  
Like in most of the previous studies investigating the psychological 
consequences of outcome proximity, the setup of those scenarios, as pointed out in 
Section 1.3.3.2, might have oversimplified real life situations where people may be 
exposed to multiple proximity cues. This is especially likely to be the case if an 
outcome is preceded by a prolonged causal episode and the experiencer is looking 
for a particular target outcome or a goal. For example, in the TV game scenario 
featured in Experiment 3, although only the proximity of the final scores was made 
available to participants, in real life, the elements that constitute this event could be 
far richer than the mere final scores. For instance, during the game, one player could 
be consistently in the lead or the two players could be neck-and-neck throughout. 
Elements such as these could also potentially contribute to people’s overall 
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perception of the closeness and counterfactual probability judgments regarding the 
whole event. 
As introduced in Section, 1.3.3, Kahneman and Varey (1990) identified two 
event cues that are critical to the perception of propensity and the validation of close 
counterfactuals – “the temporal or causal proximity of the focal outcome and 
indications of rapid progress through a causal script” (p. 1102). While the first cue 
reflects an emphasis on the effect of a single, static cue of proximity, the second cue 
reflects an emphasis on the effect of the perception of trend, which can be derived 
from multiple, dynamic proximity cues, on people’s judgments of propensity. To 
illustrate this second cue of propensity, consider two glass marbles sitting close to 
the edge of a table. Marble A has been sitting at the same place all along while 
Marble B was rolling towards the edge but stopped at the same distance to the edge 
as Marble A. Although the static proximities of the final results are the same (i.e., the 
distance between the marble and the edge was equal in the two cases), it is argued 
that the sense that “Marble B almost or could have fallen off the table” is somewhat 
stronger than “Marble A almost or could have fallen off the table” because the 
motion of Marble B displayed a trend toward traveling over the edge of the table 
while such a trend was weak for Marble A.  
The reason why the perception of progression towards a focal outcome would 
heighten one’s judgments of propensity and counterfactual probability could be that 
the perception of progression, like the perception of proximity, facilitates mental 
simulations. As mentioned earlier, according to the theorization of the simulation 
heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), the factors that facilitate the mental 
construction of a counterfactual world will also heighten counterfactual probability 
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estimates. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, proximity to a focal outcome heightens 
counterfactual probability estimates, presumably because it made the mutation of the 
reality to its alternative less effortful. In a similar manner, it might be easier to 
construct a counterfactual world in which the development of an event has retained 
its trend from the real world than a counterfactual world in which the development of 
an event suddenly possesses a new trend or dispossesses a trend that it had before 
because less mental mutation is required in the former case.   
The perception of progression, derived from the identification of the trend of 
multiple proximity cues, could exert huge impacts on counterfactual probability 
estimates and emotional experiences. However, most of the previous research has 
adopted a static view and focused exclusively on the effect of the static proximity of 
the end results on counterfactual probability judgments. For example, in a series of 
studies presented by Teigen (1998) examining what is called the proximity heuristic, 
participants’ perceptions of closeness were manipulated by (1) varying the winning 
margin in a ski race; (2) varying the distance between the loaded chamber and the 
empty chamber at which the revolver has stopped in a Russian roulette game and (3) 
varying the distance between one’s car and the car crushed in a rockslide. Those 
manipulations were all concerned with the proximity of end results.  
Notably, a study in the same article (Study 3) which featured a scenario about 
a handball game did supply the participants with more than one proximity cue – 
participants were exposed to the information about both the half-time results and the 
full time results. It was found that given the same full time results, a handball team 
which lost the game was judged more likely to win if it had been in the lead at half 
time than if it had been trialled behind. It could be argued that this finding goes 
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against the proposition regarding the effect of progression, which would have 
predicted that the team which lost the first half should be judged to be more likely to 
win because it closed the gap in scores faster in the second half and thus 
demonstrated stronger progression towards winning. However, the establishment of 
the perception of progression might need to be fed by multiple proximity feedbacks. 
That is, the more feedbacks are provided during the development of an event, the 
easier a trend can be identified. For example, a basketball fan who follows a live 
game minute by minute might be more likely to obtain a perception of a trend of the 
game (e.g., the team is winning/losing) than another person who does not commit 
his/her full attention to the game and only peers at the scoreboard every five minutes. 
Thus, it is argued that the information provided about the variations in the scores in 
the handball game experiment might be insufficient for a perception of progression 
to be formed. 
Most of the research on the emotional consequences of near-misses has also 
failed to address the impact of multiple proximity cues. For example, in one 
aforementioned study by Medvec and Savitsky (1997), proximity was manipulated 
by varying the numerical closeness of a student’s examination mark and the 
boundary of a different grade (for similar examples, see Johnson, 1986; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1982; Macrae et al., 1993; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; Miller & 
McFarland, 1986). In some studies, even when information about the variations in 
proximity was provided, this information was not part of the manipulation. For 
example, in one study by McMullen and Markman (2002, Experiment 2), 
participants were asked to read a play-by-play account of a basketball game. They 
were assigned to one of the two closeness conditions with respect to the proximity of 
the final scores.  The play-by-play account of the game did not only contain the 
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information about the final results but also about how the scores had changed over 
the course of the game. That is, the development of the game was either described to 
have been a neck-and-neck situation throughout the game or to have been dominated 
by one team (i.e., one team took a lead in the beginning and that lead was enhanced 
throughout the game). However, because the close (end results) condition was 
always paired with the “neck-and-neck” account and the far (end results) condition 
was always paired with the “domination” account, the net effect of the two types of 
trends on emotions could not be separated from the effect of proximity.  
A similar case is a study by Markman and Tetlock (2000), in which 
participants were asked to choose to invest in one of the two stocks which they 
thought would beat the other after a period of time. They then monitored the stocks’ 
performance on a graph displayed on a computer screen, which sketched out the 
fluctuation in the values of both stocks over time. Again, the effect of progression 
could not be separated from that of proximity because a “catching up” trend was 
always paired with a close condition while a “trailing off” trend was always paired 
with a far condition.  
  To fill this empirical gap, the effects of perceived progression on 
counterfactual probability estimates and emotions were tested in the present chapter. 
The predictions regarding those effects are summarized in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 and 
will be examined within the context where a desirable outcome is perceived to be 
close. 
Firstly, in accordance with Kahneman and Varey (1990), when the proximity 
of the final outcome is held constant, counterfactual probability estimates should be 
higher if the outcome is preceded by a causal episode with multiple proximity cues 
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which display a tendency of the progression towards its alternative outcome (i.e., 
shrinking distance), in comparison with when such a tendency is absent. This effect 
is denoted as Path a in Figure 3.1.  
Secondly, in accordance with the REM (Markman & McMullen 2003), 
counterfactual probability estimates should have an effect on emotions, whose nature 
depends on the perception of future possibility (path b in Figure 3.1). When future 
possibility is absent, the contrast effect was expected to be enhanced and dominate 
one’s affective experiences as a result of the evaluative simulation. In the context 
where a desirable outcome is perceived to be close, this would mean that a higher 
counterfactual probability estimate should lead to a worse mood. In comparison, 
when future possibility is present, the assimilation effect was expected to be 
enhanced and dominate one’s affective experiences as a result of the reflective 
simulation, in which case a higher counterfactual probability estimate should lead to 
a better mood. 
Thirdly, if both of the hypotheses above stand, a total effect of progression on 
affect should be observed (path c in Figure 3.2) and this effect should be moderated 
by the perception of future possibility. In the context where a desirable outcome is 
perceived to be close, when future possibility is absent, the perceived progression to 
a focal outcome should worsen one’s mood (contrast-effect-domination). In 
comparison, when future possibility is present, the perceived progression to a focal 
outcome should improve one’s mood (assimilation-effect-domination). Of course, 
this total moderated effect should be mediated by one’s counterfactual probability 
judgments (path ab). 
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Finally, in line with the REM, the moderating effect of future possibility 
should operate via an attention-switching mechanism. It was predicted that the 
presence of future possibility should divert people’s attention from the past 
implication of the highly probable counterfactual (the difference between what could 
have happened and what did happen) to its future implications (what can happen in 
the future).  
These hypotheses were tested in the two experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) 
presented in this chapter in the context of horse racing, where the sense of 
c’ 
b a 
Progression Affect 
Counterfactual 
Probability 
Estimates 
Future possibility 
Figure 3.2 The Total Effect of Progression on Affect Moderated 
by Future Possibility 
Figure 3.1 Mediating Effect of Counterfactual Probability 
Estimates Moderated by Future Possibility 
c 
Progression Affect 
Future possibility 
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progression was operationalized as the variation in the physical distance between the 
horses. It was believed that a shrinking distance between the target horse and the 
leader would provoke a stronger sense that “the horse is winning” during the race 
and that “the horse could have won” after the race than if the distance keeps 
constant.  
3.2 Experiment 4 
In this experiment, participants were presented with a story about a horse race 
and were asked to imagine they were betting on one of the horses, which was 
depicted to have stumbled right before the finishing line and finally came second in 
the race. It was predicted that the participants’ subjective probability of the horse 
winning the race (when in fact it lost) would be heightened if the horse had been 
gaining rapidly on the leader before stumbling rather than being consistently behind 
the leader throughout the race, because the causal script in the former case provoked 
a stronger sense of progression towards the target outcome (i.e., winning the race).  
The emotional consequences of this sense of progression should be 
moderated by the perception of future possibility (FP), which was manipulated by 
varying the decisiveness of the race. That is, the contrast effect should be enhanced 
and dominate one’s affective experiences (i.e., worse mood if the horse had been 
catching up rather than following consistently behind) when the gamblers’ winning 
or losing money was determined by the result of  the just-finished race alone (i.e., 
FP: low), while the assimilation effect should be enhanced and dominate one’s 
affective experiences (i.e., better mood if the horse had been catching up rather than 
following consistently behind) when the gambler did not lose money unless the horse 
also lost a second future race (i.e., FP: high). What’s more, this interaction between 
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perceived progression and future possibility should be able to be partly accounted for 
by one’s counterfactual probability estimates  
The attentional-switching mechanism was also tested by this experiment. It 
was expected that participants should focus less on its past implications (i.e., what 
could have happened in the just-finished race) and more on the future implication of 
a counterfactual (i.e., what can happen in the future races) if the race was not 
decisive than if it was.   
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Design 
The experiment investigated the effects of two independent variables - 
perceived progression and future possibility (FP) - on counterfactual probability 
estimates and emotions using a 2 (Progression: Present/Absent) × 2 (FP: High/Low) 
between-participant design.   
3.2.1.2 Participants 
The 114 psychology undergraduates of Durham University who had read and 
answered questions regarding the job entry examination scenario in Experiment 2 
constituted the sample (see Section 2.3) 
3.2.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
After they finished answering the question about the story in Experiment 2, 
participants were prompted to continue to read a second story. They were randomly 
re-assigned to one of the four conditions. Here is the story for Progression: 
Present/FP: Low condition: 
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Please vividly imagine that you are now at Doncaster 
Racecourse and are in the middle of the horse racing event 
Racing Post Trophy. The upcoming race is a 5-furlong (1 
kilometre) flat race consisting of 8 horses. You’ve bet £50 
on the horse Captain Dunne to win the race. The horse 
you bet on was considered to have a moderate chance of 
winning and if it does win, you will get your stake of £50 
back plus a bonus of £50. If the horse does not win, you 
will lose the total stake of £50. Now, all the 8 horses are 
ready in the stalls and the race is about to begin.  
[The gates were opened and the horses set off! Your horse 
Captain Dunne had a fairly weak start and was in 5th place 
at the half way point (500 metres), 7 metres short of the 
leading horse Cosmic Sun (in racing terminology about ‘3 
lengths’). However, your horse Captain Dunne started to 
increase its pace at the beginning of the second half of the 
race. It overtook its opponents one after another and 
advanced rapidly to the leading horse Cosmic Sun. The 
leading horse was losing its advantage at a fast and steady 
rate – 6 metres, 4 metres, 2 metres – and 100 metres from 
the finishing line, your horse Captain Dunne was in 2
nd
 
place and just 1 metre short of the leader Cosmic Sun (in 
racing terminology about ‘half a length’).] But suddenly the 
horse in 3
rd
 place went out of control and ran into the back 
of your horse Captain Dunne. This incident caused your 
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horse Captain Dunne to lose its step and stumble slightly. 
Although your horse was not injured and the jockey 
responded quickly and succeeded in avoiding a total fall 
over, your horse Captain Dunne clearly lost pace and lost 
ground on the leading horse. As a result, your horse finished 
2nd about 3 metres (one and a half lengths) behind the 
winner Cosmic Sun. You lost your £50 stake. It was also 
reported that the horse which had caused the incident was 
severely injured and would not be able to run any race for at 
least a month.  
In the FP: High condition, the two parts of the story in bold were replaced in 
order by “Those horses will be competing in the same race again one week later at 
the same venue. You’ve bet £50 on the horse Captain Dunne to win at least one of 
the two races. The horse you bet on was considered to have a moderate chance of 
winning and if it does win one or both of the two races, you will get your stake of 
£50 back plus a bonus of £50. If the horse does not win at least one of the two races, 
you will lose the total stake of £50. You are not allowed to switch your bet to other 
horses once the first race begins.” and “Now your horse needs to win the second race 
to stop you from losing your £50 stake”  
In the Progression: Absent condition, the text in the square brackets was 
replaced by “The gates were opened and the horses set off! From the start of the race 
your horse Captain Dunne was in 2nd place and 1 metre short of the leader Cosmic 
Sun (or in racing terminology about ‘half a length’). Cosmic Sun sustained the 
advantage throughout the first half of the race and at the half-way point (500 metres), 
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your horse Captain Dunne was still 1 metre short. The finishing line was getting 
closer and this 1 metre deficit remained constant. 100 metres from the finishing line, 
your horse Captain Dunne was still in 2nd place and 1 metre short of the leader 
Cosmic Sun.” 
The story was followed by a number of questions. To measure participants’ 
temporal perspective (i.e., the extent to which their thoughts were oriented to the past 
implications of a counterfactual as opposed to its future implications), an open-ended 
question was presented to participants where they were prompted to list five thoughts 
that most easily came to their mind regarding what had happened in the story. 
Participants’ emotional responses were then measured by asking them to rate 
on a 9-point scales (1=Not at all, 9=Extremely) the extent to which the following 
emotions described their feelings after the race: “happy”, “satisfied”, “pleased”, 
“delighted”, “content”, “relieved”, “glad”, “proud”, “determined”, “annoyed”, 
“frustrated”, “miserable”, “sad”, “depressed”, “gloomy”, “disappointed”, “guilty”, 
“regretful” .  The ratings were rescored from 0 (1=not at all) to -8 (9=extremely) for 
the negative emotions and 0 (1=not at all) to +8 (9=extremely) for the positive 
emotions. Hence, on both positive and negative scales, 0 represents a lack of emotion 
(neutrality) with higher scores representing better moods and lower scores worse 
moods.  
To provide complementary measures of people’s temporal perspective, the 
participants were presented with six statements and were asked to rate on 9-point 
scales how likely each of those thoughts would come to their mind given what had 
happened in the story (1=Extremely unlikely, 9=Extremely likely). As Table 3.1 
demonstrates, among these statements, three expressed the will to mutate a certain 
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event in the past and thus reflected a focus on the past implications of a 
counterfactual while the other three expressed the speaker’s confidence in the horse 
or its possibility to win future races and thus reflected a focus on the future 
implications of a counterfactual. These thoughts were picked from the free-responses 
of a different group of participants in a pilot study conducted earlier which adopted 
the same scenario.  
Participants’ counterfactual probability estimates were measured by asking 
them to rate on a 9-point scale as to “How likely you think the horse you bet on 
(Captain Dunne) would have won the race if it hadn’t stumbled 100 metres from the 
finishing line?” (1=Extremely unlikely, 9=Extremely likely). 
Table 3.1  Items for Measuring Temporal Perspective 
Category Statements 
Past-Implications 
1: If only the accident hadn’t happened. 
2: If only I had bet on another horse. 
3: That horse which ran into Captain Dunne really annoyed 
me. 
Future-Implications  
1: Captain Dunne almost won the race and it will have a 
good chance to win next time. 
2: At least I didn’t bet on the horse that was injured.  
3: Captain Dunne performed well and had the potential to 
win the race. 
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To check if the manipulation on the perception of progression was successful, 
participants were presented with a climbing curve and a flat line (see A and B below) 
and asked to choose one that they thought best described the finished race.  
 The questionnaire also included some measures whose purposes digress 
from the main theme of the thesis. However, a complete sample of the questionnaire 
can be found in Appendix D. 
3.2.2 Results 
3.2.2.1 Manipulation Check 
If the manipulation of the perception of progression was successful, a higher 
proportion of participants in the Progression: Present condition than in the 
Progression: Absent condition should choose the climbing curve A instead of the flat 
line B as a better representation of the horse race. The results show that while a 
significant minority of only 36.2% of the participants in Progression: Absent 
condition picked climbing curve A best representing the horse race (21 out of 58, 
χ2(1, N=58) = 4.41, p = .036, w = .28), this proportion was raised to a significant 
majority of 74.1% in the Progression: Present condition (40 out of 54, χ2(1, N=54) = 
12.52, p < .001, w = .48). The change in the proportion was significant (χ2(1, N=112) 
= 16.17, p < .001, w = .38). Those results indicate that the manipulation of the 
perception of progression was successful. 
A B 
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3.2.2.2 Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
Supporting the prediction that the sense of progression towards the target 
outcome would heighten one’s counterfactual probability estimates, a two-way 
perceived progression × future possibility ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
progression on participants’ ratings of counterfactual probability (F(1, 110) = 34.94, 
p < .001, r = .49) (see Figure 3.3). More specifically, the participants in the 
Progression: Present condition thought the horse was more likely to win the race (M 
= 7.44, SD = 1.26) than those in the Progression: Absent condition (M = 5.80, SD = 
1.64). As expected, the analysis did not reveal a significant main effect of future 
possibility or a significant interaction between the two independent variables (F(1, 
110) = 0.53, p = .467, r = .07; F(1, 110) = 0.07, p = .792, r = .03, respectively).  
3.2.2.3 Affective States 
The 18-item affect measurements yielded a high internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s α = .88). However, the item “determined” had a weak correlation (r = 
.19) with the sum of the scales so it was excluded from the analysis. By doing this 
the inter-item reliability was lifted slightly (Cronbach’s α = .89). The remaining 17 
items were averaged to establish an affective index for each participant. A two-way 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of future possibility on affect ratings 
(F(1,110) = 16.47, p < .001, r = .36) (see Figure 3.4). In general, the participants 
judged that the gambler would be feeling better when the outcome of the race was 
not decisive (M = -0.71, SD = 1.02) than when there was no second chance (M = -
1.52, SD = 1.09).  This was within expectation because generally speaking, the 
outcome in the FP: High condition was less severe than that in the FP: Low 
condition and therefore it should elicit less intense negative emotions. Also within 
expectation was a non-significant main effect of Progression (F(1,110) = 0.14, p = 
.712, r = .03). 
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Figure 3.3 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Counterfactual Probability 
Estimates across all Conditions 
Figure 3.4 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Affect Ratings across all 
Conditions 
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However, the predicted progression × future possibility interaction was also 
non-significant (F(1,110) = 0.22, p = .639, r = .04) (see Figure 3.4), which fails to 
support the hypothesis that the emotional consequences of perceived progression 
should be moderated by the perception of future possibility. In fact, no evidence was 
found that the perceived progression influenced emotions at all – the analyses reveal 
that the difference in the affect ratings between the Progression: Absent and the 
Progression: Present condition was not significant in either the FP: Low or the FP: 
High condition (F(1, 55) = 0.33, p = .566, r = .08; F(1, 55) = 0.01, p = .941, r < .01, 
respectively).  
3.2.2.4 Mediating Effect of Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
It was predicted that participants’ counterfactual probability estimates should 
mediate the effect of the perceived progression on emotions and the nature of the 
mediation should depend on the perception of future possibility. However, because 
the total effect of progression on emotions was not found to be significant in either 
of the two future possibility conditions, the hypothesis regarding the moderated 
mediating effect of counterfactual probability estimates was not supported. Like in 
Experiment 2, analyses recommended by Preacher et al. (2007) were carried out to 
explore the possibility that the perceived progression has an indirect effect on 
emotions via counterfactual probability judgments, which is moderated by perceived 
future possibility (FP). 
  As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, the predicted total effect of progression on 
emotions was denoted by path c. The predicted indirect effect of progression on 
emotions via counterfactual probability estimates was denoted by path ab, with a 
representing the effect of proximity on counterfactual probability estimates and path 
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b representing the effect of counterfactual probability estimates on emotions when 
controlling for proximity. Further, importantly, it was proposed that the nature of 
path b was moderated by perceived future possibility (FP). Before this moderated 
indirect effect was tested, participants’ progression conditions were coded as 0 
(absent) or 1 (present) and their FP conditions were coded as 0 (FP: High) and 1 (FP: 
Low).  
First of all, path a was examined by conducting a regression on 
counterfactual probability estimates with progression as the predictor. Consistent 
with the earlier results of the two-way ANOVA, it was found that progression 
significantly predicted counterfactual probability estimates in the expected direction 
(β = 0.49, t = 5.96, p < .001). Secondly, to investigate path b, a multiple regression 
was conducted on emotions with progression, counterfactual probability estimates, 
FP as well as the product of counterfactual probability estimates and FP as the 
predictors. As Table 3.2 shows, against the prediction, the product of counterfactual 
probability estimates and FP did not significantly predict emotions. This non-
significant interaction implies that overall, the indirect effect of progression on 
emotions via counterfactual probability estimates is not moderated by FP.  
Table 3.2  Regression on Emotions 
Predictor  β t value p - value 
Constant - -0.33 0.743 
Progression 0.07 0.69 0.492 
CTP -0.13 -0.98 0.329 
FP -0.06 -0.17 0.868 
CTP × FP -0.33 -0.91 0.367 
Note: Key: CTP = Counterfactual Probability Judgments; FP = Future Possibility 
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However, the analysis on the indirect effect in each individual FP condition 
revealed that the indirect effect of progression on emotions via counterfactual 
probability estimates (path ab) was significant only in the FP: Low condition (Z = -
2.05, p = .040; Bootstrap (5000 samples) 95% CI: {-0.6363, -0.0286}), reflecting the 
quality of the contrast effect. On the other hand, this indirect effect was weaker and 
did not reach a significant level in the FP: High condition (Z = -0.95, p = .340; 
Bootstrap (5000 samples) 95% CI: {-0.5287, 0.1993}). This is backed up by the 
results of multiple-regression analyses conducted in each individual FP condition, 
which revealed that counterfactual probability estimates significantly predicted 
emotions when controlling for perceived progression (path b) only in the FP: Low 
condition (β = -0.30, t = -2.02, p = .048)  but not in the FP: High condition (β = -
0.15, t = -0.96, p = .342). These results provide some support to the proposition that 
the perceived progression has an indirect effect on emotions via counterfactual 
probability estimates and the nature of the indirect effect is moderated by the 
perception of future possibility.  
3.2.2.5 Attention Focus 
Participants’ free written responses were coded as to whether they reflected a 
focus on the past implications of a counterfactual or its future implications. The 
coding scheme followed similar protocols as in Experiment 1 and the inter-coder 
reliability was high (Agreement percentage = 98%; Cohen’s Kappa = 88%). 
Examples for the statements that reflected a past perspective are: “I would have won 
if it wasn’t for that horse”; “Annoyed feeling, as you could have won the £50 bonus 
if the race went to plan” and “If the other horse hadn’t caused the accident it would 
have been fine”. Examples for the statements that reflected a future perspective are: 
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“Good chance of winning the 2nd race”; “It could win next time” and “optimistic 
about next time”. 
Table 3.3 summarises the number of past and future-perspective statements 
generated by participants in the two future possibility conditions. It is noticeable that 
only a small proportion of the total statements can be categorised as either future or 
past-perspective statements. Thus, like in Experiment 2, the non-parametric Chi-
square test was conducted on the total number of statements in each category. In 
total, participants generated a slightly smaller proportion of past-perspective 
statements in the FP: High condition (25 out of 277, 9.0%) than in the FP: Low 
condition (32 out of 278, 11.5%), although this difference was not significant (χ2(1, 
N=555) = 0.93, p = .335, w = .04). On the other hand, participants generated a bigger 
proportion of future-perspective statements in the FP: High condition (40 out of 277, 
14.4%) than in the FP: Low condition (9 out of 278, 3.2%). This difference was 
significant (χ2(1, N=555) = 21.63, p < .001, w = .20).   
Table 3.3 The Number of Past and Future-perspective Statements Generated by 
Participants across FP: Low and FP: High condition 
Category FP: Low (N = 55) FP: High (N = 59) 
Future-perspective 9 (0.16) 40 (0.70) 
Past-perspective 32 (0.56) 25 (0.44) 
Total 278 (4.88) 277 (4.86) 
Note: Figures in brackets in row 2, 3 and 4 indicate the average number of statements per 
participant in that particular category and condition. 
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Ratings were also obtained towards statements which reflected either a focus 
on the past implications of a counterfactual or its future implications. The ratings on 
the three past-perspective statements displayed a poor inter-item reliability 
(Cronbach’s α = .42). A principal component factor analysis on the three items 
(KMO = .51; Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2(3) = 24.95, p < .001) suggests a one-
factor solution (Eigenvalue = 1.47, explained 48.8% of the total variance). Item 1 
and 3, loaded heavily onto this factor (.82 and .84, respectively) while the loading of 
item 2 was weak (.30). Thus, item 2 was deleted from the scale and inter-item 
reliability was lifted (Cronbach’s α = .59). Against the prediction, a two-way 
ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of future possibility on the ratings of 
past-implication statements (F(1,110) = 0.31, p = .577, r = .05). That is, the ratings 
of past-implication statements generated in the FP: Low condition was not 
significantly higher (M = 6.75, SD = 1.84) than in the FP: High condition (M = 6.57, 
SD = 1.83).  
The ratings on the three future-perspective statements also displayed a poor 
inter-item reliability (Cronbach’s α = .54). A principal component factor analysis on 
the three items (KMO = .56; Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2(3) = 38.25, p < .001) 
suggests a one-factor solution (Eigenvalue = 1.63, explained 54.4% of the total 
variance). Item 1 and 3, loaded heavily onto this factor (.80 and .83, respectively) 
while the loading of item 2 was relatively weak (.54). Thus, item 2 was deleted from 
the scale and inter-item reliability was lifted (Cronbach’s α = .65). A two-way 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of future possibility on the ratings of 
future-implications statements (F(1,110) = 17.60, p < .001, r = .37). On average, 
participants rated the two future-implication statements higher in the FP: High 
condition (M = 7.14, SD = 1.53) than the FP: Low condition (M = 5.85, SD = 1.80), 
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indicating that the participants in the FP: High condition were more future-oriented 
than those in the FP: Low condition.  
Generally speaking, being consistent with the findings of Experiment 1 and 2, 
those results suggest that the presence of future possibility encouraged people to 
focus more on the future implications of a counterfactual. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
When exposed to multiple proximity cues, the perception of closeness of an 
alternative outcome might be shaped not only by a single, static proximity cue 
derived from the end result but also by the variations in proximity over time. The 
present experiment found evidence for this proposition – a race horse, which had a 
weak start but then kept gaining on the leader, was perceived to be more likely to 
have won the race than the other horse, which was following right behind the leader 
consistently, despite both horses stumbling metres before the finishing line when 
they were neck-and-neck and failing to show by the same amount of distance. It was 
argued that, in both cases, people would start a mental simulation in which the 
mutability of the factual outcome was examined on the condition that the horse did 
not stumble. The shrinking distance in the catching-up scenario makes the 
imagination of winning easier than in the other scenario and thus led to higher 
counterfactual probability estimates.   
However, the effect of progression on counterfactual probability estimates 
did not seem to be passed on to emotions reactions. The experiment failed to 
demonstrate a significant total effect of progression on emotions in either the FP: 
Low or the FP: High condition. Nonetheless, the indirect effect analyses indicate that  
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the perceived progression did have an indirect effect on emotions via counterfactual 
probability estimates. This effect, being consistent with the general principle of the 
REM, appeared to be dependent on the perception of future possibility. That is, 
counterfactual probability judgments negatively predicted emotions only when future 
possibility was low (i.e., no future races) but not when future possibility was high, 
although this discrepancy in the correlational strengths was not quite strong enough 
to produce a significant interaction between counterfactual probability estimates and 
future possibility on emotions.   
It was speculated that the null total effect of progression on emotions could 
be the result of the insufficient strength of the textual-based manipulation. Future 
experiments should employ more vivid stimuli such as graphic illustrations. As noted 
by Roese, Fessel, Summerville, Kruger, and Dilich (2006), the vividness of the 
stimuli increases the mental processing fluency, which could facilitate the 
establishment of the sense of progression. What’s more, it was possible that losing 
£50 might be a negative outcome that is so severe that its huge impact on emotions 
overshadowed other factors like progression. Thus, scenarios featuring less dramatic 
outcomes should be considered in future experiments.  
3.3 Experiment 5 
The previous experiment has demonstrated that people’s counterfactual 
probability estimates would increase when the causal script of an event displayed a 
progression towards the target outcome. However, it failed to demonstrate the effects 
of the sense of progression on emotions, possibly due to an inadequacy in the 
strength of the progression manipulation. The present experiment used a similar 
horse-racing scenario. To enhance the strength of the manipulation of progression, 
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the text-based description of the race was supplemented by graphic-based 
illustrations to facilitate the formation of the sense of trend. Also, a mixed-design 
was employed in the present experiment with progression being treated as a within-
participant variable. As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, within-participant design has 
been showed by Teigen (1998) to be able to enhance the strength of the proximity 
manipulation. Thus, the manipulation of progression was expected to be more potent 
in a within-participant design as well. Finally, the severity of the negative outcome 
(i.e., losing the race) was reduced for the gamblers by decreasing their stakes put into 
the bet from £50 in the previous experiment to £30. This was to enhance the strength 
of the progression stimulation on emotions by drawing participants’ attention more 
to the trend of the race instead of the valence of the outcome when making 
judgments of affect. The same predictions were made regarding the effects of 
progression on counterfactual probability estimates and emotions as in Experiment 4. 
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Design 
The experiment investigated the effects of two independent variables - 
perceived progression and future possibility (FP) - on people’s counterfactual 
probability estimates and emotions. It was a 2 (Progression: Present/Absent) × 2 (FP: 
Low/High) mixed-design with progression treated as a within-participant variable 
and FP a between-participant variable.   
3.3.1.2 Participants 
A total of 107 students of Durham University participated in the experiment 
(40 Males, 65 Females, 2 failed to report gender). Among them, 15 were recruited 
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and responded to the questionnaires in one of their maths classes pertaining to a 
foundation program. The remaining 92 students were recruited in the university main 
library. The latter group of participants were each offered £2 monetary incentives.  
3.3.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
The horse racing story in the previous experiment was re-adopted with trivial 
adaptions to go along with the mixed-design. To be more specific, all participants 
read that there were two gamblers (Henry and John) betting on two different horses 
in the same race. The manipulations of progression and future possibility were 
carried out in the same fashion as in Experiment 4. The scenario for the FP: Low 
condition reads as this.  
Henry and John are at Doncaster Racecourse and are in the 
middle of the horse racing event Racing Post Trophy. The 
upcoming race is a 5-furlong (1 kilometre) flat race consisting 
of 8 horses. [Henry has bet £30 on the horse Captain Dunne 
to win the race and John instead, has bet £30 on Silver Line to 
win the race] (see Betting Table below).  
 
Betting Table 
•Captain Dunne Henry 
•Silver Line John 
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Both horses they bet on were considered to have a moderate 
chance of winning and [Henry and John will get their stake of 
£30 back plus a bonus of £30 if the horse they bet on does 
win. If their horse does not win, they will lose the total stake 
of £30. ] Now, all the 8 horses are ready in the stalls and the 
race is about to begin.  
The gates were opened and the horses set off (see Figure A)! 
 
Figure A Start off 
Henry’s horse Captain Dunne started strongly. It obtained 
2nd place and was 1 metre short of the leader Cosmic Sun. 
Cosmic Sun sustained this advantage throughout the first half 
of the race and at the half-way point (500 metres), Captain 
Dunne was still 1 metre short (see Figure B). 
50 M 
Henry’s Captain Dunne John’s Silver Line 
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On the other hand, John’s horse Silver Line had a fairly weak 
start and was in 5th place at the half way point (500 metres), 
7 metres short of the leading horse Cosmic Sun (see Figure B). 
 
Figure B Half way 
The finishing line was getting closer and the 1 metre deficit 
between Henry’s horse Captain Dunne and Comic Sun 
remained constant. However, John’s horse Silver Line started 
to increase its pace at the beginning of the second half of the 
race. It overtook its opponents one after another and advanced 
rapidly to the leading horse Cosmic Sun and 2
nd
 place Captain 
Dunne (see Figure C). 
 
500 M 
Henry’s Captain Dunne John’s Silver Line 
700 M 
John’s Silver Line Henry’s Captain Dunne 
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Figure C 300 metres from finishing 
Silver Line was closing the gap between itself and the leading 
horse in a rapid and steady rate – 6 metres, 4 metres, 2 metres 
– and 100 metres from the finishing line, Silver Line was neck 
and neck with Henry’s horse Captain Dunne in 2nd place and 
they were both 1 metre short of the leader Cosmic Sun (see 
Figure D). 
 
Figure D 100 metres from finishing 
Suddenly the horse in 4th place went out of control and ran 
into the backs of Henry and John’s horses. This incident 
caused both Captain Dunne and Silver Line to lose their step 
and stumble slightly. Although both horses were not injured 
and the jockeys of both horses responded quickly and 
succeeded in avoiding a total fall over, they clearly lost pace 
and lost ground on the leading horse. As a result, Henry’s 
horse Captain Dunne and John’s horse Silver Line finished 
the race at almost the same time, 4 metres behind the winner 
900 M 
Henry’s Captain Dunne John’s Silver Line 
152 
 
Cosmic Sun (see Figure E). [Henry and John both lost their 
£30 stake.]  
 
Figure E Finishing 
In the FP: High condition, the text in the square brackets was replaced in 
order by the words “Those horses will be competing in the same race again one week 
later at the same venue. Henry has bet £30 on the horse Captain Dunne to win at 
least one of the two races. Instead, John has bet £30 on the horse Silver Line to win 
at least one of the two races”, “Henry and John will get their stake of £30 back plus a 
bonus of £30 if their horse wins one or both races. If their horse does not win at least 
one of the two races, they will lose the total stake of £30. They are not allowed to 
switch their bet to other horses once the first race begins” and “Now Henry and 
John’s horses need to win the second race to stop them from losing their £30 stake”. 
Like in Experiment 3, both a single-item and a multi-item affect scale were 
employed to measure participants’ affect judgments. Participants were firstly asked 
to rate the global affective states of Henry and John respectively on a 9-point scale (1 
= Extremely negative; 9 = Extremely positive) by responding to the question “In 
general, how negative or positive do you think Henry and John will be feeling 
respectively after the race?”.  
Henry’s Captain Dunne John’s Silver Line 
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Then the participants were presented with 12 emotion-related adjectives 
(“Happy”, “Annoyed”, “Satisfied”, “Frustrated”, “Pleased”, “Miserable”, “Content”, 
“Disappointed”, “Proud”, “Regretful”, “Elated” and “Discouraged”). Under each 
emotion-related adjective, the participants were asked to rate on a 9-point scale both 
for Henry and John separately as to the extent to which they thought Henry and John 
would experience that particular emotion (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely). As in 
previous experiments, those ratings were rescored from 0 (1=not at all) to -8 
(9=extremely) for the negative emotions and 0 (1=not at all) to +8 (9=extremely) for 
the positive emotions. Hence, on both positive and negative scales, 0 represents a 
lack of emotion (neutrality) with higher scores representing better moods and lower 
scores worse moods.  
To measure counterfactual probability estimates, the participants were asked:  
“How likely do you think Henry’s and John’s horses would have won the race if the 
accident had not happened 100 metres from the finishing line?” (1 = Extremely 
unlikely, 9 = Extremely likely).  
The questionnaire also included some measures whose purposes digress from 
the main theme of the thesis. However, a complete sample of the questionnaire can 
be found in Appendix E. 
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3.3.2 Results 
3.2.2.1 Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
Confirming the finding of Experiment 4, a two-way perceived progression × 
future possibility ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of perceived 
progression on counterfactual probability estimates (F(1, 103) = 32.64, p < .001, r 
= .49)(See Figure 3.5). To be more specific, participants judged that John’s horse 
(Progression: Present) had been more likely to win the race (M = 6.73, SD = 1.51) 
than Henry’s horse (Progression: Absent) (M = 5.61, SD = 1.66). However, it should 
be noted that the effect size was no bigger than that found in Experiment 4 (where r 
= .49 as well), which used a between-participant design. Surprisingly, the main 
effect of future possibility was also found significant (F(1,103) = 5.21, p = .024, r 
= .22). The participants who were told there was going to be two races (FP: High) 
assigned higher counterfactual probability ratings to the horses (M = 6.44, SD = 1.71) 
than those who were told there was going to be only one race (FP: Low) (M = 5.91, 
SD = 1.69). The cause of this effect is unclear but it is possible that the unchangeable 
outcome in the FP: Low condition might have activated the participants’ 
psychological defense system (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002), under the influence of which 
people understated the mutability of a past outcome in order to gain comforts. 
Finally, as expected, no significant progression × FP interaction was found (F(1, 103) 
= 0.12, p = .731, r = .03). 
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Figure 3.5 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Counterfactual Probability 
Estimates across all Conditions 
Figure 3.6 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Affect Ratings across all 
Conditions 
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3.2.2.2 Affect States 
Like in Experiment 3, participants’ ratings on the single-item and multi-item 
affect scales produced the same pattern of results. Thus, only the analyses on the 
multi-item affect ratings are reported here. The 12-item affect measures yielded a 
good internal reliability both in the ratings for Henry (Cronbach’s α = .78) and John 
(Cronbach’s α = .86). However, the item “regretful” was found to be poorly 
correlated to the total measures (r = .13 for Henry and r = .24 for John). After 
deleting this item from the scale, the internal reliabilities were improved (Cronbach’s 
α = .80 for Henry and Cronbach’s α = .87 for John). The remaining 11 items were 
averaged to form a measure of the global affective state for both Henry and John.  
A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of future possibility 
on participants’ affect ratings (F(1, 104) = 11.05, p = .001, r = .31) (See Figure 3.6). 
That is, the participants who were told there was going to be two races (FP: High) 
gave higher affect ratings to Henry and John (M = -1.02, SD = 1.46) than those who 
were told there was going to be only one race (FP: Low) (M = -1.68, SD = 1.43). 
This is unsurprising because the outcome of the race was less severe if it was not 
decisive and should elicit less intense negative emotional reactions. However, the 
predicted progression × FP interaction was not significant (F(1, 104) = 1.20, p = .276, 
r = .10). Instead, the analysis found a significant main effect of progression (F(1, 
104) = 17.58, p = .001, r = .38). Regardless of FP condition, participants Judged that 
John (Progression: Present) would feel better (M = -1.14, SD = 1.32) than Henry 
(Progression: Absent) (M = -1.57, SD = 1.04). These results fail to support the 
hypotheses that the perception of future possibility moderates the emotional 
consequences of perceived progression.  
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3.2.2.3 The Mediating Effect of Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
The mediating role of counterfactual probability estimates in the relationship 
between progression and emotions was examined by the same method in Experiment 
3, recommended by Judd et al. (2001). The data were examined against the following 
criteria for mediation: (1) Progression has effects on counterfactual probability 
estimates; (2) Progression has effects on emotions; (3) Counterfactual probability 
estimates were related with emotions in each progression condition; and (4) The 
difference in emotions between the two progression treatments (present/absent) 
could be predicted by the difference in counterfactual probability estimates. These 
four criteria were examined in order. The predictions derived from these four criteria 
for the FP: Low condition and the FP: High condition were summarised in Tables 
3.4 and 3.5 
The previous analysis has found a significant main effect of progression on 
counterfactual probability estimates. Therefore, criterion one is satisfied. Because the 
effects of progression and the counterfactual probability estimates on emotions were 
expected to differ across different level of future possibilities, the last three criteria 
were examined separately for the FP: Low and the FP: High conditions. 
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Table 3.4 Predictions and Results regarding the Four Criteria to Identify 
Counterfactual Probability Estimates as Mediating Variable (FP: Low condition) 
Criterion Prediction Descriptives p-value 
1 CP > CA CC > CF < .001 
2 AP < AA AC > AF = .002 
3 CP predicts AP  
CA predicts AA 
β = -0.002  
β = -0.28  
= .987 
= .045 
4 CD predicts AD β = -0.25 = .070 
Note: Key: A = Affect Ratings, C = Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
Key for subscript letters: P = Progression-Present, A = Progression-Absent, D = Difference 
between two progression Conditions 
 
Table 3.5 Predictions and Results regarding the Four Criteria to Identify 
Counterfactual Probability Estimates as Mediating Variable (FP: High condition) 
Criterion Prediction Descriptives p-value 
1 CP > CA CC > CF < .001 
2 AP > AA AC > AF = .008 
3 CP predicts AP  
CA predicts AA 
β = -0.20  
β = -0.14  
= .161 
= .327 
4 CD predicts AD β = -0.06 = .661 
Note: Key: A = Affect Ratings, C = Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
Key for subscript letters: P = Progression-Present, A = Progression-Absent, D = Difference 
between two progression Conditions 
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FP: Low 
When future possibility was low, progression was found to have an 
significant effect on emotions, (F(1, 53) = 10.42, p = .002, r = .41) (see Figure 3.6). 
However, this effect was not in the predicted direction. The perception of 
progression did not worsen one’s mood in the FP: Low condition. Instead, 
participants judged that John (Progression: Present) would feel more positively than 
Henry (Progression: Absent), which indicates progression has actually improved the 
gambler’s mood. It seemed that the assimilation effect was dominating one’s 
affective experience even when future possibility was low. If this was true, 
counterfactual probability estimates would be found to have a positive relationship 
with affect. However, in each individual progression condition, counterfactual 
probability estimates were found to have either a significant negative correlation or 
non-significant correlation with affect (see Table 3.4), indicating that the relationship 
between counterfactual probability estimates and affect was still, if any, contrast-
dominant. Further analysis also shows that the difference in the participants’ 
counterfactual probability estimates for Henry’s and John’s horses marginally and 
negatively predicted the difference in the affect ratings (see Table 3.4). Thus, the 
proposed mediating effect of counterfactual probability estimates was rejected on the 
ground that the indirect effect and the total effect were in opposite directions.  
The fact that counterfactual probability estimates were significantly 
correlated with emotions only when the progression was absent indicates that there 
was an interaction between progression and counterfactual probability estimates on 
people’s emotional reactions. That is, counterfactual probability estimates seems to 
influence emotions more strongly when the perceived progression was absent than 
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when it was present. However, further analysis shows that the sum of participants’ 
counterfactual probability estimates for Henry and John’s horses did not significantly 
predict the difference in the affect ratings (β = -0.17, t = 1.25, p = .217), indicating 
there was no significant interaction between progression and counterfactual 
probability estimates. 
Overall, these results suggest that in when future possibility was low, 
progression had an indirect effect on emotions via counterfactual probability 
estimates which reflected a quality of the contrast effect. However, this indirect 
effect seemed to be overridden by other mechanisms via which progression exerted 
impacts on emotions. 
FP: High 
When future possibility was high, progression was found to have an 
significant effect on emotions, (F(1, 51) = 7.62, p = .008, r = .36) (see Figure 3.6). 
Participants judged that John (Progression: Present) would feel more positively than 
Henry (Progression: Absent), indicating a domination of the assimilation effect. 
However, further analysis shows that in neither individual progression condition did 
counterfactual probability estimates have significant effects on affect (see Table 3.5). 
Also, the difference in the counterfactual probability estimates did not predict 
difference in the affect ratings (see Table 3.5). These results indicate that 
counterfactual probability estimates did not mediate or intervene the effect of 
progression on emotions in the FP: High condition and the observed total effect was 
caused by mechanisms other than the assimilation effect of counterfactuals.  
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The fact that negative correlations between counterfactual probability 
estimates and emotions were only found in the FP: Low condition but not in the FP: 
high condition indicates that the emotional consequences of counterfactual 
probability estimates, as well as the nature of the predicted indirect effect,  is 
contingent on future possibility, although none of those correlation coefficients in the 
FP: Low condition was significantly different from their counterparts in the FP: High 
condition (Z = 0.98, p = 0.327 for Progression: Present condition; Z = 0.72, p = 0.472 
for Progression: Absent condition; Z = 0.97, p = 0.332 for the difference). 
3.3.3 Discussion 
The present experiment successfully replicated the findings of Experiment 4 
that the perceived progression towards a focal outcome would heighten one’s 
counterfactual probability estimates regarding that outcome. It was found that 
regardless of the future possibility condition, participants thought the horse which 
had been catching up rapidly with the leader had a better chance to win the race than 
the horse which had been following the leader closely but consistently during the 
race. However, despite the fact that the present experiment used a more vivid 
stimulation of progression than its predecessor (i.e., graphic illustrations) and 
adopted a within-participant design to enhance the effect of the progression 
manipulation, the effect of progression on counterfactual probability judgments 
observed in this experiment was not stronger than the previous experiment. It was 
speculated that, while a within-participant setup  made salient to participants the 
different trends displayed by the two race horse, it might have also prohibited or 
disrupted the formation of the sense of progression by forcing one’s focus  to jump 
back and forth between the stories of the two horses.     
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What’s more, it was found in the present experiment that the absence of 
future possibility lowered one’s subjective likelihood of the horse winning, which 
indicates the possibility that counterfactual probability judgments can be influenced 
by motivational factors. Tykocinski and Steinberg (2005) discovered that people 
sometimes adopted a strategy called the retroactive pessimism as a defence 
mechanism when they failed to achieve their goal. That is, in the face of failure or 
grave disappointment, people sometimes oppress the thought that the success or a 
better outcome was very likely in order to gain comfort. In one of their studies, 
participants were asked to imagine that they applied for a grant to cover their tuition 
fee in university but failed to obtain it. Participants gave lower counterfactual 
probability estimates when the loss was severe (i.e., the grant could have covered 50% 
of their tuition fee) than when the loss was moderate (i.e., the grant could only have 
covered 10% of their tuition fee), presumably because people are more motivated to 
adopt the defensive mechanism when the outcome is severe than when it is not. 
Under a similar logic, in the present experiment, the participants in the FP: Low 
condition might have been more motivated to deny that their horse could have won 
than those in the FP: High condition because the outcome in the former case was 
more severe.  
Suggestive evidence was found that the perceived progression has an indirect 
effect on emotions via counterfactual probability estimates and the nature of this 
indirect effect depends on the perception of future possibility. The relationship 
between counterfactual probability estimates and emotions was indicative of a nature 
of contrast effect domination in the FP: Low condition and this relation seemed to be 
weaker (although not significantly) in the FP: High condition, suggesting that the 
presence of future possibility enhanced the assimilation effect.  
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However, the observed indirect effect seemed to be overshadowed by the 
influence of other factors.  In the experiment, participants judged that John 
(Progression: Present) would be feeling better than Henry (Progression: Absent) in 
both the FP: Low and the FP: High condition. However, these positive total effects 
were unlikely to be related with counterfactual thinking. First of all, in the FP: Low 
condition, this positive total effect of progression on affect was in the opposite 
direction to the effect of counterfactual probability estimates. Secondly, in the FP: 
High condition, the positive total effect still exists even when the effect of 
counterfactual probability estimates on affect was not significant.  
Thus, there seemed to be a mechanism between progression and emotions 
that operates independently from counterfactual probability estimates. It was 
speculated that in a horse race, the thrill and excitement that could be directly 
derived from the sense that “we are winning” could have contributed to the observed 
total effect. Indeed, in the present experiment, the perceived progression toward 
winning was found to increase counterfactual probability estimates and may evoke 
more intense disappointment regarding the outcome of the game (“The horse could 
have won but it didn’t!”). However, one might still be able to take joy out of the 
process of the race. That is, seeing one’s horse getting closer and closer to winning 
might be an enjoyable experience itself, which could cancel out some negative affect 
from the disappointment due to losing a race. This speculation receives some support 
from our results, which indicates that, when the future possibility was low, the 
negative relationship between counterfactual probability estimates and emotions was 
weaker in Progression: Present condition than in Progression: Absent condition. 
Presumably, the strength of the relationship in the former condition has been diluted 
by the positive effect of progression on emotions.   
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This view is consistent with the finding of Hsee and Abelson (1991, Study 2), 
in which participants were asked to monitor the vertical movement of a bar along a 
scale, which represents the probability that they would win a hypothetical gamble. 
The higher the bar went, the higher the probability it represented that they would win. 
This task resembles the one in the present experiment in that participants were given 
live feedback about the propensity of a certain future outcome (e.g., winning a 
gamble). They found that participants’ satisfaction was a function of the rising rate 
of the probability (the faster the bar was rising, the higher level of satisfaction was 
reported). Unlike the present experiment, they did not disclose information about the 
final results of the gamble and therefore participants wouldn’t be disappointed due to 
their prior expectation of winning. However, their results do show that regardless of 
the final outcome, people could take pleasure merely out of the rising of the 
expectations for a positive outcome.  
In a scenario study like the present experiment, the effect of the race process 
on affect might have become very prominent because participants had weak affective 
attachments to the outcome of the race due to its limited implications to their life. 
They might have focused more and thus were more affected by the vivid textual and 
graphical depicts of the process of the race. Thus, it was argued that to make it 
possible to detect the effect of counterfactual probability estimates on one’s overall 
affective experiences, real-life tasks should be introduced to future experiments.   
3.4 General Discussion 
3.4.1 Progression and Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
The sense that something almost happened was believed to rely heavily on 
the events cues emerging from the causal episode that precedes an outcome 
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(Kahneman & Varey. 1990).  The previous chapter has demonstrated the effect of 
one of those cues – proximity - on people’s counterfactual probability estimates and 
emotions on different levels of the perception of future possibility. The current 
chapter made an attempt to extend those findings by examining the situation where 
people are exposed to multiple proximity cues. It was argued that when multiple cues 
of proximity are made available, counterfactual probability judgments as well as the 
sense that something almost happened are not only determined by the proximity of 
the end result but also by the trend or progression developed by the variation in 
proximity over a period of time prior to the final outcome.  This notion receives 
supports from both experiments presented in this chapter. The race horse displaying 
a trend of “catching-up” was thought to be more likely to win compared to the race 
horse bearing no such trend, despite the fact that they both stumbled and lost the race 
by the same margin. This effect was robust in both between-participant and within-
participant designs.  
The finding that people’s counterfactual probability judgments are dependent 
not only on a single, static value of proximity but also on its variations is an 
important extension to the existing evidence of the proximity heuristic (Teigen, 1998, 
2005). It is also in line with the theoretical framework of the availability heuristic, 
which posits that people sometimes infer the probability of an event from the ease of 
retrieving it from memory or mentally constructing it. In the case of a counterfactual 
probability judgment, the fewer properties of the real world that people need to 
mentally mutate in order to undo the outcome, the closer or more convincing a 
counterfactual is. Besides static distance, trend could be one of the properties that 
can be retained or mutated in one’s counterfactual world. In our story, after the horse 
race, people made attempts to construct a counterfactual world in which the horse 
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had won. Clearly, in the imaginary world, for the horse to win the race, it had to 
overtake the leader. If the horse had been gaining on the leader in the real world, 
then such a trend of overtaking could be retained in the counterfactual world without 
any necessity of correction. However, if the horse had been following the leader 
consistently, then such a trend would need to be corrected in the counterfactual 
world, which means more mental mutations and less convincing counterfactuals.  
A competing alternative explanation for the obtained effect of progression is 
that participants’ memory of the proximity has been distorted by the motion of the 
two horses. That is, instead of having a direct effect on counterfactual probability 
estimates, progression might have heightened it by making the static distance 
between the target horse and the leader look somewhat shorter. A phenomenon 
called representation momentum has been widely documented in the research of 
visual perception (see for example, Freyd & Finke, 1984), in which people’s 
perceived final position of a moving object which abruptly halted is further along the 
initial direction of its travelling than where it actually is. Thus, the strong forward 
motion of the “catching-up” horse might distort the audience’ perception of its final 
position before stumbling and makes it look closer to the winner than the other horse. 
It is believed that this explanation is unlikely because in both experiments, the 
textual description of the race explicitly told the participants that the two horses were 
in the same distance behind the leader before they stumbled. Nevertheless, the 
distortion of perceived proximity can indeed play a part in the counterfactual 
probability estimates of the audience in a real life horse race where the perceptions 
of motion and position are derived from visual stimulations.  
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The observed effect of progression is also open to another alternative 
explanation. That is, the causal link between “catching-up” and “win” might not 
have been derived from the basic physical cues like “trend” or “proximity” but from 
more rational grounds. The thrilling experience of “catching-up” might be believed 
to have a positive impact on the confidence and motivation of both the jockey and 
the horse. Those psychological impacts may well be translated into good 
performance and raise their likelihood of winning. This view coincides with the 
literatures of psychological momentum in sport. In the Antecedents-Consequences 
Psychological Momentum Model (Vallerand, Colavecchio, & Pelletier, 1988), it was 
proposed that the perception that one is progressing towards winning can give rise to 
improved synchronism, heightened confidence, perception of control and energy, 
which in turn lead to good performance. This proposition is supported by the 
empirical study by Perreault and Vallerand (1998), in which participants took on the 
task of 12-minute solo bike riding and were led to believe they were in a one-on-one 
competition with another participant of a similar physical condition. During the ride, 
they were also given false feedbacks about their performance in relation to their 
opponent. It was found that participants gave higher power output (hence better 
performance) when they were led to believe that they were gaining on their opponent 
from behind than when they were tied with their opponent or trailing behind. The 
psychological momentum-performance effect could be especially prominent in a 
horse race featured in the scenario of the present experiment because such a sport 
requires high arousal. 
Although even the improvement in the objective performance in the 
“catching-up” scenario has to be preceded by the subjective belief that one is truly 
winning, it is still worthwhile to test the direct or “pure” effect of the perception of 
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progression on people’s counterfactual probability estimates. For this purpose, future 
experiments could introduce abstract stimuli to evoke the sense of progression (e.g., 
the motion of dots) without addressing any real-life context. Alternatively, 
experiments could be set in a context where neither the actor nor the spectator has 
control over the outcome of an event (e.g., chance-determined gambling game).  
3.4.2 Progression and Emotions 
The results of the two experiments indicate considerable complexities 
regarding the emotional consequences of the sense of progression. First of all, 
evidence has been obtained from both experiments suggesting that the perceived 
progression had an indirect effect on emotions via counterfactual probability 
estimates and the indirect effect is contingent on the perception of future possibility. 
While the results indicate a negative correlation between the counterfactual 
probability estimates and emotions when the outcome of the race was decisive, no 
such relationship was found when the outcome of the race was not decisive. Those 
findings are consistent with those in Chapter 2 and concur with the hypothesis that 
the presence of future possibility enhances the assimilation effect and diminishes the 
contrast effect. Also in line with the findings of Chapter 2, participants were found to 
focus more on the future implications of a counterfactual when future possibility was 
high. Indeed, The catching-up horse was not only regarded as a horse that had had a 
bigger chance of winning in the just-finished race but also a horse that had a bigger 
chance to win future races. However, the later implication can only be appreciated 
when there is a second race.  
Nonetheless, the total effect of progression on emotions seemed to be quite 
insensitive to this indirect effect as well as the manipulation of future possibility. 
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Progression was found to have no significant effect on emotions in either of the 
future possibility conditions in Experiment 4 but had positive effect on emotions 
regardless of future possibility condition in Experiment 5. Counterfactual probability 
estimates did not seem to be the only intervening variable through which the 
perceived progression can influence emotions. Other mechanisms might have diluted 
or overridden the predicted indirect effect. One possible mechanism, as identified in 
the discussion section of Experiment 5, is that the sense of progression may improve 
one’s mood by raising one’s expectation of winning, although this could lead to 
higher level of disappointment later when the outcome of losing is revealed. Thus, 
the heightened sense of progression towards winning might have dual effects on 
emotions. On one hand, during the development of a horse race, the progression 
towards winning engenders positive emotions like thrill and hopefulness. On the 
other hand, after the revelation of the losing outcome at the end of the race, the 
progression towards winning lifts counterfactual probability estimates and engenders 
negative emotions like disappointment.  
The overall emotional experiences might be determined by how much focus 
people give to the process of an event relative to its outcome, which might be in turn 
affected by several situational factors. For example, negative events that are severe 
and high in self-relevance may dispose people to focus more on its outcome than the 
ones that are mild and low in self-relevance. Thus, the emotional experiences in the 
former case should be more susceptible to counterfactual probability estimates. As 
discussed in Experiment 5, the reason why the effect of counterfactual probability 
estimates was overwhelmed in our experiments could be that participants had weak 
affective attachments to the outcome described in a scenario study. Another possible 
factor is the phrasing of the question regarding the judgment of affect. In the two 
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experiments presented in this chapter, participants were invariably asked to make 
judgments about the gamblers’ emotional experiences “after the race”. The 
ambiguous scope of the question might have led participants to take a comprehensive 
consideration regarding both the process and the outcome of the race. It is believed 
that if the scope of the questions had been restricted to the outcome of the race, 
participants’ ratings on affect might have been more susceptible to their 
counterfactual probability estimates. 
In the two experiments presented in this chapter, the perception of 
progression was elicited by text or pictures which depicted the physical movements 
of objects. However, when cues of physical motion or proximity are not directly 
available to aid probability estimations, people may still apply the analogue of 
proximity and progression to those situations. For example, it might be appropriate 
to say that a person “was close to becoming a doctor” or “almost became a doctor” if 
he/she graduates from medical school with prominent academic performance and 
spends years in a hospital as an intern but finally decides to leave the health sector 
and launch a new career somewhere else. In such a case, the counterfactual 
probability is estimated even when there is no clear cue of proximity or progression 
on a perceptual level. The next chapter will examine the role of progression in such 
cases where the perception of progression is not informed by physical but by 
conceptual distances.  
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Chapter 4 Diminishing of Causal Proximity - Temporal Order 
Effect on Counterfactual Probability Judgments 
4.1 Introduction 
The experiments reported in Chapter 3 demonstrated how the sense of 
progression or “shrinking distance” to a target outcome affects people’s subjective 
likelihood regarding that outcome. The perceived progression was operationalized in 
a different fashion in the present chapter. As discussed briefly in Chapter (Section 
1.3.3.2), it is argued that the subjective sense of progression or “shrinking distance” 
is not only provoked by basic perceptual stimulations like motion or physical 
distance (e.g., the variation in the size of the gap between horses in a race). It can 
also be provoked by the decrease or increase in the causal distance to a target 
outcome. For example, for one person who tosses a coin five times and aims to see 
five heads in a row, every time a head is obtained, the person might perceive 
him/herself to be one step “closer” to seeing five heads. It is argued that the person 
in the coin-tossing game might base their perception of propensity and 
counterfactual probability estimates on the cues of causal proximity to a target state 
(i.e., tossing five heads) in a similar way that gamblers in a horse race base their 
probability estimates on cues of physical proximity between their horse and the 
leader. Only that in the former case, the perceived proximity to a target outcome was 
not cued by visible distance in the material world but by the numbers of premises 
that have to be satisfied for a target outcome to be true (e.g., How many “heads” are 
still needed to realize the outcome of “five heads”?).   
In the case of causal proximity, the effect of perceived progression might 
manifest itself as a temporal order effect. According to Kahneman and Varey (1990), 
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the perception of propensity is crucial to the validation of close counterfactuals. For 
the statement “Outcome A almost happened instead of outcome B” to be plausible, 
the propensity of outcome A must have been very high at some point during the 
development of the event before the occurrence of a decisive event, which dictates 
outcome B and brings the propensity of outcome A to zero. Thus, a decisive event 
which occurs late in a causal sequence will allow the perception of propensity to be 
accumulated to a high level before dropping and provoke the sense “things were 
going well but we blew it the last minute”. On the other hand, a decisive event which 
occurs early in the causal sequence will disrupt the accumulation of the perception of 
propensity and terminate the event before the perceived propensity goes high.   
To illustrate, consider a gambler who has been offered an opportunity to win 
£500 if they draw three cards of the same suit from a deck of cards.  It is quite 
plausible to say “I could have drawn three hearts” if the gambler drew a spade, 
followed by two hearts. However, this counterfactual might be even more 
compelling if the gambler drew two hearts first, followed by a spade. Please note that 
in both cases, the gambler is one card from winning, meaning that the causal 
distances separating the real outcome and its alternative are equal. However, in the 
latter case, the events preceding the final outcome are organized in such an order that 
it provokes a perception that “the gambler is winning” while in the former case this 
perception is disrupted by the drawing of a spade as the first card.   
There have been several investigations on the effect of antecedents’ temporal 
order on counterfactual thinking, which demonstrate that when a factual outcome is 
preceded by a sequence of independent events, the event which occurs later in the 
sequence is more likely to be mutated in one’s counterfactual construction and is 
173 
 
given more causal significance than the event which occurs earlier (Byrne, Segura, 
Culhane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000; Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990; Spellman, 1997; 
Walsh & Byrne 2004). For example, in a study by Miller and Gunasegaram (1990), 
participants were presented a scenario in which Jones and Cooper were said to have 
been offered an opportunity to win $1000 if they both tossed a coin and matched 
each other’s result. Jones tossed the coin first and got a head. Cooper tossed next and 
got a tail. Thus, neither of them won anything. The majority of the participants (86%) 
thought Cooper, who tossed the coin second, would experience a greater extent of 
guilt and be blamed more than Jones, despite the fact that, as argued by the two 
authors, the actions of the two persons contributed equally to the final outcome.  
In attempt to explain this temporal order effect, Spellman (1997) proposed 
that causal reasoning involves a probability updating process. In her discussion of 
what is called crediting causality, people judge and compare the causal importance 
of two events to an outcome by calculating and comparing the changes in the 
probability of the outcome due to the occurrence of each event. In the 
aforementioned coin-tossing scenario, Jones’ toss, regardless of its outcome, did not 
change the probability of winning - it remains 50% before and after his toss. 
However, if the result of Cooper’s toss matched Jones’, the probability of winning 
became 100%. If it did not, the probability of winning became 0%. In either case 
there would be a change in the chance of winning (i.e., from 50% to 100% or from 
50% to 0%). Thus, Cooper, who tossed the coin after Jones, would be considered 
more decisive to the final outcome than Jones and his action would seem more 
mutable.  
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It should be noted that there is an important distinction in the order effect 
examined in the present thesis and the one tested in the previous research. To clarify, 
the earlier research investigated how the mutability of one antecedent was affected 
by its position in a causal sequence when several antecedents equally contribute to 
the final outcome. For example, in the aforementioned coin-tossing scenario where 
Jones and Cooper were aiming to obtain the same value out of their tosses, the 
actions of the two were equally decisive to the final outcome in that one can always 
mentally mutate the final outcome by altering the result of either action. In this case, 
the antecedent that occurs later in the causal sequence (i.e., Cooper’s toss) will be 
more likely to be mutated in people’s counterfactual world than the antecedent that 
occurs earlier (i.e., Jones’ toss). This effect was identified by the thesis as the 
temporal order effect type 1.  In contrast, the thesis investigated what is called the 
temporal order effect type 2 – that is, the mutability of an outcome is affected by the 
temporal position of its only decisive antecedent in the causal sequence. To illustrate 
this distinction, consider a similar scenario involving coin tossing. This time, instead 
of aiming to match each other’s result, Jones and Cooper will win only if both of 
them toss a head (i.e., they will lose if they both toss a tail). The temporal order 
effect type 2 would predict that if one of the two persons tossed a tail, the losing 
outcome should be perceived to be more mutable if it was the second person, rather 
than the first person who tossed a tail.  
 Despite the distinction, the two types of temporal effects might share some 
common grounds in terms of mechanism. The theoretical underpinning of the 
temporal order effect type 2 is Kahneman and Varey (1990)’s theory of perceived 
propensity and close counterfactuals, which in essence, proposed a probability 
updating process. Take the adapted coin-tossing scenario for example (where Jones 
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and Cooper must both toss a head in order to win). Before anyone has tossed a coin, 
the chance of winning is 25% because tossing two heads is one of four possible 
outcomes (H-H, H-T, T-H, T-T).  Now suppose Jones tosses first and gets a tail, 
which brings the chance of winning (or propensity to win) down to 0%. It would 
remain at 0% even if Cooper gets a head in the next toss. Thus, the chance of 
winning peaks at 25% and then drops to 0%. However, suppose the game is rerun 
and this time Jones tosses first and gets a head, which brings the chance of winning 
up to 50% because now there are two possible outcomes (H-H, H-T). If Cooper 
tosses second and gets a tail, then the chance of winning will drop to 0%. In this case, 
the chance of winning peaks at 50% and then drops to 0%. In both cases, the two 
players get one head and one tail. However, they might perceive themselves “closer” 
to winning in the second case where “tail” appears later in the causal sequence 
because the probability or the propensity of winning peaks higher and also drops by 
a bigger magnitude.  
 4.2 Experiment 6 
The experiment presented in this chapter examined the temporal order effect 
type 2 on counterfactual probability estimates and emotions in a real-life gambling 
environment, where participants were given real money and gambled in multiple 
trials of a computer-simulated coin-flipping game. In each trial, participants flipped 
three coins simultaneously and stopped them in succession by repeatedly pressing 
the “space” key on the keyboard. They would win if the three coins stopped at the 
same value (i.e., three heads or three tails) but would lose if otherwise. Table 4.1 
provides a list of all eight possible outcomes, which fall into four categories – Win 
(H-H-H, T-T-T), Lose on third coin (H-H-T, T-T-H), Lose on second coin (H-T-H, 
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T-H-T) and Lose on first coin (H-T-T, T-H-H). Because a fair coin has a 50% 
chance of landing either heads or tails, the probabilities of the eight outcomes are 
equal. Thus, participants had 25% chance of seeing each of the four categories listed 
above. It is also important to note that if participants lost, they were always one coin 
away from winning, meaning that the static causal proximities to winning were equal 
in all losing trials and the losing outcome can always be mentally undone by 
mutating the result of one decisive coin. However, it was predicted that as a result of 
the temporal order effect type 2, participants would report higher counterfactual 
probability estimates and would be more disappointed by the result if they lost on the 
third coin (i.e., decisive event comes last) rather than on any other coin.  
What’s more, to investigate whether the perception of progression is derived 
from the temporal order in which the antecedents occur in the real world or the 
temporal order in which the antecedents were revealed to participants, a 
“simultaneous” condition (as opposed to the  “sequential” condition introduced 
earlier) was added to the experimental design. To recap, in the sequential condition 
participants flipped the three coins simultaneously by pressing the “space” key and 
stopped them in succession by pressing the “space” key three times on the keyboard. 
In contrast, in the simultaneous condition, participants started the three coins flipping 
in succession by pressing the “space” key three times and pressed it a fourth time to 
stop all three coins flipping simultaneously.  
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Table 4.1 List of possible outcomes and their categorization 
 
Outcomes Combinations 
Win 
H-H-H 
T-T-T 
Lose on third 
H-H-T 
T-T-H 
Lose on second 
H-T-H 
T-H-T 
Lose on first  
H-T-T 
T-H-H 
 
 
It should be noted that in both conditions, the outcomes of the three coins 
were determined in succession. That is, in the sequential condition, the outcomes of 
the three coins were determined one after another by the moment they were stopped 
flipping while in the simultaneous condition, they were determined one after another 
by the moment they were started flipping. It was only the disclosures of the results 
that were different between the two conditions. Spellman (1997) found that both the 
occurrence order and the revelation order have effects on causal attribution. Thus, it 
was expected that both orders would have effect on counterfactual probability 
estimates, too. If that’s true, then (1) the temporal order effect should be observed in 
both the sequential condition and the simultaneous condition; and (2) the effect 
should be stronger in the sequential condition because both the occurrence order and 
the revelation order were having an effect on counterfactual probability judgments in 
Notes: H = Head; T = Tail 
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this condition while only the occurrence order was having an effect in simultaneous 
condition. 
As a continuation of the tradition in the previous experiments, the effect of 
the perception of progression (derived from the temporal order of events) on 
emotions was also examined. Because participants undertook as many as 80 game 
trials in the experiment, measuring a wide range of emotions between those trials 
would be practically difficult. Thus, unlike its predecessors, the present experiment 
exclusively focused on one typical contrast-effect-derived emotion – disappointment. 
To minimize the impact of the process of progression on one’s emotional reactions, 
participants were explicitly asked to report the level of disappointment regarding the 
outcome of the game. It should be noted that although participants took gambles in 
repeated trials and hence their perception of future possibility should be high, a 
domination of the contrast effect was still expected to be observed because the 
participants were asked in the question to focus on the outcome of the just-finished 
trial alone. It was predicted that participants’ ratings on disappointment should 
follow the same pattern as their counterfactual probability estimates. That is, in both 
the sequential and the simultaneous conditions, participants would be more 
disappointed if they lost on the third coin than if they lost on any other coin. 
However, the effect should be stronger in the sequential condition than the 
simultaneous condition. Of course, the effect of temporal order on the feeling of 
disappointment should be mediated by counterfactual probability estimates. 
The reason why the game was configured to involve flipping three, instead of 
two coins is that it allowed for a testing of the confounding effect of memory 
availability on counterfactual probability estimates. As noted by Miller and 
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Gunasegaram (1990), temporal order effects could arise simply because the last 
event in the sequence is more available in memory and thus more mutable. In a coin-
flipping game, it is possible that when evaluating the credibility of the statement “I 
could have won”, participants back-track the causal sequence in search of the 
decisive antecedent. It might be less effortful for participants to find the decisive 
event if it occurs last in the causal sequence (thus readily available in memory) than 
if it occurs earlier. For example, if the participant loses on the first coin, she/he will 
have to track all the way back to the beginning of the trial to find the decisive 
antecedent in order to construct a counterfactual world in which she/he wins. If 
memory availability does play a part in the effect of temporal order on counterfactual 
probability judgments in the coin-flipping game, then the probability judgment and 
the level of disappointment should be reported higher after losing on the second coin 
than after losing on the first coin, because in the latter case the decisive event occurs 
even further back in the causal sequence. 
Another possible confounding variable is attention. It could be that in the 
case where people lose on the second or the first coin, their attention to the outcome 
of the last coin simply lapses because it no longer dictates the outcome of the game. 
This could cause poor memory on the value of the third coin and hence difficulty in 
mental simulation, which in turn leads to lowered counterfactual probability 
judgments and disappointment compared to losing on the third coin. To rule out the 
confounding effect of attention, participants were asked to undertake a memory 
recall task after different types of outcomes. If the temporal order effect is partially 
caused by a shift in attention, then participants should recall better when losing on 
the third than on any other coin. What’s more, their memory recall performance 
should be positively correlated with counterfactual probability estimates. 
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4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Design 
The experiment investigated the effect of two independent variables - 
Temporal Order of antecedents and Revelation - on counterfactual probability 
estimates and emotions. It employed a 3 (Temporal Order: Lose on First/Lose on 
Second/Lose on Third) x 2 (Revelation: Sequential/Simultaneous) mixed design with 
Temporal Order as a within-participant variable and Revelation a between-
participant variable.  
4.2.1.2 Participants 
Eighty two first year psychology undergraduates of Durham University were 
recruited as participants (14 males and 68 females) and were given real money to 
gamble in a computer-simulated coin-flipping game. The computer programme was 
written by IT technician David Knight in author’s department. Participants also 
received either participant credits or £2 monetary compensation for taking part. On 
top of that, they were entitled to keep whatever was left of the gambling fund at the 
end of the experiment.  
4.2.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was run on one participant or in small groups of three or four 
at a time. At the beginning of the experiment, all the participants were given an oral 
introduction to the purpose and the basic procedure of the study. They were told that 
the purpose of the experiment was to investigate people’s gambling behaviours and 
they were going to be given real money to bet in a computer-simulated coin-flipping 
game. Having given written consent to taking part in the experiment, they were led 
into a two-square-metre isolated cubical and seated before a computer. 
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After the computer programme was launched, text messages appeared on the 
screen giving instructions on how to play the game. Participants then pressed the 
“space” key to enter a block of four practice trials before proceeding to the 80 
experimental trials. Figure 4.1 shows the interface of the programme. In each trial, 
participants were asked to complete four actions in succession: Bet – Flip – Lock – 
Answer.  
Bet 
All participants started with 2000 credits (equivalent to £2). At the beginning 
of each trial, participants used the “up” or “down” key on the keyboard to adjust the 
amount of credits they wished to bet, which were displayed in the box at the bottom-
right corner of the screen. The frame of the box changed its colour between black 
and red alternately to remind the participants to adjust their bet at the beginning of 
each trial. The minimum allowed bet was set to 1 and the maximum was 25. The 
upper limit made sure that participants would not be in deficit after 80 trials even if 
they used the most aggressive betting strategy and lost every trial. At the end of the 
game, they could trade whatever was left of their credits for real money at a rate of 
10 credits = 1p. Their total remaining credits were always displayed in the box at the 
bottom-left corner of the screen. 
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Flip and Lock 
After placing their bets, the computer prompted the participants to press the 
“space” key to flip three identical coins laid across the computer screen. The initial 
pre-flipping value assigned to each coin was randomized at the beginning of each 
trial to prevent the participants from developing a winning strategy. In the 
Revelation: Sequential condition, the participants pressed the “space” key once to 
make the three coins start flipping rapidly at the same time (at a speed of 45 
milliseconds per flip). Then they pressed the “space” key three times in sequence to 
stop the coins flipping one by one from left to right. In comparison, in the Revelation: 
Simultaneous condition, the participants pressed the “space” key three times to make 
Remaining credits Credits bet in the current trial Instructions 
Figure 4.1 Coin-flipping simulation Program Interface 
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the three coins start flipping one by one from left to right. Then they pressed the 
“space” key for a fourth time to stop all three coins flipping at the same time. In both 
conditions, the minimum interval between the presses of the “space” key was set to 
be one second. This feature was to prevent the participants from pressing the key too 
quickly, in which case the sense of progression would be obscured. The outcome of 
the flipping of each coin was NOT pre-programmed and was completely determined 
by the moment of participants pressing the “space” key.   
In both conditions, if all three coins showed the same value (i.e., H-H-H or T-
T-T in Table 4.1), the words “Congratulations, you won” would appear on screen 
and participants won three times the amount they had bet for that trial. Otherwise, 
the words “Sorry, you didn’t win this time” would appear on screen and they lost the 
full amount of whatever they had bet.  
Answer 
At the end of each trial, regardless of outcome, participants were instructed to 
press the “space” key to bring up the first of two questions. The first question was 
the target question and was determined by the outcome of the just-finished trial. For 
example, following the outcome of a Losing on third trial, the target question would 
be one of the four following questions
4
: 
(1) (To measure their counterfactual probability estimate) To what extent do you 
agree with the following statement: “I could have won this trial.” (1 = 
Strongly disagree; 9 = Strongly agree) 
                                                             
4 The purpose of Question 2 digresses from the main theme of the thesis and thus its results were 
not reported in the main body of the thesis. 
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(2) (To measure the perception of luck) How lucky or unlucky do you think you 
were in this trial? (1 = Extremely unlucky; 9 = Extremely lucky) 
(3) (To measure disappointment) How disappointed are you regarding the result 
of this trial? (1 = Not at all; 9 = Extremely) 
(4) (To measure participant’s recall accuracy) How many heads/tails have you 
got in this trial? Please indicate by pressing a number from 0-3 (0 = none, 3 = 
3 heads/tails). 
As the reader has probably noticed, unlike Experiment 2, 3, 4 and 5, 
participants’ were not asked to rate counterfactual probability directly in this 
experiment. Instead, the participants were asked to report the level of agreement on a 
statement of counterfactual probability. The purpose of this adjustment was to avoid 
prompting participants to engage in deliberate calculation of the odds or probability 
of winning in a mathematical way instead of reporting their intuitive estimations.      
The four questions were brought up by the computer in rotation after each 
Losing on third trial. The same set of questions was configured for Losing on second 
and Losing on first trials and they followed the same rotation setup. It should be 
noted that each of the three sets of questions rotated independently from the other 
two. Although the interest of the experiment lay in the participants’ responses after 
losing trials, two questions were still asked after winning trials to balance the time 
spent by participants in each trial and to minimize suspicions. The four 
aforementioned target questions were used for winning trials with superficial 
adaptations to fit them in context (e.g., the statement in the question (1) was changed 
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to “I could have lost this trial” and the word “disappointed” in question (2) was 
changed to “pleased”.).  
After all outcomes, the second question asked was always a filler question 
which was randomly selected by the computer from a pre-composed filler questions 
pool (see Appendix F). What’s more, the amount that participants bet on each trial 
was recorded by the computer. The purpose of this measure deviates from the main 
theme of the thesis and hence its results are not fully reported. However, references 
to those results will be made in the results section when they help interpret the data 
of interest.  
Participants were given a chance to take a rest after 40 trials for as long as 
they wished. After the total of 80 trials, participants traded their final balance for real 
money with the experimenter. Then they were given a written debrief and thanked 
for their contribution to the study.  
4.2.2 Results 
4.2.2.1 Preliminary Analysis 
As Table 4.2 indicates, on average, the four outcomes occurred with similar 
frequencies (means close to 20) and this was true for both the sequential and the 
simultaneous conditions. This pattern is consistent with the theory of probability and 
confirms that the computerised coin tossing programme produced a fair result. Table 
4.3 indicates that each of the three questions concerning counterfactual probability, 
the level of disappointment and memory recall appeared around five times on 
average after each type of outcome for each person. Means of the ratings regarding 
those three questions were therefore taken by averaging all the available scores for 
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each participant. It was shown that other extracting methods (e.g., averaging the first 
three scores, first four, first five and so forth) yielded the same results for all 
analyses.  
Table 4.2 Means of Frequencies of Four Outcomes across Two Revelation 
Conditions  
Outcome 
Categories 
Revelation Conditions 
Overall 
Sequential Simultaneous 
Win 
18.93 (times) 
Range: (12 - 28) 
19.24 (times) 
Range: (11 - 28) 
19.09 (times) 
Range: (11 - 28) 
Lose on third 
20.37 
Range: (14 - 31) 
20.20 
Range: (11 - 30) 
20.28 
Range: (11 - 31) 
Lose on second 
21.17 
Range: (10 - 28) 
19.66 
Range: (10 - 30) 
21.04 
Range: (10 - 32) 
Lose on first 
19.54 
Range: (10 - 32) 
20.90 
Range: (12 - 29) 
19.60 
Range: (10 - 29) 
 
Table 4.3 Means of Frequencies of Three Questions Following Three Losing 
Outcomes 
Outcome 
Categories 
Measures 
Counterfactual 
Probability Estimates 
Level of 
Disappointment 
Memory Recall 
Lose on third 
5.41 (times) 
(range: 3 - 8) 
4.93 (times) 
(range: 3 - 8) 
4.65 (times) 
(range: 2 - 7) 
Lose on second 
5.61 
(range: 3 - 8) 
5.02 
(range: 2 - 8) 
5.03 
(range: 2 - 8) 
Lose on first 
5.31 
(range: 3 - 8) 
4.85 
(range: 2 - 8) 
5.05 
(range: 3 - 8) 
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4.2.2.2 Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
For each participant, means were taken of their counterfactual probability 
statement ratings following “Lose on third” trials, “Lose on second” trials and “Lose 
on first” trials separately. The means of “Lost on second” trials and “Lose on first” 
trials were pooled together because in both cases, participants knew that they had 
lost the trial after seeing the outcome of the second coin and thus there was no 
meaningful psychological difference between the two types of outcomes in terms of 
perceived propensity. A mixed temporal order × revelation ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of temporal order (F(1, 80) = 12.85, p = .001, r =  .37) (see 
Figure 4.2). More specifically, counterfactual probability estimates were higher after 
“Lose on third” trials (M = 6.17, SD = 1.45) than other trials (M = 5.83, SD = 1.57).  
However, under the main effect of temporal order, there was a significant 
temporal order × revelation interaction (F(1, 80) = 11.32, p = .001, r = .35). As 
Figure 4.2 suggests, the effect of the temporal order was only significant when the 
outcomes of the three coins were presented sequentially (F(1, 40) = 14.32, p = .001, 
r = .51), where the counterfactual probability ratings were significantly higher after 
“Lose on third” trials (M = 6.43, SD = 1.63) than other trials (M = 5.76, SD = 1.89). 
On the other hand, when the outcomes of the three coins were presented 
simultaneously, temporal order did not have a significant effect on counterfactual 
probability estimates (F(1, 40) = 0.08, p = .782, r =  .04; M = 5.92, 5.90; SD = 1.21, 
1.19, respectively). Going against the hypothesis, the null effect in the simultaneous 
condition suggests that the temporal order effect found in the sequential condition 
was caused by the revelation order of the events alone but not the occurrence order. 
As expected, the main effect of revelation was not significant (F(1, 80) = 0.35, p 
= .556, r =  .06).  
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Figure 4.2 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Ratings on Counterfactual 
Probability Statement across all Conditions 
 
Figure 4.3 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Ratings on Disappointment 
across all Conditions 
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Finally, to make sure that the temporal order effect found in the sequential 
condition was not caused by the fact that the “losing coin” appearing later in a 
sequences is more available in memory than if appearing earlier, comparison was 
drawn between the means of “Lose on second” and “Lose on first” trials. It was 
found that the mean ratings of counterfactual probability did not significant differ 
after these two types of trials (t(40) = 0.15, p = .882, r = .03) (see Figure 4.3), 
indicating that memory availability could not explain the effect of temporal order on 
counterfactual probability estimates.  
4.2.2.3 Disappointment 
Mean scores were also taken of the disappointment ratings following the 
three losing outcomes separately. As was done before, the means of “Lost on second” 
trials and “Lose on first” trials were pooled together. It was predicted that 
participants’ ratings on disappointment should be in the same fashion as the ratings 
on counterfactual probability. A mixed temporal order × revelation ANOVA on 
participants on the ratings of disappointment revealed a significant main effect of 
temporal order (F(1, 80) = 9.93, p = .002, r =  .33)(see Figure 4.3). That is, 
participants were more disappointed after “Lose on third” trials (M = 5.64, SD = 1.74) 
than other trials (M = 5.35, SD = 1.70). 
Contrary to expectations, the temporal order × revelation interaction was not 
significant (F(1, 80) = 1.47, p = .229, r =  .13). Nevertheless, there is an indication 
from Figure 4.3 that the effect of the temporal order on participants’ feelings of 
disappointment was weaker in the simultaneous condition than in the sequential 
condition. Simple main effects tests showed that, when outcomes were revealed in 
succession, temporal order had a significant effect on the level of disappointment 
(F(1, 40) = 8.10, p = .007, r = .41) - the ratings on disappointment were significantly 
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higher after “Lose on third” trials (M = 6.24, SD = 1.53) than other trials (M = 5.84, 
SD = 1.61). On the other hand, when the outcomes of the three coins were presented 
simultaneously, temporal order had no significant effect on the level of 
disappointment (F(1, 40) = 2.28, p = .139, r =  .23; M = 5.05, 4.87; SD = 1.76, 1.67, 
respectively). What’s more, in sequential condition, the level of disappointment did 
not significantly differ after “Lose on second” and “Lose on first” trials (t(40) = 0.12, 
p = .906, r = .03), indicating that memory availability could not explain the effect of 
temporal order on disappointment.  
   Also, surprisingly, the analysis found a significant main effect of revelation 
(F(1, 80) = 8.82, p = .004, r = .31). Overall, participants were more disappointed if 
the outcomes were presented to them sequentially (M = 5.97, SD = 2.25) than 
simultaneously (M = 4.93, SD = 2.25). This difference however can’t be explained 
by participants’ counterfactual probability estimates because those estimates were 
not significantly different across the two revelation conditions. Instead, it could be 
due to the fact that the participants in the sequential condition had a higher sense of 
control over the outcome of the game and thus had a higher expectation of winning 
in general. The discrepancy in the sense of control could arise from two sources. 
First of all, participants in the sequential condition received feedback more 
frequently during the course of every trial than those in the simultaneous condition. 
When the outcomes of the three coins were presented in succession, participants got 
immediate feedback every time after pressing the “space key” while participants in 
the simultaneous condition did not receive any feedback until the end of the game. 
Higher feedback frequency in the former condition might have raised participants’ 
sense of control. Secondly, in the sequential condition, participants had control on 
when a coin would stop flipping while in the simultaneous condition, participants 
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had control on when a coin would start flipping. Participants might view that how 
the flipping stopped contributed more to the outcome of the flipping than how a 
flipping started because the former occurred later in the causal chain. Thus, a higher 
sense of control over the outcome of the game might arise if participants were asked 
to control the stopping of the coin rather than the starting of it.   
The analyses on participants’ adjustments to the amounts bet after each trial 
support these speculations. Participants in the two revelation conditions seemed to 
adopt different betting strategies. On average, after a losing trial, participants in the 
sequential condition reduced their bet (M = -0.10, SD = 0.81) while those in the 
simultaneous condition increased their bet (M = 0.22, SD = .81). This difference was 
significant (F(1, 80) = 6.41, p = .013, r =  .27). On the other hand, after a winning 
trial, an opposite pattern arose – participants in the sequential condition increased 
their bet (M = 0.47, SD = 1.18) while those in the simultaneous condition reduced 
their bet (M = -0.48, SD = 2.27). This difference was also significant (F(1, 80) = 5.59, 
p = .020, r =  .26).  
It is speculated that the participants in the sequential condition had a higher 
sense of control and therefore might interpret winning (or losing) as an indication of 
their successful (or an unsuccessful) strategy or their good (or bad) skills, which 
would in turn lead to future winning (or losing). On the other hand, participants in 
the simultaneous condition might have perceived that the game was chance-
determined and thus were susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy (see Sundali & Croson, 
2006), believing losing outcomes were more likely to be followed by winning 
outcomes and winning outcomes were more likely to be followed by losing 
outcomes.  
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4.2.2.4 Mediating effect of Counterfactual Probability Estimates 
It was predicted that counterfactual probability estimates would mediate the 
effect of temporal order on emotions. Again, this mediation was examined against 
the four criteria recommended by Judd et al. (2001): (1) Temporal order has an effect 
on counterfactual probability estimates; (2) Temporal order has effects on the level 
of disappointment;  (3) Counterfactual probability estimates were related to 
disappointment in each temporal order condition and (4) The difference in the level 
of disappointment between the three Temporal order treatments (Lose on third, Lose 
on second and Lose on first) could be predicted by the difference in counterfactual 
probability estimates. These four criteria were examined in order. 
Previous analyses have shown that in the simultaneous condition, the 
temporal order had no significant effect on counterfactual probability estimates or 
feelings of disappointment, which violated criterion one and two and thus did not 
support the proposition that the counterfactual probability estimates mediate the 
effect of temporal order on disappointment in this condition. 
On the other hand, in the sequential condition, previous analyses showed that 
the temporal order of the decisive event has effects on both counterfactual 
probability estimates and disappointment in a similar fashion, which meets criterion 
one and two. However, counterfactual probability estimates were not found to 
significantly predict disappointment in any temporal order condition (B = -0.10, t = -
0.65, p = .552 for Lose on third; B = -0.12, t = -0.74, p = .466 for other trials), which 
violates criterion three and therefore does not support hypothesis regarding the 
mediating effect of counterfactual probability estimates.  
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4.2.2.5 Performance of Memory Recall 
Once participants pressed a number key to answer the question in the 
memory recall task, the computer automatically appraised the answer and produced a 
score of either 1 (if correct) or 0 (if false). These scores were later averaged for each 
outcome. Thus, higher score indicate better memory recall. As was done before, the 
means of “Lost on second” trials and “Lose on first” trials were pooled together. A 
mixed temporal order × revelation ANOVA revealed a non-significant main effect of 
temporal order on memory recall (F(1, 80) = 1.98, p = .163, r =  .15) and a non-
significant temporal order × revelation interaction (F(1, 80) = 3.74, p = .057, r 
=  .21), indicating that in neither the sequential condition nor the simultaneous 
condition, participants’ performance of memory recall was significantly affected by 
the temporal order of the decisive coin. However, Figure 4.4 does indicate that 
participants in the sequential condition performed better in memory recall after 
losing on the third than any other outcomes. Analysis in this particular condition 
shows that the main effect of temporal order on memory recall was significant (F(1, 
40) = 5.27, p = .027, r =  .34). That is, participants had better memory recall of “Lose 
on third” trials (M = 0.81, SD = 0.20) than other trials (M = 0.73, SD = 0.17). 
However, the performance of memory recall did not positively predict counterfactual 
probability estimate (B = -.28, t = -1.79, p = .081 when losing on the third coin; B = -
0.14, t = -0.90, p = .373 when losing on other coins). These results rule out the 
possibility that the observed temporal order effect on counterfactual probability was 
due to a lapse of attention after seeing the mismatch of the first two coins. 
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4.3 General Discussion 
The previous research has found that after the occurrence of an outcome, the 
mutability of one particular antecedent is affected by its temporal position in the 
event chain that precedes the outcome (Byrne et al., 2000, Miller & Gunasegaram, 
1990; Spellman, 1997; Walsh & Byrne 2004). The present experiment has 
successfully demonstrated a different type of temporal order effect. That is, after the 
occurrence of an outcome, the mutability of this outcome (i.e., counterfactual 
probability) and its emotional consequences are affected by the temporal position of 
the decisive event in the event chain, which is referred to as temporal order effect 
type 2. In the computer-simulated coin-flipping game, when the outcome of the coins 
were presented in succession, both the sense that “I could have won” and the feeling 
of disappointment were stronger if the decisive event came last (i.e., losing on the 
Figure 4.4 Mean (with error bars representing 95% CIs) Memory Recall Performance 
across all Conditions 
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third coin) than if it came earlier (i.e., losing on the second or first coin), presumably 
because a decisive event that occurs later in the casual sequence allowed a sense of 
progression towards the target outcome (e.g., “I am winning!”) to be established, 
which lifts one’s perceived propensity of winning.  
As a development from the last chapter, the present experiment demonstrated 
that the sense of progression can be derived from the diminishing in a causal distance 
to a target outcome. It also showed that the sense of progression toward a goal or 
desirable outcome can indeed exert a negative impact on one’s emotional 
experiences if that goal or desirable outcome fails to realize. More specifically, the 
results show that when the outcomes of the coins were presented sequentially, losing 
on the last coin was more disappointing than losing on the second or the first coin. 
However, the experiment failed to obtain evidence that people’s counterfactual 
probability estimates play a mediating role in the observed effect because no 
significant correlational connection was found between the counterfactual 
probability estimate and the level of disappointment. One possible explanation could 
be that the experiment failed to control other factors that could potentially contribute 
to the feeling of disappointment. For example, in the present experiment, participants 
were allowed to change the amount of bet freely, which could have introduced a 
source of variance in disappointment – participants should be more disappointed by a 
losing outcome when they had put more money at the stake. The influence of this 
factor to the feeling of disappointment could have diluted the effect of counterfactual 
probability estimates.  
The results also suggest that the temporal order effect has got more to do with 
the revelation order (i.e., the order in which the information of the events in a causal 
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sequence is disclosed to people) rather than the occurrence order (i.e, the order in 
which the events in a causal sequence actually happen). In the simultaneous 
condition, where the outcomes of the three coins were determined in succession (i.e., 
participants pressed the “space” key three times to activate the flips of the three coins 
one after another) but presented at the same time, the effect of temporal order was 
not found. This finding is at odds with that of Spellman (1997), which found both the 
effects of occurrence order and revelation order on the perceived causal importance 
of an antecedent. The reason for this inconsistency could be that in the scenario 
study of Spellman (1997), participants were explicitly told about the order of the 
occurrence of the antecedents (i.e., order of coin tosses). By comparison, in the 
simultaneous condition in the present experiment, the information that the outcomes 
of the three coins were determined in succession was very subtle because 
participants only had control over when the coins started flipping but not over when 
the coins stopped flipping. It therefore may have been easily overlooked by 
participants. Thus, it is argued that our results are inconclusive regarding whether 
temporal order effect can be triggered by revelation order, occurrence order or both. 
This issue needs further examinations in experiments where the manipulation of 
occurrence order is made more salient to participants.  
A possible alternative explanation for the observed temporal order effect 
would be on the grounds of memory availability. It was possible that people gave 
higher counterfactual probability estimates and felt more disappointed after losing on 
the third coin than any other coin simply because the decisive event in this case was 
more available in memory and hence made the mental simulation of what might have 
been less effortful. However, it was argued that this explanation is unlikely. If 
memory availability did play a part in the judgments of counterfactual probability, 
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participants should have given higher ratings on the counterfactual statement when 
they lost on the second coin than when they lost on the first because in the latter case, 
the decisive event was earlier in the causal sequence and should be less available in 
memory. However, the difference between the two conditions was non-significant.  
This non-significant result, however, is in favour of the “propensity” 
explanation. Before seeing the outcome of the first coin, all participants’ prospect of 
winning was 25%. After the revelation of the first coin, this prospect remained 25%. 
However, if the second coin differed from the first coin in its value, the prospect of 
winning would drop to 0%. The prospect would remain at 0% regardless of the 
outcome of the third coin. Therefore, whether participants lost on the first coin or the 
second coin, the prospect of winning, which directly informed one’s perceived 
propensity, peaked at the 25%. Therefore the counterfactual probability estimates 
should be equal across the two conditions, which was exactly what the experiment 
has found.  
The observed temporal order effect is also possible to have been simply 
caused by lapses of attention in the Lose on second and Lose on first trials. In these 
two conditions, when the value of the second coin failed to match that of the first 
coin, participants might simply have lost interest in the outcome of the third coin, 
which made them give lower ratings on counterfactual probability and 
disappointment. However, this possibility is also dismissed by the results, which 
show that although participants’ memory recall accuracy regarding the detail of the 
just-finished trial significantly differs after different outcomes, it did not positively 
predict their counterfactual probability estimates. This indicates that attention has not 
played a role in participants’ probability judgments. 
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To conclude, the evidence presented in this chapter confirms that people’s 
counterfactual probability judgments are susceptible to the temporal order of the 
antecedents in the causal sequences. When a decisive antecedent occurs late in a 
causal sequence, a perception of progression towards the focal outcome is triggered, 
which will heighten one’s counterfactual probability judgment and the level of 
disappointment, although the mediating role of counterfactual probability judgments 
between progression and disappointment still needs empirical support.    
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Chapter 5  General Discussion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The thesis set out to investigate the determinants of people’s judgments of 
counterfactual probability and their role in people’s emotional reactions to past 
events. The six experiments presented in the thesis provide insights into two central 
questions: (1) How do people make counterfactual probability judgments?; and (2) 
How do these judgments subsequently influence their emotional experiences? The 
findings regarding these questions are summarized separately in the following 
sections.     
5.1.1 The Determinants of Counterfactual Probability Judgments 
The results of Experiments 1, 2 and 3 presented in Chapter 2 support the 
hypothesis that people’s counterfactual probability judgments can be informed by the 
event cue of outcome proximity. More specifically, the three experiments 
demonstrated that people’s subjective likelihood of the occurrence of a 
counterfactual outcome will be heightened when the real outcome is spatially or 
numerically proximate to that alternative possibility (i.e., getting close to scoring a 
goal in a football game; failing a job entry test by one point; beating or beaten by the 
opponent by one point in score in a TV game show). These results confirm and 
advance the previous demonstration of the proximity-probability relationship 
(Teigen, 1998; Tykocinski & Steinberg, 2005) by: (1) ruling out the potential 
confounding of the absolute value of numbers in the relationship between numerical 
proximity and probability judgments (Experiment 3); and (2) showing that 
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conditional counterfactual probability judgments are affected by proximity cues in a 
similar way as unconditional ones (Experiment 2). 
However, the fact that the effect of numerical proximity on counterfactual 
probability judgments was noticeably weaker in Experiment 2 (where participants 
were asked “How likely you think you would have passed the test if you hadn’t spent 
so much time in the bar the night before?”) than in Experiment 3 (where participants 
were asked “How likely do you think that Kelly (or another contestant in the story) 
could have won (or lost) the round that just finished?”) highlights the possibility that 
people may take slightly different strategies when dealing with conditional and 
unconditional counterfactual probability judgements. It was suspected that, while 
both kinds of probability judgments are closely related to the perception of 
propensity and thus can be informed by the event cue of proximity, judgments of 
conditional counterfactual probability might be also affected by the perceived 
correlation between the antecedent (e.g., “drinking”) and the outcome (e.g., the result 
of the examination”).  
Experiments 4, 5 and 6 presented in Chapters 3 and 4 investigated the 
determination of counterfactual probability judgments in the situation where people 
do not only receive feedback about the proximity of the final outcome but also about 
how the proximity to a target outcome varies over a prolonged causal episode 
preceding the final outcome. It was found that, when controlling for outcome 
proximity, the trend with which the proximity to a focal outcome varies before the 
revelation of the final outcome also matters to the estimation of counterfactual 
probability. Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrated that a trend of “shrinking distance” 
between a target horse and the leader heightened people’s subjective likelihood of 
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the horse winning when it actually lost. As argued in Section 3.4.1, this effect was 
unlikely to be the result of a distorted visual perception caused by the motion of the 
“catching-up” horse because the textual descriptions of the race in Experiment 4 
made it very explicit that the two horses were behind the leader by the same distance 
before they stumbled. This information was made even more transparent in 
Experiment 5 where the positions of the two race horses during the race were 
illustrated by pictures. In contrast, these results suggest that participants have used a 
simulation heuristic where the propensity of winning was estimated by assessing the 
ease with which a counterfactual scenario, where the horse actually won, can be 
imagined.  
Experiment 6 demonstrated that people also apply the physical metaphor of 
distance and motion into situations where the “closeness” between a real outcome 
and its alternatives is only conceptual (e.g., “How close was I to tossing three heads 
in a row?”). A temporal order effect was found on people’s perception of 
counterfactual probability. That is, in a coin-flipping game where the objective was 
to obtain three coins in the same value (either three heads or three tails), if the coins 
were presented sequentially, the subjective probability of winning after a losing trial 
was heightened when a decisive event (i.e., obtaining a tail when the other two coins 
turned out to be heads, or vice versa) occurred later in the event sequence (e.g., 
obtaining one tail after obtaining two heads) rather than earlier (e.g., obtaining one 
tail, followed by two heads).  
As argued in Section 4.3, this temporal order effect was unlikely to be caused 
by the fact that later events in a sequence are more available in memory than earlier 
events. Counterfactual probability judgments did not differ significantly after losing 
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on the first coin and after losing on the second coin. However, memory availability 
could play a role in occasions when the causal episode of an outcome covers a longer 
period of time than a coin-flipping game. The results also indicate that attention was 
not a confounding variable in the observed effect because no significant positive 
correlation was found between participants’ memory recall accuracy and 
counterfactual probability estimates.  
The temporal order effect was found only when the outcomes of three coins 
were determined and revealed sequentially (sequential condition) but not when they 
were determined sequentially but revealed simultaneously (simultaneous condition), 
indicating that the temporal order effect can only be derived from the “revelation 
order” but not the “occurrence order”. However, as argued in Section 4.3, this result 
could be caused by the fact that the occurrence order was not particularly salient to 
the participants in the simultaneous condition. Thus, it is inconclusive whether the 
observed temporal order effect emerged from the revelation order, the occurrence 
order or both.   
Together, the results presented in Experiments 4, 5 and 6 support a general 
principle that the perception of progression towards a focal outcome will lift one’s 
perception of propensity towards that outcome and hence heighten one’s 
counterfactual probability estimates if the focal outcome fails to be realized. The fact 
that the effect of progression was found both in a skill-oriented sports event (i.e., 
horse racing) and a chance-determined gamble (i.e., coin-flipping game) indicates 
that perceptions of progression are not necessarily derived from a rational 
understanding of the causal relationship between the trend and the outcome (e.g., a 
horse that catches up indicates it’s in top form and will give a strong performance). 
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Instead, they can be derived purely from the superficial features of an event, which 
may create an illusion of trend (e.g., a stronger sense that “I could have won” when 
losing on the third coin than when losing on the first or the second coin). Thus, it 
seems that event cues like proximity and progression could either be a frugal and 
useful heuristic that helps people deal with complex judgment tasks or a source of 
judgmental bias. This point will be elaborated in Section 5.2.4 
Overall, the findings of the six experiments support and develop the notion of 
the proximity heuristic (Teigen, 1998) by showing that not only the static proximity 
is used as a cue for counterfactual probability judgments but also the dynamic 
variations in proximity.  More broadly, the results are also in support with the notion 
of the simulation heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), which posit that people 
estimate probability or propensity of an outcome by assessing how easily the 
outcome can be imagined in mind. It was assumed that a short distance to an 
alternative outcome and a sense of rapid progression towards it both facilitate mental 
simulation and thus are able to heighten one’s probability judgments about what 
could have been.  
5.1.2 Counterfactual Probability Judgments and Emotions 
Being consistent with the finding by Petrocelli et al. (2011), the results of 
Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5 suggest that a counterfactual probability judgment plays an 
important role in people’s emotional reactions to past events. While Petrocelli et al. 
(2011) only demonstrated a contrast-dominant emotional consequences of 
counterfactual probability judgments, the correlational analyses in the experiments 
presented in this thesis suggest that (1) counterfactual probability judgments could 
exert influence on emotions in the direction of either contrast-domination 
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(Experiments 2, 4 and 5) or assimilation-domination (Experiment 3), although the 
thesis failed to document both types of dominance in any single experiment; (2) the 
effects of counterfactual probability judgments on emotions are contingent on the 
perception of future possibility (i.e., the data from Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5 is 
indicative of a general rule that the absence of future possibility enhances the 
contrast effect and the presence of future possibility enhances the assimilation effect, 
which is consistent with the prediction of the REM (Markman & McMullen, 2003)); 
and (3) the observed moderating effect of future possibility was likely to be caused 
by the fact that the presence of future possibility encourages people to focus more on 
the future implications of a counterfactual, compared to when the future possibility is 
absent (Experiments 1, 2 and 4). 
However, it should be noted that none of the experiments demonstrated that 
the moderation of the perception of future possibility can be strong enough to reverse 
the emotional consequences of counterfactual probability judgments. While the 
results of Experiments 2, 4 and 5 suggest that the assimilation effect brought up by 
the presence of future possibility has cancelled out the contrast effect, the results of 
Experiment 3 suggests that the contrast effect brought up by the absence of future 
possibility has cancelled out the assimilation effect. These results are at odds with 
those of McMullen and Markman (2002), who demonstrated in the context of a 
basketball game that a dominance of the contrast effect (e.g., the team being one 
point down felt more negative than the team being 15 points down at the end of 
game) was reversed to a dominance of the assimilation effect when the future 
possibility was present (e.g., the team being one point down felt more positive than 
the team being 15 points down at half time). However, they did not measure 
counterfactual thinking in any way, which made their results open to alternative 
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interpretation. As argued in Section 2.1, in their experiment, the observed dominance 
of the assimilation effect when future possibility was high could be simply caused by 
the fact that the team which was one point down at half time had an objectively 
better chance to win than the team which was trailing far behind. Thus, it is argued 
that the experiments in this thesis, which ruled out this confounding factor and 
directly examined the relationship between counterfactual thinking and emotions, 
render more valid results. The conclusion is that, although the perception of future 
possibility is capable of moderating the effects of counterfactual thinking on 
emotions, it can-not reverse them.  
What’s more, while counterfactual probability judgments were found to have 
an effect on emotions, their contributions to the total emotional consequences of 
proximity and progression are still ambiguous. Firstly, there still lacks definitive 
evidence for the mediating role of counterfactual probability judgments in the 
emotional consequences of outcome proximity. In Experiment 2, although proximity 
was found to have an indirect effect on emotions via counterfactual probability 
judgments, the mediation was rejected on the ground that the total effect of 
proximity on emotions was not significant. This was believed to be caused by the 
weak effect of proximity on counterfactual probability judgments. When this effect 
was enhanced in Experiment 3, the total effect did display the predicted pattern. 
However, this time only indicative evidence was found that the total effect was 
mediated by counterfactual probability judgments. As argued in Section 2.4.3, this 
could be caused by the restricted range of the dependent variable (i.e., affect) due to 
a within-participants design. Thus, it is suggested that the mediation of 
counterfactual probability judgments should be examined in future experiments 
using a between-participant setup. 
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Secondly, although evidence suggsests that the counterfactual probability 
judgment is an intervening variable between progression and emotions, this indirect 
effect didn’t seem to contribute much to the total effect – it appeared to be diluted or 
overwhelmed by other effects that progression has on emotions. That is, the process 
of a rapid progression towards a desirable outcome can itself be very enjoyable, 
despite the fact that it heightens one’s expectation of success and hence introduces 
the feeling of disappointment when this expectation fails to be confirmed. When 
measures were taken to divert participants’ attention to the outcome of an event 
instead of its process (Experiment 6), progression did affect emotions in a way that 
reflects a dominance of the contrast effect. However, the results fail to obtain any 
evidence that this effect was mediated by counterfactual probability judgments. That 
is, participant’s counterfactual probability judgments did not correlate with emotions. 
This is suspected to have been caused by the fact that participants were allowed to 
change their bet freely in the experiment, which may have introduced variations to 
people’s feeling of disappointment. To rectify this limitation, participants in future 
experiments should be asked to bet with fixed stake.    
Overall, the evidence support the proposition that counterfactual probability 
judgments have an effect on emotions and the nature of this effect is moderated by 
the perception of the future possibility. The nature of the moderation is consistent 
with the prediction of the REM that the absence of future possibility enhances the 
contrast effect and the presence of future possibility enhances the assimilation effect. 
However, the moderation of future possibility is not strong enough to reverse the 
dominance of one effect to the dominance of the other. What’s more, only indicative 
evidence was obtained that counterfactual probability judgments mediate the 
relationship between proximity/progression and emotions. This relationship should 
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receive further examinations in a between-participant setup. Measures should also be 
taken to control factors other than counterfactual probability judgments which 
potentially have powerful impacts on people’s emotional experiences. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
5.2.1 Propensities versus Dispositions 
The results of the experiments presented in this thesis support the notion that 
counterfactual probability judgments are informed by the perception of propensity 
and thus are established via the strategy of the simulation heuristic (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982) or the proximity heuristic (Teigen, 1998, 2005). However, it should 
be noted that the potency of this support was limited by the fact that the participants 
in our experiments did not have the liberty of choosing different strategies to reach 
probabilistic judgments.  
Kahneman and Varey (1990) distinguished two types of subjective 
probabilities – propensity and disposition. Propensity, as introduced by the present 
thesis, was defined as the subjective probability of an outcome informed by the event 
cues after the relevant causal episode begins (e.g., the probability judgment 
regarding the outcome of a football game based on what occurs during the match). In 
contrast, disposition refers to the subjective probability of an outcome based on the 
information prior to the commencing of the relevant causal episode, like base rates 
(e.g., “Team A has beaten Team B most of the time in the past) or other causal 
information (e.g., “Team A has stronger defence line than Team B”). More 
importantly, the two authors made an important observation that the usage of the 
word “almost” in a close counterfactual (e.g., “Team A almost won the football 
game.”) is considered appropriate only when the propensity of a counterfactual 
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outcome is perceived to be high. On the other hand, a high disposition does not 
suffice a close counterfactual. The two authors refer to this phenomenon as 
disposition neglect in retrospective judgments. To illustrate, they presented a 
scenario study where participants read about Mark, who is known as a very strong 
player in chess but narrowly missed the registration for a chess tournament. 
Although it can be argued that Mark’s disposition of winning the tournament was 
high (because he is a stronger player), 97% of the participants thought it was “very 
peculiar” to comment “Mark almost won the tournament” (p. 1104).   
Given its close tie to the usage of “almost”, the judgment of counterfactual 
probability is also expected to be subject to disposition neglect. This is not to say, 
however, that the information about prior probabilities does not affect counterfactual 
probability judgments. In the above scenario, it might be more plausible to say 
“Mark could have won the tournament” if he is known as a strong player than if he is 
not. However, it will be interesting to see how people make counterfactual 
probability judgments when the disposition and the propensity are at odds.  For 
example, which horse would be considered to have been more likely to win – the 
horse which had a weak performance in the past but lost the race by an inch or the 
horse which had a strong performance in the past but lost the race by a long way?  
The experiments presented in the thesis fail to give insights into this question. 
In some of our studies (Experiments 2 and 3), participants were provided with no 
information regarding the prior probability of an outcome. In other studies where 
they did receive this information (Experiments 1, 4, 5 and 6), it was kept 
symmetrical across conditions (e.g., in Experiment 5, participants were told that the 
two horses in question both had moderate chance of winning). Thus, these 
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experiments were incapable of examining whether the use of the event cues will still 
be a preferred strategy for counterfactual probability judgments even when 
competing information about the disposition is available. Future research should 
address this limitation by granting participants the freedom to adopt different 
judgmental strategies. For example, information about winning odds should be 
provided to the participants who make judgments about how likely a horse could 
have won a race or how likely they could have won a gamble. Similarly, relevant 
historical records of academic performance should be made available to participants 
who make judgments about how likely a student could have passed an examination. 
It is expected that the judgments of counterfactual probability should be affected 
more by cues of proximity or progression than the information of prior probabilities.  
5.2.2 Proximity Heuristic versus Simulation Heuristic 
Both the proximity heuristic and the simulation heuristic make the prediction 
that counterfactual probability judgments are affected by the perception of closeness. 
However, as a distinction, their accounts regarding the psychological process 
underpinning this proximity-probability relationship are slightly different. The 
simulation heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) suggests that the reason why 
counterfactual probability estimates are higher when a focal outcome is close is 
because the short distance between the reality and its counterfactual alternative 
makes it easy for a counterfactual scenario to be mentally constructed. On the other 
hand, the proximity heuristic (Teigen, 1998, 2005) suggests that the observed 
relationship between closeness and probability judgments is caused by the fact that 
people use proximities as direct cues for probabilities. These two proposed heuristics 
are so alike that in many occasions, including in the six experiments presented in this 
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thesis, they render the same predictions. Thus, our studies are incapable of testing 
which theory provides a more accurate account of the psychological process under 
the observed effect. Future research, however, could address this matter by observing 
the situations where the two heuristics would yield different predictions.  
Consider the following scenario featured in a study by Teigen (2005): “One 
winter day, three girls walk in a row on a narrow sidewalk. Annie walks in front, 
followed by Bente, with Christine hindmost. An icicle falls from a roof and hits 
Annie. Fortunately, she is not injured” (p. 427). In this case, both heuristics would 
predict that Bente, who walks in the middle would have a higher counterfactual 
probability estimate of being hit (e.g., “It could have been me”) than Christine 
because Bente is physically closer to the victim. Now, consider an alternative 
scenario in which Annie is still hit by the icicle but this time she walks in the middle 
with Bente behind her and Christine in the front. The interesting question is, would 
Bente change his counterfactual probability judgments of being hit? The proximity 
heuristic would predict no because Bente’s distance to the victim does not differ in 
the two scenarios. However, the simulation heuristic would disagree. Although 
Bente can easily imagine how he was hit by the icicle instead of Annie due to his 
proximity to the victim, there is a salient fact that Christine is also very close to the 
victim. Bente, therefore, can also easily imagine how Christine was hit instead of 
Annie and himself (e.g., “I could have been Christine as well”). The salient 
counterfactual world in which Christine was hit will make it more difficult for Bente 
to imagine how he could have been the victim. Thus, according to the simulation 
heuristic, Bente should have a lower counterfactual probability estimate in the latter 
scenario than in the former. Future research should test the two heuristics to see 
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which one provides a more accurate account of the psychological process underlying 
the intuitive judgments of counterfactual probability.  
5.2.3 The Perception of Closeness 
It should be noted that the distances that were chosen to provoke the sense of 
“closeness” and “farness” in the experiments presented here were all quite arbitrary. 
For example, in Experiment 3, the difference in final scores was fixed at either one 
point for the close condition or 15 points for the far condition. Although the 14-point 
difference has been shown by McMullen and Markman (2002) to be sufficient to 
provoke different degrees of the sense of closeness, their usages lack theoretical 
underpinnings. This problem is prevalent in the literature on “near-misses”, in which 
spatial, temporal and numerical proximity have often been manipulated to a certain 
extent without any explanation being provided as to why they were manipulated in 
such ways. Thus, while the effects of outcome proximity on a range of social and 
cognitive judgments have been frequently documented by the previous research, a 
question remains unanswered: how close is close enough? 
It may be convenient to assume that the closeness in the physical world has a 
linear relationship with the subjective feeling of closeness. Thus, a basketball team 
who is beaten by the opponent by 12 points should be considered to be closer to 
winning and hence be assigned to a higher counterfactual probability of winning than 
another team being beaten by 13 points. What’s more, the difference found in the 
counterfactual probability estimates between these two teams should be exactly the 
same as that found between two teams who are beaten by 24 and 25 points, 
respectively. However, this linear account might oversimplify the real-life situation. 
In one aforementioned study by Teigen (1998, Study 2), participants were presented 
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with a scenario in which Per, who is on a fishing trip, comes back to his car and finds 
that another car in the parking lot has fallen victim of a rockslide. Participants were 
told that the damaged car is either right next to Per’s car (close condition) or 50m 
away (far condition). Difference in the counterfactual probability estimates between 
the two conditions was only found to be significant in a within-participant set-up but 
not in a between-participant set-up. That is, if the variation of distance was not made 
salient to them, participants’ subjective feeling of closeness is the same for “right 
next” and “50m”.  
Miller et al. (1990) introduced the concept of mental models to explain the 
effect of outcome closeness on the mutability of a past outcome. Mental models refer 
to “content-based rules of thumb about the ways that systems operate” (p. 313). The 
authors argued that if the distance between an event and its counterfactual alternative 
falls in a “critical range of values around which parameters in the model can be 
manipulated or set” (p. 313), the reality will be thought to be easy to transform from 
one state to another. This account implies a non-linear relationship between the 
closeness in the physical world and one’s subjective feeling of closeness. That is, the 
distance between the reality and its alternative has to be diminished below a “tipping 
point” to make a meaningful difference in people’s perception of “closeness” and 
counterfactual probability estimates.  
The mental model account also implies that the determination of this “tipping 
point” could be contextual and subject to individual differences because an 
individual may apply different mental models to different situations and different 
individuals may apply different mental models to the same situation. As an 
illustration, an interval of two metres may be considered adequate and safe when 
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cars are slugging in a traffic jam. However, the same distance might be considered 
dangerously close when cars are travelling at 70 miles an hour on the motor way. 
Also, a young driver who just obtained his/her license may have different 
perceptions of closeness compared to an experienced driver. One challenge for future 
research is to identify the situational and individual factors that influence people’s 
perception of closeness, which will help develop more accurate predictions regarding 
people’s judgments of counterfactual probability.  
5.2.4 Conditional versus Unconditional Counterfactual Probability 
The notion of counterfactual probability employed by the thesis covers both 
the conditional probabilities (e.g., “How likely could my horse have won the race if 
it hadn’t stumbled?”) and unconditional probabilities (e.g., “How likely could my 
horse have won the race?”). The two types of counterfactual probability were not 
treated very differently in the present thesis because it is believed that their 
judgmental processes share some common grounds. That is, the judgments of both 
types of probability might involve mental simulation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) 
and should be both subject to the alterations of event cues like proximity and 
progression, as was found by the experiments presented in this thesis. However, the 
psychological processes used to produce these two probability judgments might not 
be exactly the same.  
As pointed out by Teigen (1998), a retrospective probability judgment 
requires the judge to engage in mental time travel. Over et al. (2007) also suggested 
that “…the subjective probability of the counterfactual at the present time is the 
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same as the conditional probability P(q|p)
5
 at an earlier time (as given by the 
context)”.Thus, to evaluate a “if-then” counterfactual conditional, the judge would 
naturally rewind the story back to the temporal position right before the occurrence 
of the event that is specified in the condition and make a prospective judgments 
about the propensity of a target outcome, pretending that the outcome was unknown. 
For example, answering the question “How likely could I have passed the test if I 
hadn’t got drunk the night before” would require the judge to travel back to the night 
before the test and evaluate the prospective conditional probability “How likely am I 
to pass the test tomorrow if I don’t get drunk tonight?”.  
As being postulated by the theorization of the simulation heuristic, such a 
judgment might be reached by simulating oneself actually preparing for the test 
instead of drinking and assessing the ease with which the counterfactual outcome (i.e. 
passing the test) can be imagined. The experiments presented in this thesis have 
demonstrated that the ease of imagination may be determined by event cues like 
proximity and progression. It might also, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1, be affected 
by the judge’s belief in the correlation between the “if” conditional and the “then” 
outcome. That is, when holding outcome proximity constant, counterfactual 
probability estimates should be higher if the correlation between the conditional and 
the outcome is perceived to be strong than if it is perceived to be weak. For example, 
the extent to which people think “drinking” is correlated to the “mark” in an 
examination would affect their judgments about the likelihood of passing if they had 
not got drunk. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that when the causal relation is 
                                                             
5 P(q|p) denotes the probability of an event q given that an event p occurs. 
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very strong, the effect of outcome proximity on counterfactual probability estimates 
can be attenuated. 
On the other hand, the temporal position of the judgment is not specified in 
an unconditional counterfactual probability assessment. So how do people decide 
how far they should travel back in time in order to make the judgment? The answer 
to this question is important because spontaneous counterfactual thinking is mostly 
activated by the motivation to mutate a past factual outcome rather than the 
antecedent of a past outcome (Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1997) and thus a 
counterfactual simulation usually starts with a question in mind concerning 
unconditional probability (e.g., “How likely could the accident have been avoided?”).   
One possible strategy to resolve the problem of the temporal positions of 
judgments is to treat an unconditional counterfactual probability as a global 
evaluation of the probabilities of all the possible conditionals. For example, after 
taking a taxi to the airport but missing his/her flight, one might start asking a 
question regarding the unconditional probability of catching the flight (i.e., “How 
likely could I have caught the plane?”).  This person might construct several 
counterfactual scenarios in which different aspects of the incident are mutated. Those 
different scenarios are translated into several different conditional probability 
assessments (e.g., “How likely could I have caught the flight, if I had not overslept 
this morning/If I had used public transportations/If the taxi driver had taken a 
different route,”). Each of those conditional probabilities will be evaluated separated 
by mental simulation. Afterwards, those conditional probabilities will each be 
weighed by the probability of its “if” condition (i.e., How likely could I have not 
overslept?; How likely could I have used the public transportations?; How likely 
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could the taxi driver have taken a different route?) and integrated into a global 
estimation of the mutability of a past outcome.  
However, while this method might be relatively easy to implement for the 
participants who read a scenario which only contains limited elements in the causal 
episode of an outcome, it might not be practically possible in real life situations 
where there could be numerous elements of a story that can be mutated. As argued 
by E.P. Seelau et al. (1995), people only consider limited possible alternatives when 
constructing a counterfactual world. Thus, a second possible strategy is for the judge 
to base a global unconditional counterfactual probability judgment not on all but 
only a subset of possible conditionals that come to mind most easily. As mentioned 
earlier, the antecedents of an outcome differ in mutability (Roese & Olson, 1995). It 
could be that, when evaluating the mutability of an outcome, only the conditionals 
that concern the most mutable aspects of the reality will be considered while other 
counterfactual possibilities will be omitted. This strategy is more frugal than the one 
mentioned above and may yield similar results: Since people use mental simulations 
to evaluate probabilities, the conditionals that are difficult to come to mind (e.g., 
“How likely could I have caught the flight if I had suddenly acquired the ability of 
flying?”) are usually led by “if” conditions that are deemed improbable (e.g. 
suddenly acquiring the ability of flying). Thus, even if those conditionals had been 
considered, they would have been given little weight anyway when composing the 
global counterfactual probability.  
In an extreme case, when making an unconditional counterfactual probability 
judgment regarding an actual outcome that is preceded by only one prominently 
mutable antecedent (e.g. a car accident on the way to the airport), people may 
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consider only one conditional probability (e.g., How likely could I have caught the 
plane if I had not been involved in that car accident) and other possible paths to 
mutate the actual outcome are simply neglected. Also, the probability of the “if” 
condition in this case (i.e., the probability of avoiding an accident) might be judged 
very high (because it slips into mind easily). Thus, in these extreme circumstances, 
evaluating an unconditional counterfactual probability (e.g., “How likely could I 
have caught the plane?”) and a conditional one (e.g., “How likely could I have 
caught the plane if I had not been involved in the accident?”) should yield the same 
result.     
Nevertheless, in order to make a judgment about an unconditional 
counterfactual probability, people may not always need to convert it into one or 
several conditional ones. There are situations where no information about the 
antecedents of a factual outcome is provided. For example, in the TV game show 
scenario in Experiment 3, only information about final scores was provided to the 
participants. This is also true in several studies by Teigen (1998). But people still 
seemed to be able to handle the task of judging a counterfactual probability without 
any difficulty in those cases. The information about outcome proximity seems to be 
sufficient to justify a counterfactual “Things could have been different”, even if no 
material in the story was there to help one contemplate how exactly things could 
have been different. As Tversky and Kahneman (1982) noted, “to assess availability 
it is not necessary to perform the actual operations of retrieval or construction. It 
suffices to assess the ease with which these operations could be performed, much as 
the difficulty of a puzzle or mathematical problem can be assessed without 
considering specific solutions” (p. 164).      
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There are also situations where people are provided with the information 
about the antecedents of an outcome but they still base their probability judgments 
purely on cues of proximity or progression. The coin-flipping gambling game in 
Experiment 6 is a good example of this. In this game, a losing outcome (e.g., Head-
Tail-Head) could always be mutated by altering the outcome of only one coin. 
Therefore, a conditional counterfactual should be obvious after each losing trial. 
That is, “I could have won if I had one more head/tail.” Please note that the 
probability of this conditional was always the same despite the temporal position of 
the losing coin because: (1) the likelihood of winning if one had one more head/tail 
was always the same; and (2) the likelihood of getting one more head/tail was always 
equal because the outcomes of the three coins were independent from each other. 
Thus, if participants’ unconditional counterfactual probability judgments (i.e., “How 
likely could I have won?”) had been based on the aforementioned conditional 
probability judgments, they would have been the same regardless of the temporal 
position of the losing coin. However, what was found in the experiment was that 
participants’ unconditional probability judgments were higher when losing on the 
last coin than when losing on other coins, which indicates that participants did not 
convert the unconditional counterfactual probability judgments into conditional ones.    
It was possible that the salience of the critical antecedent (i.e., getting a head 
when a tail was needed or vice versa) was dampened by the fact that participants 
were always one coin from winning. This lack of salient mutable antecedent, might 
have disposed the participants to base their probability judgments on other more 
salient cues like proximity and progression.  
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It is speculated that, when making an unconditional counterfactual 
probability judgment, people may switch between the two different strategies 
depending on the salience of mutable antecedents and the availability of 
proximity/progression cues. To test this idea, future experiments could employ a 
similar coin-flipping gambling task but include a condition where participants have 
to flip and get the same values from four coins, instead of three coins, in order to win. 
In this case, instead of always losing on one coin, people might lose on two coins 
(e.g., Head-Tail-Tail-Head). Thus, if people lose on one coin (e.g., Head-Tail-Head-
Head), the losing coin will look salient and mutable, which might dispose people to 
convert the unconditional probability judgment (i.e., “How likely could I have won?”) 
to a conditional one (i.e., “How likely could I have won if I had got one more 
head/tail?”). If this happens, the temporal order effect on unconditional 
counterfactual probability judgments should be diminished.      
5.2.5 The Validity of Counterfactual Probability Judgments  
One issue that has not been addressed in depth by the present thesis is 
whether the use of event cues like proximity and progression in the judgment of 
counterfactual probability is a source of cognitive bias or an optimal strategy and a 
reasonable compromise when the observer has limited information and mental 
recourse to calculate probabilities accurately. Or put in another way, to what extent 
could proximity and progression accurately reflect “true” counterfactual probabilities? 
Unfortunately, there might not be a definite answer to this question. It is still under 
fierce debate in the philosophical literature how people should conduct probability 
judgments regarding counterfactuals (see for example, Bennett, 2003; Shaffer, 2009). 
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Indeed, it is practically difficult to examine the reliability of one’s counterfactual 
probability judgments simply because one can’t, at least for now, travel back in time.  
However, there is evidence indicating that the reliance on event cues like 
proximity and progression may at least result in violations of the formal rule of 
probability theory. In the aforementioned study by Teigen (1998, study 2), 
participants read a story about a ski racer Bjarne who beats his opponent in a race. It 
was found that participants’ judgments about the probability of the factual (i.e., the 
likelihood of him winning) and their judgments about the probability of the 
counterfactual (i.e., the likelihood of him losing) were both above the midpoint of 
the scale, which violates the complementary rule of probability theory.  Similar 
evidence can also be found in the counterfactual probability estimates made by the 
participants in Experiment 5, where the mean ratings of the likelihood of John’s 
horse winning and the likelihood of Henry’s horse winning (when they actually both 
lost) are both above the mid-point of the scale, despite the fact that the participants 
were told explicitly that the two horses were in the same race and there was going to 
be only one winner.   
Evidence also suggests that the reliance on the cue of proximity could lead to 
an overestimation of retrospective probability. One example is Teigen (1998)’s 
finding that the same event (e.g., winning a lottery) can be considered more likely if 
it was close to happening (but did not happen) than if it did actually happen. More 
specifically, participants imagined that they were a customer in a record store who 
either received gifts as the number 10,000 customer visiting the store or queued 
behind a woman who became the lucky customer (and hence did not become the 
lucky customer but was very close). An event should not be rated more likely if it 
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did not occur than if it did occur. However, it was found that participants rated their 
chance of being the lucky one higher if they narrowly missed this opportunity than if 
they actually got it. Also participants’ ratings in the former case were close to mid-
point of the scale, despite that “being the number 10,000 customer” was a very rare 
event.  
Although the reliance on the events cues like proximity and progression 
could lead to counterfactual probability judgments that violate the formal rule of 
probability, they still can be argued to be functional or useful if “closer” or “stronger 
progression” does indeed reflect a higher probability in the real world. Miller et al. 
(1990) argued that sometimes it is rational to base probability judgments on distance. 
In the TV game show scenario used in Experiment 3, it could be argued that the 
people who were beaten by their opponent by one point did have better chance of 
winning than those who were beaten by 15 points because getting 15 points is indeed 
harder than getting one point. However, in some situations, proximity might lead to 
an illusion of high probability. Turnbull (1981) found that in a lottery, people who 
held the ticket with a number that was numerically close to the winning ticket 
reported a higher level of disappointment than those whose ticket was numerically 
far, despite the fact that their chances of winning were the same because the winning 
number was drawn randomly. The researchers in gambling have noticed that near-
miss outcomes (e.g., losing on one symbol at a slot machine; betting on the number 
that is right next to the winning number on the wheel of the Russian roulette) 
encourage persistent gambling behaviours (Dixon et al., 2009; Gilovich & Douglas 
1986; Griffiths, 1999; Reid, 1986), presumably because the short distance to winning 
enhances the perception that “I could have won” and “I will win next time” even if 
the games are chance-determined.  
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In a similar way, the perception of progression could also lead to either 
rational or irrational increases in probability judgments depending on contexts. As 
discussed in Section 3.4.1, a “catching-up” horse could indeed be more likely to win 
than the horse consistently falling behind because the subjective perception of 
moving towards one’s goal has been shown to improve objective performance 
(Vallerand et al., 1988). Also, in the case of causal proximity, it can be argued that 
the outcome was indeed more likely to have turned out differently if a decisive event 
occurs latter, rather than earlier, in its causal sequence.  
Consider a football team which took a lead in the early stage of a game but 
was tied later. People’s perception that “the team could have won” might be stronger 
when the scores were tied within minutes of the final whistle than when they were 
tied in the early stage of the game.  There could be a rational basis for this judgment. 
Because the events in the causal sequence are not independent in this case (i.e., the 
occurrence of one event depends on the occurrence of an earlier event), if the scores 
were tied in the early stage of the game, the consequences of undoing this decisive 
event would appear quite uncertain because it changes every event that follows. Thus, 
the counterfactual “If they had not been tied, they would have won” might be quite 
weak because people could easily construct a counterfactual scenario where the team 
was not tied but still did not win (e.g., “Even if they had not got tied at that moment, 
they might have still got tied later and not won”). In contrast, mutating a decisive 
event (i.e., being tied) that occurs at the end of the game introduces little change to 
the whole causal episode because all the events that occur prior to the decisive event 
can still be retained in the counterfactual world. This might make people more 
certain or confident in the counterfactual they construct compared to if the decisive 
event occurs early in the game. Therefore, when an outcome is preceded by a 
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sequence of events which are causally dependent on each other, it can be argued that 
it is justifiable to consider an outcome to be more mutable if a decisive event occurs 
later in its causal sequence than earlier.  
  However, when the antecedents in a causal episode are causally independent 
of each other, like in the coin-flipping game in Experiment 6, the temporal order 
effect seems to be less justifiable. In this case, undoing the outcome of an earlier 
coin will not affect the outcomes of coins that follow. Thus, if a person sees two 
heads and a tail, the conditional counterfactual “I could have won if I got one more 
head” as well as the unconditional counterfactual “I could have won” should be 
equally plausible regardless of the temporal order of the outcomes of the three coins. 
However, as was found in Experiment 6, people’s sense that “I could have won” was 
higher if they lost on the last coin than any other coin.  
Future research should particularly focus on the situations where the 
perception of progression is likely to lead to judgmental biases because of their 
important real-life implications. For example, the temporal order effect observed in 
the present thesis seems to have been already extensively exploited by the designers 
and the manufacturers of slot-machines in casinos. As discovered by Strictland and 
Grote (1967), a slot machine, which reveals the outcomes of the three wheels 
sequentially from left to right, usually has the highest proportion of winning symbols 
on the first wheel, a lower proportion on the second wheel, and the lowest proportion 
on the third wheel. This particular design will undoubtedly raise the probability of 
the gambler losing on the third wheel instead of on the first or the second. The two 
researchers also discovered that the slot machine with this design led to more 
persistent gambling behaviour than the slot machine whose winning symbol 
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arrangement was the other way around, presumably because losing on the last wheel, 
like losing on the last coin in our experiment, created intense frustration that “I could 
have won” and also made future winning seem more likely.  
5.2.6 Beyond Temporal Perspective 
When examining the emotional consequences of counterfactual probability 
judgments, the present thesis exclusively focused on the moderation of the 
situational factor of temporal perspective. However, it should be noted that it is not 
the only factor that can potentially influence the strengths of the contrast and 
assimilation effects. As reviewed in Section 1.2.3.2, the relative strengths of the two 
effects can be manipulated by directing one’s attention between the counterfactual 
imagination and its difference to the reality using explicit verbal instructions 
(McMullen, 1997). The strengths of the two effects can also be influenced by 
whether the task is outcome oriented or process oriented (Markman & Tetlock, 
2000). In addition, Markman and McMullen (2003) proposed that the assimilation 
effect should be promoted after counterfactual thinking to the extent that the self or 
the current situation is perceiced to be mutable in the future, presumably because the 
mutability of the self or the current situation makes an upward counterfactual state 
appear attainable and also makes one feel vulnerable to a downward counterfactual 
state.  
It is important to recognize that these factors may not operate independently 
but rather interact with each other to determinate the strengths of the contrast and 
assimilation effects. For example, the effect of perceived future possibility on the 
strength of the assimilation may depend on whether one perceived the self or the 
current situation as being mutable. Hence, the counterfactual thought “If I had put 
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more effort into the revision, I would have passed the test” indicates future 
possibility only if one holds the belief that he or she will put more effort into the 
revision next time. Thus, instead of examining individual factors in an isolated 
manner, future research should aim to clarify how these different factors interact 
with each other and determine the strengths of the contrast and assimilation effects 
jointly.  
How people make probability judgments about counterfactuals and how these 
judgments influence people’s affective experiences are important topics to explore 
because such judgments are prevalent in everyday life and bear profound 
psychological implications. What’s more, by exploring this topic, we will also get a 
better understanding of the cognitive process of counterfactual thinking as a whole. 
The next section is devoted to this matter.  
5.3 Theoretical Implications 
5.3.1 The Basic Process of Counterfactual Thinking 
In general, our findings regarding the determinants and the emotional 
consequences of counterfactual probability judgments help advance the conceptual 
framework of the basic process of counterfactual thinking. More specifically, an 
AES model is proposed which posits that counterfactual thinking consists of three 
basic stages: Activation – Estimation – Simulation.  
Activation  
The concept of “activation” employed here is the same in meaning to the one 
used in Roese and Olson’s (1995, 1997) two-stage model of counterfactual thinking, 
which refers to “whether the process of counterfactual thinking is turned on or off” 
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(Roese & Olson, 1997, p. 5). Upon the activation of counterfactual thinking, people 
start to consider the alternative to a factual outcome. Counterfactual thinking can be 
activated spontaneously, mostly when a factual outcome is negative (Gleicher, et al., 
1990; Roese, 1994; 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995; 1997) or proximate to an alternative 
state (Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; Roese & Olson, 1995; 1996). For 
example, a student might start to consider “Could the result of my examination have 
been different?” when he/she fails or gets numerically close to the boundary of a 
higher or lower grade. The evidence for those proposed factors has already been 
reviewed in Section 1.2.2 and hence won’t be repeated here. It is emphasized that, 
whichever factor activates the process of counterfactual thinking, it starts with a 
question – a question regarding the unconditional probability of an alternative 
outcome. (e.g., “How likely could the results of my examination have been 
different?”).  
Estimation  
In this stage, the answer to the question regarding the unconditional 
counterfactual probability of a past outcome posed in the earlier stage will be 
estimated. Section 5.2.4 has discussed different strategies that people might adopt to 
assess unconditional counterfactual probabilities. People may search for mutable 
antecedents in the causal script of the factual outcome and then construct one or 
several counterfactual scenarios by altering different aspects of the reality. By doing 
this, an unconditional counterfactual probability judgment is converted into one or 
several conditional ones. To illustrate this with an earlier example, a person who 
missed his/her flight and wondered “How likely could I have caught the plane?” 
might convert this question into several conditional probability judgments like “How 
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likely could I have caught the flight if I had not overslept in the morning/if I had 
taken the public transportations/if I the taxi driver had taken a different route?”. 
Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) predicted that unusual or atypical events in 
the causal sequence are more likely to be mutated in one’s constructions of the 
counterfactual scenario than usual or typical events. Also, controllable or dynamics 
aspects of an event have been found to be more mutable than uncontrollable and 
stable ones (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995; Roese & Olson 
1995).  
The probability of each conditional counterfactual will be estimated, possibly 
by the strategy of the simulation heuristic or the proximity heuristic, informed by 
event cues like proximity and progression as well as the perceived correlation 
between the condition and the outcome. Those conditional probability estimates will 
be weighed by the probabilities of their “if” conditions before being integrated to 
form a global evaluation of the unconditional counterfactual probability. When the 
antecedents of the factual outcome are unknown or when none of the antecedents is 
mutable, people may adopt a more frugal strategy of assessment, by which the 
estimation of the probability of the counterfactual outcome is purely based on event 
cues of proximity or progression, without any aspect of the reality being mentally 
mutated.   
Simulation  
Finally, the emotional experiences after a negative outcome depend on the 
interaction between the counterfactual probability estimate and the simulation mode. 
More specifically, a counterfactual probability estimate determines the “magnitude” 
of the emotional responses. The higher a counterfactual probability estimate is, the 
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more intense the emotional reaction will be. On the other hand, the simulation mode 
determines the “quality” of the emotional responses. A reflective simulation 
enhances the assimilation effect and an evaluative simulation enhances the contrast 
effect (Markman & McMullen, 2003). 
Compared to previous models, the AES model proposed here emphasizes that 
counterfactual thinking is not only a mental process of constructing a world that’s 
different to the reality but also, more importantly, a process of evaluating the 
probability of that world. Thus it is the result, rather than the activation, of this 
evaluation, that critically determines the psychological impacts of a counterfactual. 
This claim coincides with the latest finding by Petrocelli et al. (2011) that 
counterfactual probability judgments are better predictors for judgments of blame 
and affect than counterfactual frequencies (which denote the degrees of 
counterfactual activation).  The inclusion of counterfactual probability judgments in 
the conceptual framework of counterfactual thinking renders researchers a new 
perspective on how the psychological impacts of counterfactual thinking 
documented by previous research can be explained. It also helps us develop novel 
predictions as to how counterfactual thinking can affect people’s social judgments, 
motivations and behaviours. Some of those implications are discussed below. 
5.3.2 Counterfactual Probability, Functions and Motivations 
5.3.2.1 Counterfactual Probability Judgments and Behavioural Intention 
The functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008; 
Roese, 1994; 1997) posits that self-concerned counterfactual thinking can serve a 
preparative function by facilitating improvements in future behaviours. It is assumed 
in the REM that the effects of counterfactuals on people’s behavioural intentions 
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partly depend on the emotions they evoke (Markman & McMullen, 2003; Markman 
at al., 2008). More specifically, in an achievement-pursuing task, the negative 
emotions induced by counterfactual thinking worsen one’s affective experience but 
increase motivation and persistence. The positive emotions induced by 
counterfactual thinking, on the other hand, should have the opposite effects. 
Following this argument, the REM predicts that the contrast effect following upward 
counterfactuals and the assimilation effect following downward counterfactuals 
should both increase motivation and persistence because they both engender negative 
emotions (non-complacency and fear, respectively). Therefore, they serve 
preparative functions for the future. By comparison, the assimilation effect following 
upward counterfactuals and the contrast effect following downward counterfactuals 
should both decrease motivation and persistence because they both engender positive 
emotions (complacency). Therefore, they serve the function of affective 
enhancement. In a word, the effects of counterfactual thinking on behavioural 
intentions should depend on both its direction (i.e., upward or downward) and the 
simulation mode (i.e., reflective or evaluative).  
However, the AES model proposed here indicates that the direction and the 
simulation mode of a counterfactual should interact with counterfactual probability 
on behavioural intentions. For example, contrasting a highly probable upward 
counterfactual like “I would have passed the test if I had not got drunk” could induce 
dissatisfaction towards the results and anger in oneself, which drives the desire to 
improve one’s performance in the future. However, an improbable upward 
counterfactual like “I would probably still have failed even if I had not got drunk” 
makes a negative outcome appear inevitable and can actually ease one’s initial 
adverse emotional experiences derived from the  negative outcome (Gleicher et al., 
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1990) and prevent corrective behaviours. In a similar way, although assimilating a 
highly probable downward counterfactual like “I would have failed the test if I had 
got drunk” could promote preventive behaviours against drinking by inducing 
negative emotions like fear, this function will be weakened if one concludes that the 
counterfactual probability is actually quite low (i.e., “I would still have passed even 
if I had got drunk the night before”). 
Counterfactual thinking could also affect behavioural intentions through 
other mechanisms. In a recent paper by Epstude and Roese (2008), two pathways 
were proposed via which an upward counterfactual can affect future behavioural 
changes. First of all, the causal inference derived from a counterfactual can heighten 
behavioural intentions via the “content-specific pathway”. That is, the thought “I 
could have passed the test if I had not got drunk” pinpoints the causal relationship 
between “not drinking” and “passing the test” and should lead to behavioural 
intention “I will not get drink next time”. Secondly, upward counterfactual thinking 
can affect behavioural intentions via a “content-neutral pathway” by inducing 
negative emotions and lifting one’s self-efficacy, confidence and the perception of 
control. Thus, the thought “I could have passed the test if I had not got drunk” 
highlights the fact that “I can pass the test” and motivates behavioural change.  
Again, the AES model would predict that the effectiveness of these two 
pathways may largely depend on one’s counterfactual probability judgments. First of 
all, a counterfactual probability judgment could affect the credibility of the causal 
inference derived from a counterfactual representation. When the counterfactual 
probability is low, upward counterfactual thinking might have a weak causal 
inference for future behavioural change. In extreme cases, low counterfactual 
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probability estimates might lead to “even if” thoughts, which deny the causal 
relationship between one’s behaviour and his/her goal and thus inhibit corrective 
behaviours (e.g., “Even if I had got drunk, I would still have failed the test. So my 
failure was not caused by drinking and there is no point avoiding getting drunk 
before the test next time”). Secondly, counterfactual probability estimates may affect 
behavioural intentions by influencing self-efficacy, confidence and the perception of 
control. In the case of upward counterfactual thinking, a low counterfactual 
probability estimate could deflate confidence and hope and thus reduce the 
motivation to change (e.g., “I would have still failed the examination even if I had 
put more effort in it. So what’s the point of trying?”).  
In summary, counterfactual probability judgments may have critical effects 
on behavioural intentions after counterfactual thinking by influencing affective 
reactions, the credibility of the causal inferences and the expectancies for future 
success. These propositions open new avenues for future research. 
5.3.2.2 Counterfactual Probability Judgments and Affect Enhancement 
Although positive emotions induced by counterfactual thinking hinder the 
motivation for future behavioural change, they can help people improve their 
affective well-being and cope with traumatic events (Markman et al., 1993). This 
function could come especially useful where the future implications of a 
counterfactual are irrelevant (e.g., when the outcome is unchangeable or out of one’s 
control). As predicted by the REM, the assimilation effect following upward 
counterfactual thinking and the contrast effect following downward counterfactual 
thinking both reduce the motives for future behavioural changes but can serve an 
affect-enhancement purpose because they induce positive emotions like 
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complacency. However, it is argued here that the affective-enhancement function of 
counterfactual thinking can also be achieved by manipulating the perception of 
counterfactual probability. For example, after having a car accident, the severely 
injured victim may mentally construct several counterfactual scenarios about what 
might have been. The traditional view of counterfactual thinking would recommend 
constructing downward counterfactuals to improve the victim’s psychological well-
being (e.g., “I should feel lucky and be grateful because I could have been killed”). 
However, the AES model indicates that generating implausible upward 
counterfactuals might have a similar effect (e.g., Even if I had done something 
differently, I would have still been caught in the accident).  
This proposition receives some support from one study by Tykocinski and 
Steinberg (2005, study 2) and Experiment 5 in this thesis, both of which revealed 
that people’s counterfactual probability judgments after a negative outcome 
regarding an upward counterfactual decreased when the outcome became more 
severe. This is presumably because people’s desire for affect-enhancement was 
stronger when the outcome was severe than it was not. The role of counterfactual 
probability judgments in affect-enhancements should be examined more directly in 
future research. It is expected that eliciting an upward counterfactual thinking with 
low counterfactual probability will not deteriorate one’s psychological well-being 
after a traumatic event. On the contrary, it should be able to improve one’s emotional 
experiences. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
People are not only affected by what did happen but also by what did not but 
could have happened. The present thesis embraces the idea that the psychological 
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impacts of these counterfactual worlds are largely determined by the certainties or 
uncertainties that are assigned to them. Six experiments examined both the 
antecedents and the emotional consequences of these probability judgments. First of 
all, being consistent with the simulation heuristic and proximity heuristic, it was 
found that both static information about outcome proximity and dynamic information 
about the trend of its variation affected one’s counterfactual probability estimates. 
This is true for both conditional and unconditional probabilities, which were found to 
be heightened in the face of short or shrinking spatial, numerical or conceptual 
distances. Secondly, the emotional consequences of those probability judgments 
were investigated within the theoretical framework of the Reflective and Evaluative 
Model of Comparative Thinking (REM). Evidence suggests that counterfactual 
probability estimates are able to influence one’s emotional experiences in either the 
direction of contrast-domination or assimilation-domination and the likelihood of 
these two directions are a function of the perception of future possibility – low 
perception of future possibility increases likelihood of the contrast-domination and 
high perception of future possibility increases likelihood of the assimilation-
domination.     
These findings have implications to both the research on subjective 
probability and counterfactual thinking. First of all, the current research is an 
important instalment to the existing literature on proximity-probability relationship 
which previously only focused on the effects of static proximity cues. Secondly, our 
results suggest that the psychological impact of a counterfactual world should be a 
result of a three-way interaction of its direction (i.e., upward or downward), 
probability (i.e., low or high), and simulation mode (i.e., reflection or evaluation). 
Combining our findings with the previous research, the thesis proposed the 
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Activation – Estimation – Simulation (AES) model to account for the general 
process of counterfactual thinking from a probabilistic point of view, where 
counterfactual thinking was described as a process of identifying, constructing and 
answering question regarding the probabilities of alternative worlds.  
The thesis also illuminates the way for future research by posing new 
questions regarding both the psychological mechanisms and the consequences of 
counterfactual probability judgments. These questions include:  Which is the more 
accurate account of the psychological mechanism underlying proximity-probability 
relationship, the simulation heuristic or the proximity heuristic? If such judgments 
are determined by perceived distance, how is objective closeness in the physical 
world is related to psychological closeness? How much weight do people assign to 
information about propensities and dispositions respectively when making 
counterfactual probability judgments? Do people use different strategies to reach 
conditional and unconditional probability judgments? How reliable are these 
judgments? What roles do those judgments play in people’s motivation, behavioural 
intention, self-perception and coping mechanisms? Answering these questions will 
help us understand how people interpret their past in general and what impacts these 
interpretations have on their lives.   
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Appendices – Experimental Materials 
Appendix A Experimental Materials for Experiment 1 
Information Sheet for Participants 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Understanding how people respond to success and 
failure 
This experiment is conducted by a research postgraduate in the Department of 
Psychology as part of the requirements for the doctoral degree.  
Experimenter: Qiyuan Zhang 
Supervisor: Dr Judith Covey 
The participants are asked to read all of the following information  
 This experiment is designed to examine how people respond to 
success and failure in daily life. 
 You will be asked to read one short story featuring successes or 
failures that people may confront in real life.  
 You will then answer some questions following the story about 
your thoughts and opinions. 
 Please be advised that your participation in the experiment is 
absolutely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at anytime 
without having to give a reason for withdrawing or affecting your 
position in the University. 
 All the data collected during the process of the experiment will be 
treated with full confidentiality and used for academic purpose 
only. 
 If you consent to take part in this study please leave your name 
and signature on the CONSENT FORM overleaf. 
 
Qiyuan Zhang                                         Dr Judith Covey 
Department of Psychology                     Department of Psychology 
Durham University                                  Durham University 
Queen's Campus                                   Queen's Campus 
Stockton-on-Tees TS17 6BH                 Stockton-on-Tees TS17 6BH 
Tel: 0191 334 0102                                Tel: 0191 334 0104 
Email address:                                       Email address:   
qiyuan.zhang@durham.ac.uk                 j.a.covey@durham.ac.uk
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Consent Form 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Understanding how people respond to success and 
failure  
This experiment is conducted by a research postgraduate in Department of 
Psychology as part of the requirements for the doctoral degree.  
Experimenter: Qiyuan Zhang 
Supervisor: Dr Judith Covey 
The participants are asked to answer all of the questions below independently and 
sign where appropriate. 
 Have you fully read the information sheet for participants? 
(Yes / No) 
 Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and to discuss 
about the study? (Yes / No) 
 Have you received enough information about the study? (Yes 
/ No) 
 Do you consent to participate in the study? (Yes / No) 
 Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the 
study at any time without having to give a reason for 
withdrawing or affecting your position in the University? (Yes 
/ No) 
Signed …………………………………………………Date………………………………….. 
NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS……………………………………………………………… 
Signature of witness…………………………….Date………………………………… 
NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS……………………………………………………………….. 
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Questionnaire for Future Possibility: Low Condition 
Please read the story below carefully and answer the questions that follow. 
The Brazilian National Championships Série A is the highest division of Brazilian 
football, which is composed of the 20 most competitive football clubs in the 
country. Football teams Flamengo and Sao Paulo are both the top clubs in the 
championships. They are now confronting each other in the national stadium and 
the game is about to begin. It is hard to predict which team will win because both 
teams showed top form in previous matches against other opponents. According to 
the rules set by the Brazilian Football Confederation, the team who wins the match 
obtains 3 points and the team who loses obtains none. If the scores are tied at the 
end of the full time (90 minutes plus injury time), the game ends in a draw, in which 
case both teams obtain 1 point. Since Flamengo and Sao Paulo currently hold equal 
points in the championship ranking table and it is near the end of the season, the 
result of this match will be critical to both teams.  
After kicking-off, both teams have managed to exert some pressure on the 
opponent’s defense line but no real threat was caused by either team.  Now the 
game has entered injury time of the second half and it will be roughly 2 minutes 
before the referee ends the whole game. The scores are still 0-0. 
Flamengo starts to build up their attack on the edge of the opponent’s penalty area. 
They are showing excellent skills and teamwork. The defense line of Sao Paulo is 
torn apart while the Flamengo midfielder Lenon breaks into the penalty area with 
the ball. Lenon then passes the ball to his teammate Adriano (striker of Flamengo), 
who is currently in a good shooting position.  Adriano gives it a powerful shot. But 
the ball hits the goal post and is deflected back into the pitch. A Sao Paulo defender 
clears the ball. The scores remain 0-0.   
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Questions: 
Please answer the following questions. You can refer back to the story if necessary. 
1. Which players do you think are in a better mood right now? ____ 
A) The players of Flamengo              B) The players of Sao Paulo 
Could you tell us why you think they are in a better mood?  
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
2. At this moment, one of the players is feeling disappointed. Who do you think it 
is? ____ 
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
3. At this moment, one of the players is feeling relieved. Who do you think it is? 
____ 
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
4. At this moment, one of the players is feeling proud. Who do you think it is? 
____ 
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
5. At this moment, one of the players is feeling discouraged. Who do you think it 
is? ____ 
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
6. At this moment, one of the players is feeling pleased. Who do you think it is? 
____ 
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A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
7. At this moment, one of the players is feeling frustrated. Who do you think it is? 
____ 
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
8. At this moment, one of the players is thinking: “we have a better chance to win 
this game than our opponent.” Who do you think it is? ____ 
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
9. At this moment, one of the players is thinking: “things could have been better.” 
Who do you think it is? ____  
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
10. At this moment, one of the players is thinking: “things could have been worse.” 
Who do you think it is? ____ 
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
11. At this moment, one of the players is thinking: “we almost scored a goal.” Who 
do you think it is? ____  
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
12. At this moment, one of the players is thinking: “we almost conceded a goal.” 
Who do you think it is? ____ 
A) A player of Flamengo                   B) A player of Sao Paulo 
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Please tell us more about yourself: 
1. Are you male or female? ___ 
A) Male 
B) Female 
2. What is your age? ___ 
3. What is your first language? ____________ 
Please tell us how you think of the study: 
Was the content of the story easy to understand? 
(Yes/No) 
Were the instructions given by the experimenter(s) clear and easy to follow? 
(Yes/No) 
Were the questions clear and easy to understand? 
(Yes/No) 
Any other comments (optional)? 
_________________________________________ 
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Debriefing Sheet for Participants 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Understanding how people respond to success and failure 
This experiment is conducted by a research postgraduate in the Department of 
Psychology as part of the requirements for the doctoral degree.  
Experimenter: Qiyuan Zhang 
Supervisor: Dr Judith Covey 
Thanks for your contribution to the study! 
As stated in the information sheet, the current research explores how people react 
to successes and failures in daily life. To be more specific, the experiment was 
designed to investigate how people react to close outcomes (e.g. almost won a race, 
nearly failed a test). Many of you may have had the experience when you nearly 
succeeded in doing something but finally failed to achieve it (e.g. failing an 
examination by merely one point) or when you narrowly miss something bad (e.g. 
almost being hit by a car when crossing a street). It was demonstrated in some 
previous studies that people’s emotional reactions would be intensified as such 
close outcomes occur. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) found that 
people would judge missing a flight by 5 minutes to be more upsetting than missing 
the flight by half an hour. It was also suggested that such effects were mediated by 
a mental process called counterfactual thinking, which means the imaginations 
about the alternative worlds to the reality. For example, a student who failed an 
examination by merely one point would possibly ruminate about how he or she 
could have passed. Similarly a person who was almost hit by car may dwell on how 
he or she could have been hit or even been killed.  
The current study investigates the situational factors which will potentially 
influence the emotional impacts of close outcome and counterfactual thinking. It 
was suggested that people could infer both positive and negative meanings from a 
close outcome. In the case of a football game, almost scoring a goal could be 
frustrating but it can also be seen as a sign of good potential and lift the football 
players’ expectations for future success. Similarly, almost conceding a goal could be 
relieving but it can be seen as an indicator of threat and future failure, which will 
cause fear and anxiety and demoralize the football players. Thus, a close outcome 
could produce mixed emotions. Whether positive or negative emotions dominate 
one’s affective experiences depends on which piece of information people focus on.  
In our study, some of you were told that the football team Flamengo had almost 
scored the goal at the beginning of the match. In this circumstance, the future 
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opportunity was still open and the team who had almost scored a goal should focus 
more on the positive implications of a close outcome (e.g. “We are playing quite 
well and we will win this match”) while the team who had almost conceded the 
goal should focus more on the negative implications of the close outcome (e.g. “We 
almost lost that goal and we are losing this game”). So in this condition, we predict 
that people should judge the players of Flamengo to be feeling better than the 
players of Sao Paulo. On the other hand, some of you were told that Flamengo had 
almost scored a goal at the end of the game. In this case, the future opportunity 
was closed. We predict a reversed pattern in this condition as opposed to the 
previous one. That is, the team which had almost scored a goal would focus on the 
negative implications of a close outcome (e.g. “We missed a good opportunity”) 
and the team who had almost conceded would focus on the positive (e.g. “We were 
so lucky. We didn’t lose.”). So in this condition, people should judge the players of 
Flamengo to be feeling worse than the players of Sao Paulo. 
If you have future queries, please contact the researcher: 
Qiyuan Zhang 
Research Postgraduate 
Department of Psychology 
Queen's Campus 
Durham University 
Thornaby, Stockton-on-Tees 
TS17 6BH, UK 
Email: qiyuan.zhang@durham.ac.uk 
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Appendix B Experimental Materials for Experiment 2 
The Information sheet and the consent form are the same as used in Experiment 1  
Questionnaire for Future Possibility: Low/Proximity: Close Condition 
Please vividly imagine that you were applying for a job that you have been longing 
for. After the job interview, you were told that you had won the eligibility for the 
final entrance test. You would have to score at least 80 out of 100 points or your 
job application would be rejected.  
You only have one chance to pass the test. 
You had been preparing for the test for the whole month and you were planning to 
revise the whole material one last time the night before the test to “recharge” 
yourself. However, in the afternoon before the day of the test, you came across an 
old friend you hadn’t seen for quite a while on your way home from the library. You 
decided to buy him or her a drink in the local bar. Being aware that you would have 
a test the very next morning, you promised yourself to get back home no later than 
7pm so you could do some study before going to bed. However, you two were 
having such a good time that neither of you were ready to call it an end until very 
late. It was already midnight when you eventually got home. Being too tired to 
study, you slammed yourself into bed. 
You got up a little bit late the next morning. You grabbed your stuff and rushed out. 
You managed to arrive at the test venue on time and dashed onto your seat only 
seconds before the test began. You regained your breath and started working on 
the questions. Two hours later, you finished the test. 
You got the results one week later by mail. You opened the mail only to find you’ve 
got 79 on your result sheet – you failed the test by 1 point. Therefore your job 
application would be rejected. 
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Questions 
Please imagine that you were the job applicant who took the test in the story and 
answer the following questions 
1. Please list 5 thoughts about what has happened in the story that most easily come 
to your mind. 
1) _________________________________ 
2) _________________________________ 
3) _________________________________ 
4) _________________________________ 
5) _________________________________ 
2. Please indicate the extent to which the following words would describe your 
feelings after receiving the result, by circling the number 1-9 on the scales 
provided below. 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Happy 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Annoyed 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Satisfied 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Frustrated 
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all  
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A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Delighted 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Sad 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Content 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Depressed 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Relieved 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Gloomy 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Glad 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Dis- 
appointed 
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3. Please indicate how likely you think the following thoughts would come to your 
mind regarding what had happened in the story, using the scale provided below. 
 
1) If only I had studied the night before the test instead of having so many 
drinks. ________ 
 
2) I nearly passed the test this time and I believe I will have a very good 
chance if a resit opportunity is given. ________ 
 
3) At least I’ve learnt something from the failure. ________ 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Proud 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Guilty 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Regretful 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
Determined 
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4) It probably wouldn’t have made much difference if I hadn’t gone out 
with my friend. ________ 
 
5) Even if I had studied the night before, I would still have failed. ________ 
 
6) It’s good to know I’ve got the potential to pass the test and I’m 
competent for the job. ________ 
 
7) I feel bad because I don’t seem to be competent for the job. ________ 
 
8) Why did my friend have to show up the night before the test? ________ 
 
9) I shouldn’t have gone out with my friend. ________ 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
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10) It doesn’t matter. The job doesn’t suit me anyway. ________ 
 
4. Please indicate how likely you think you would have passed the test if you 
hadn’t spent so much time in the bar the night before, using the number 1 to 9 
on the scale provided below ____ 
 
5. To what extent do you agree the following statement?  
“If I had been given a chance to resit, I would make more efforts in preparing for the 
test than the last time.” 
 
6. If you are given a chance to resit, how likely do you think you will pass the test 
next time? ________ 
 
7. How close or far away do you think you were to (from) passing the test? 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Agree 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
2 
 
3 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
disagree  
9 
Strongly 
agree 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
far or 
close 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
far away  
9 
Extremely 
close 
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Appendix C Experimental Materials for Experiment 3 
The Information sheet and the consent form are the same as used in Experiment 1  
Questionnaire for Future Possibility: Low Condition 
Please read the story below carefully and answer the questions that follow. 
“Split Second” is an arena-based evening TV game show in the USA, 
which features a rich variety of mental and physical challenges in 
which the contestants try to outperform and eliminate their 
opponents to win big monetary prizes. Each episode of “Split 
Second” features two arenas located in different cities across the 
country. The competitions in the two arenas go on separately yet at 
the same time. At the end of each episode, one winner from each 
arena advances to the next stage of the competition.     
In this episode of “Split Second”, 12 contestants are competing in 
two arenas located in Los Angeles and Philadelphia (six contestants 
compete in each arena). The winner from each arena wins $50,000 
and advances to the next week’s show, with the potential to win an 
additional $100,000. The losers leave empty-handed.  
Here is what happened in the Los Angeles arena: 
After the first three rounds of competition, two contestants, Kelly 
and Susan, who have the highest scores among the six, play the final 
challenge. They have to beat their opponent in this challenge to be 
the Los Angeles winner of this episode of “Split Second”. 
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In the final challenge, a basketball shooting machine is introduced 
to the contestants (as pictured below), which has two bottomless 
baskets bolted side-by-side on a metal panel at one end of the 
machine. When the whistle goes off, the two contestants race 15 
metres to the machine, pick up balls from the pool and start 
shooting the balls at the basket which has been pre-assigned to 
them. They score one point for each ball they throw in their basket. 
If they accidentally throw a ball into the wrong basket, their 
opponent will score one point instead of them. The objective is to 
outscore their opponent 
within the time limit of two 
minutes. 
Picture: The basketball shooting 
machine featured in this episode 
of “Split Second” 
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The two contestants play just one round of this game. The 
contestant who outscores their opponent in this single round is 
the winner of Los Angeles arena in this episode of “Split 
Second”.  
The result of the game is shown overleaf. 
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 [Future Opportunity: Absent condition] 
Result of the game 
Contestant Kelly Susan 
Score 13 (Lost) 28 (Won) 
Status 
Retires from the competition 
empty-handed 
Wins $50,000 and advances to 
the next stage 
 
Please read the results above carefully and then proceed to the next page to 
answer the questions. You can refer back to the content of the story while you 
are answering the questions if you feel like doing so. 
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Questions 
1. In general, how negative or positive do you think Kelly (Susan) will be feeling 
now? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on the scale provided 
below: 
 
2. To what extent do you think that Kelly (Susan) will be experiencing each of 
the following 12 emotions now? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 
on each of the scales provided below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
positive 
4 
 
5 
Neutral 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
negative 
1 
Extremely 
negative  
9 
Extremely 
positive 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Happy 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Annoyed 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Satisfied 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Frustrated 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Pleased 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Miserable 
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3. How likely do you think that Kelly (Susan) could have won (or lost) the round 
that just finished? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on the scale 
provided below: 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Content 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Relieved 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Disappointed 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Proud 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Elated 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Discouraged 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
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4. How close or far away do you think that Kelly (Susan) was from winning (or 
losing) the round that just finished? Please indicate by circling a number from 
1-9 on the scale provided below: 
 
 
From this point onward, the questions are only applicable to FP: High conditions: 
5. How likely do you think that Kelly (Susan) will win (or lose) the next round? 
Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on the scale provided below: 
 
6. How likely do you think that Kelly (Susan) will win (or lose) this Los Angeles 
episode of “Split Second”? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on 
the scale provided below: 
 
 
 
Please proceed to the next section of the story 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
close 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
far or 
close 
2 
 
3 
Quite far 
away 
1 
Extremely 
far away  
9 
Extremely 
close 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
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Meanwhile, in the Philadelphia arena, Fiona and Christina are the 
two contestants who have the highest scores among the six in their 
group and make it to the final challenge. They take on the same 
challenge as Kelly and Susan do in the other arena.   
[Future Opportunity: Absent] The two contestants play just one 
round of the basketball game. The contestant who outscores their 
opponent in this single round is the winner of Philadelphia arena in 
this episode of “Split Second”. The result of the game is shown 
overleaf. Please note that the contestants in one arena have no way 
of knowing what is happening in the other arena. 
[Future Opportunity: present] The two contestants play up to 5 
rounds of the basketball game. The contestant who outscores their 
opponent in 3 of these rounds is the winner of Philadelphia arena in 
this episode of “Split Second”. The result of the first round (out of 5 
possible rounds) is shown overleaf. Please note that the contestants 
in one arena have no way of knowing what is happening in the 
other arena. 
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 [Future Opportunity: Absent condition] 
Result of the game 
Contestant Fiona Christina 
Score 23 (Lost) 24 (Won) 
Status 
Retires from the competition 
empty-handed 
Wins $50,000 and advances to 
the next stage 
 
Please read the results presented above carefully and then proceed to the next 
page to answer the questions. You can refer back to the content of the story 
while you are answering the questions if you feel like doing so. 
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Questions 
1. In general, how negative or positive do you think Fiona (Christina) will be 
feeling now? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on the scale 
provided below: 
 
2. To what extent do you think that Fiona (Christina) will be experiencing each 
of the following 12 emotions now? Please indicate by circling a number from 
1-9 on each of the scales provided below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
positive 
4 
 
5 
Neutral 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
negative 
1 
Extremely 
negative  
9 
Extremely 
positive 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Happy 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Annoyed 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Satisfied 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Frustrated 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Pleased 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Miserable 
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3. How likely do you think that Fiona (Christina) could have won (or lost) the 
round that just finished? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on the 
scale provided below: 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Content 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Relieved 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Disappointed 
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6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Proud 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Elated 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Discouraged 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
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4. How close or far away do you think that Fiona (Christina) was from winning 
(or losing) the round that just finished? Please indicate by circling a number 
from 1-9 on the scale provided below: 
 
 
From this point onward, the questions are only applicable to FP: High conditions: 
5. How likely do you think that Fiona (Christina) will win (or lose) the next round? 
Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on the scale provided below: 
 
6. How likely do you think that Fiona (Christina) will win (or lose) this 
Philadelphia episode of “Split Second”? Please indicate by circling a number 
from 1-9 on the scale provided below: 
 
 
 
End of the experiment 
Thanks for your participation 
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7  
Quite 
close 
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5 
Neither 
far or 
close 
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3 
Quite far 
away 
1 
Extremely 
far away  
9 
Extremely 
close 
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7  
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2 
 
3 
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1 
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9 
Extremely 
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7  
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likely 
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Quite 
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9 
Extremely 
likely 
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Debriefing Sheet for Participants 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Understanding how people respond to success and failure 
This experiment is conducted by a research postgraduate in the Department of 
Psychology as part of the requirements for the doctoral degree.  
Experimenter: Qiyuan Zhang 
Supervisor: Dr Judith Covey 
Thanks for your contribution to the study! 
As stated in the information sheet, the current research explores how people react 
to successes and failures in daily life. To be more specific, the experiment was 
designed to investigate how people react to near misses (e.g. almost won a race, 
nearly failed a test).  
In the experiment, half of you were asked to focus on the two losers of the game 
show while the other half the two winners. The winners (or losers) beat (or were 
beaten by) their opponent either by 1 point (near miss) or by 15 points (blowout).  
We are interested in how people respond to near-misses as opposed to blowouts, 
either as winners or losers.  
 
 
 
Emotional 
Reaction 
Interpretation 
The loser who 
nearly won 
Missed 
Opportunity 
Disappointment 
Frustration 
Possibility to win 
next time 
Hopefulness 
Emotional 
Reaction 
Interpretation 
The winner who 
nearly lost 
Bad outcome 
avoided 
Relief 
Thankfulness 
Vulnerability 
Fear 
Anxiety 
Figure: Possible interpretations to near-misses and their emotional implications 
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We proposed that people’s reactions to near-misses depend on how they interpret 
them (see Figure), which should further be affected by people’s perception of future 
opportunity. In the story, half of you were told that only one round was to be played 
and the result of this single round would determine the winner, in which case the 
perception of future opportunity was low. The other half were told that several 
rounds were to be played and the result was just for the first round, in which case 
the perception of future opportunity was high.  
As Figure suggests, for the loser who nearly won, a low perception of future 
opportunity should dispose people to interpret a “nearly won” situation as an 
indicator of missed opportunity (“I could have won but I didn’t”) and thus one’s 
mood should be WORSENED, while a high perception of future opportunity should 
dispose people to interpret a “nearly won” situation as a sign of future winnings (I 
could have won and I probably will) and thus one’s mood should be IMPROVED. 
Correspondingly, for the winner who nearly lost, a low perception of future 
opportunity should dispose people to interpret a “nearly lost” situation as an 
indicator that a misfortune has been avoided (“I could have lost but I didn’t”) and 
thus one’s mood should be IMPROVED, while a high perception of future 
opportunity should dispose people to interpret a “nearly lost” situation as a sign of 
vulnerability to losing the game (I could have lost and I probably will) and thus one’s 
mood should be WORSENED.  
 
 
Should you have further inquiries regarding this study, please email to: 
qiyuan.zhang@durham.ac.uk 
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Appendix D Experimental Materials for Experiment 4 
The Information sheet and the consent form are the same as used in Experiment 1  
Questionnaire for Future Possibility: Low/Progression: Absent Condition 
Please vividly imagine that you are now at Doncaster Racecourse and are in the 
middle of the horse racing event Racing Post Trophy. The upcoming race is a 5-
furlong (1 kilometre) flat race consisting of 8 horses. You’ve bet £50 on the horse 
Captain Dunne to win the race. The horse you bet on was considered to have a 
moderate chance of winning and if it does win, you will get your stake of £50 back 
plus a bonus of £50. If the horse does not win, you will lose the total stake of £50. 
Now, all the 8 horses are ready in the stalls and the race is about to begin.  
The gates were opened and the horses set off! Your horse Captain Dunne had a fairly 
weak start and was in 5th place at the half way point (500 metres), 7 metres short of 
the leading horse Cosmic Sun (in racing terminology about ‘3 lengths’). However, 
your horse Captain Dunne started to increase its pace at the beginning of the second 
half of the race. It overtook its opponents one after another and advanced rapidly to 
the leading horse Cosmic Sun. The leading horse was losing its advantage at a fast and 
steady rate – 6 metres, 4 metres, 2 metres – and 100 metres from the finishing line, 
your horse Captain Dunne was in 2nd place and just 1 metre short of the leader 
Cosmic Sun (in racing terminology about ‘half a length’). But suddenly the horse in 
3rd place went out of control and ran into the back of your horse Captain Dunne. This 
incident caused your horse Captain Dunne to lose its step and stumble slightly. 
Although your horse was not injured and the jockey responded quickly and succeeded 
in avoiding a total fall over, your horse Captain Dunne clearly lost pace and lost 
ground on the leading horse. As a result, your horse finished 2nd about 3 metres (one 
and a half lengths) behind the winner Cosmic Sun. You lost your £50 stake. It was also 
reported that the horse which had caused the incident was severely injured and would 
not be able to run any race for at least a month.  
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Questions 
Please imagine that you were the gambler who bet £50 on the horse Captain Dunne in the 
story and answer the following questions: 
1. Please list 5 thoughts about what has happened in the story that most easily come to 
your mind. 
1) _________________________________ 
2) _________________________________ 
3) _________________________________ 
4) _________________________________ 
5) _________________________________ 
2. Please indicate the extent to which the following words would describe your feelings 
after the race, by circling the number 1-9 on the scales provided below. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Happy 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Annoyed 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Satisfied 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Frustrated 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Pleased 
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8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Miserable 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Delighted 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Sad 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Content 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Depressed 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Relieved 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Gloomy 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Glad 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Proud 
Dis- 
appointed 
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3. Please indicate how likely you think the following thoughts would come to your mind 
regarding what had happened in the story, using the scale provided below. 
 
1) If only the accident hadn’t happened. _________ 
 
2) If only I had bet on another horse. ________ 
 
3) Captain Dunne almost won the race and it will have a good chance to win next 
time. ________ 
 
4) At least I didn’t place a bigger bet. ________ 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Guilty 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Regretful 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
Determined 
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5) At least I didn’t bet on the horse that was injured. ________ 
 
6) Even if Captain Dunne hadn’t stumbled, it wouldn’t have won the race. ________ 
 
7) Captain Dunne performed well and had the potential to win the race. ________ 
 
8) Captain Dunne performed poorly and barely got a chance to win the race. 
________ 
 
9) It just wasn’t my lucky day. ________ 
 
10) That horse which ran into Captain Dunne really annoyed me. ________ 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
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11) I made a bad decision. ________ 
 
12) I wouldn’t care much about losing £50 anyway. ________ 
 
4. Please indicate how likely you think the horse you bet on (Captain Dunne) would have 
won the race if it hadn’t stumbled 100 metres from the finishing line, using the number 
1 to 9 on the scale provided below ____ 
 
5. Please indicate which of the following figures best represents the race that your horse 
(Captain Dunne) just had ____ 
 
6. What do you think of the performance of the horse you bet on (Captain Dunne)? 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
A B 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Good 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
good nor 
bad 
2 
 
3 
Bad 
1 
Extremely 
bad  
9 
Extremely 
good 
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7. Please indicate how likely you think it would be that the horse you bet on (Captain 
Dunne) would win a second race run one week later against the same opponents apart 
from the one that fell out of the course?____ 
 
8. How close or far away do you think your horse was to (from) winning the race? 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
far or 
close 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
1 
Extremely 
far away  
9 
Extremely 
close 
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Appendix E Experimental Materials for Experiment 5 
The Information sheet and the consent form are the same as used in Experiment 1  
Questionnaire for Future Possibility: Low Condition 
Please read the story below carefully and answer the questions that follow. 
Henry and John are at Doncaster Racecourse and are in the middle of the horse 
racing event Racing Post Trophy. The upcoming race is a 5-furlong (1 kilometre) flat 
race consisting of 8 horses. Henry has bet £30 on the horse Captain Dunne to win the 
race and John instead, has bet £30 on Silver Line to win the race (see Betting Table 
below).  
 
 
Betting Table 
 
Both horses they bet on were considered to have a moderate chance of winning and 
Henry and John will get their stake of £30 back plus a bonus of £30 if the horse they 
bet on does win. If their horse does not win, they will lose the total stake of £30. 
Now, all the 8 horses are ready in the stalls and the race is about to begin.  
The gates were opened and the horses set off (see Figure 1)! 
 
Figure 1 Start off 
 
•Captain Dunne Henry 
•Silver Line John 
50 M 
Henry’s Captain Dunne John’s Silver Line 
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Henry’s horse Captain Dunne started strongly. It obtained 2nd place and was 1 metre 
short of the leader Cosmic Sun. Cosmic Sun sustained this advantage throughout the 
first half of the race and at the half-way point (500 metres), Captain Dunne was still 1 
metre short (see Figure 2). 
On the other hand, John’s horse Silver Line had a fairly weak start and was in 5th 
place at the half way point (500 metres), 7 metres short of the leading horse Cosmic 
Sun (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Half way 
The finishing line was getting closer and the 1 metre deficit between Henry’s horse 
Captain Dunne and Comic Sun remained constant. However, John’s horse Silver Line 
started to increase its pace at the beginning of the second half of the race. It 
overtook its opponents one after another and advanced rapidly to the leading horse 
Cosmic Sun and 2nd place Captain Dunne (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 300 metres from finishing 
Silver Line was closing the gap between itself and the leading horse in a rapid and 
steady rate – 6 metres, 4 metres, 2 metres – and 100 metres from the finishing line, 
Silver Line was neck and neck with Henry’s horse Captain Dunne in 2nd place and 
they were both 1 metre short of the leader Cosmic Sun (see Figure 4). 
700 M 
John’s Silver Line Henry’s Captain Dunne 
500 M 
Henry’s Captain Dunne John’s Silver Line 
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Figure 4 100 metres from finishing 
Suddenly the horse in 4th place went out of control and ran into the backs of Henry 
and John’s horses. This incident caused both Captain Dunne and Silver Line to lose 
their step and stumble slightly. Although both horses were not injured and the 
jockeys of both horses responded quickly and succeeded in avoiding a total fall over, 
they clearly lost pace and lost ground on the leading horse. As a result, Henry’s horse 
Captain Dunne and John’s horse Silver Line finished the race at almost the same time, 
4 metres behind the winner Cosmic Sun (see Figure 5). Henry and John both lost their 
£30 stake.  
 
Figure 5 Finishing 
 
Please proceed to the questions 
900 M 
Henry’s Captain Dunne John’s Silver Line 
Henry’s Captain Dunne John’s Silver Line 
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Questions: 
Please answer the following questions. You can refer back to the story if necessary. 
1. In general, how negative or positive do you think Henry and John will be feeling 
respectively after the race? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on 
each of the scales provided below: 
 
Henry (who bet on Captain Dunne) ___            
 
John (who bet on Silver Line) ___ 
 
2. Please indicate to what extent Henry and John will be experiencing each of the 
following 12 emotions after the race? Please indicate by circling a number from 
1-9 on each of the scales provided below:  
 
1) Happy 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
positive 
4 
 
5 
Neutral 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
negative 
1 
Extremely 
negative  
9 
Extremely 
positive 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
positive 
4 
 
5 
Neutral 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
negative 
1 
Extremely 
negative  
9 
Extremely 
positive 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
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2) Annoyed 
 
 
3) Satisfied 
 
 
4) Frustrated 
 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
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5) Pleased 
 
 
6) Miserable 
 
 
7) Content 
 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
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8) Disappointed 
 
 
9) Proud 
 
 
10) Regretful 
 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
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11) Elated 
 
 
12) Discouraged 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
Henry     
(Captain Dunne) 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
a bit 
4 
 
5 
Moderately 
2 
 
3 
A little 
1 
Not at 
all  
9 
Extremely 
John            
(Silver Line) 
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3. How likely do you think that after the race, Henry and John will be thinking how 
things could have been DIFFERENT? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-
9 on each of the scales provided below: 
Henry (who bet on Captain Dunne) ___             
  
 
 
John (who bet on Silver Line) ___ 
 
4. How likely do you think that after the race, Henry and John will be thinking how 
things could have been BETTER? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 
on each of the scales provided below: 
Henry (who bet on Captain Dunne) ___             
  
 
John (who bet on Silver Line) ___ 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
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5. How likely do you think that after the race, Henry and John will be thinking how 
things could have been WORSE? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 
on each of the scales provided below: 
 
Henry (who bet on Captain Dunne) ___         
  
 
John (who bet on Silver Line) ___ 
 
6. How likely do you think Henry’s and John’s horses would have won the race if 
the accident had not happened 100 metres from the finishing line? Please 
indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on each of the scales provided below: 
 
Henry’s horse Captain Dunne ___             
 
John’s horse Silver Line ___ 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
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7. How likely do you think it would be that Henry’s and John’s horses would win a 
second race run one week later against the same opponents (not including the 
injured horse that caused the accident who has been disqualified)? Please 
indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on each of the scales provided below: 
Henry’s horse Captain Dunne ___             
 
John’s horse Silver Line ___ 
 
8. How lucky or unlucky do you think Henry and John were? Please indicate by 
circling a number from 1-9 on each of the scales provided below: 
 
Henry (who bet on Captain Dunne) ___             
 
John (who bet on Silver Line) ___ 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
likely 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
likely or 
unlikely 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlikely 
1 
Extremely 
unlikely  
9 
Extremely 
likely 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
lucky 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlucky 
1 
Extremely 
unlucky  
9 
Extremely 
lucky 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
lucky 
 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
2 
 
3 
Quite 
unlucky 
1 
Extremely 
unlucky  
9 
Extremely 
lucky 
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9. What do you think of the performance of Henry’s and John’s horses? Please 
indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on each of the scales provided below: 
Henry’s horse Captain Dunne ___             
 
John’s horse Silver Line ___ 
 
10. How close or far away do you think Henry’s and John’s horses were from 
winning the race? Please indicate by circling a number from 1-9 on each of the 
scales provided below: 
Henry’s horse Captain Dunne ___             
 
John’s horse Silver Line ___ 
 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Good 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
good nor 
bad 
2 
 
3 
Bad 
1 
Extremely 
bad  
9 
Extremely 
good 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Good 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
good nor 
bad 
2 
 
3 
Bad 
1 
Extremely 
bad  
9 
Extremely 
good 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
close 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
far or 
close 
2 
 
3 
Quite far 
away 
1 
Extremely 
far away  
9 
Extremely 
close 
8 
 
6 
 
7  
Quite 
close 
4 
 
5 
Neither 
far or 
close 
2 
 
3 
Quite far 
away 
1 
Extremely 
far away  
9 
Extremely 
close 
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Please tell us more about yourself: 
1. Are you male or female? ___ 
C) Male 
D) Female 
2. What is your age? 
A) 17 or below 
B) 18-21 
C) 22-25 
D) 26-30 
E) 31-40 
F) 41-50 
G) 51-60 
H) 61 or over 
3. What is your first language? ____________ 
Please tell us how you think of our study: 
1. Was the content of the story easy to understand?  
(Yes/No) 
2. Were the instructions clear and easy to follow?  
(Yes/No) 
3. Were the questions clear and easy to understand?  
(Yes/No) 
4. Any more comment (optional)? 
_________________________________________ 
 
End of the Questionnaire 
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Debriefing Sheet for Participants 
Thanks for your contribution to the study! 
 
As stated in the information sheet, the current research explores how people react to 
successes and failures in daily life. To be more specific, the experiment was designed 
to investigate how people react to close outcomes (e.g. almost won, nearly fail). It was 
suggested by the earlier research that the outcome closeness would induce people to 
think about the alternatives to the reality. For example, a student who failed an 
important exam merely by 1 point may ruminate on how he or she could have passed. 
The outcome closeness could also induce people to make high probability judgments 
regarding the outcomes that didn’t happen. For example, failing the exam by 1 point 
could make people feel that passing the exam was once highly probable. Some 
previous research has demonstrated that simulating a once probable but unrealized 
outcome could exert profound impacts on people’s emotional reactions, self-
evaluations and future expectations.  
The current experiment explores: firstly, what factors influence people’s perception 
that something almost happened as well as their probability judgment regarding the 
unrealized outcome. You were presented with a story involving two gamblers in a 
horse racing event. Both of them saw their horse stumbled before the finishing line 
and fail to win by the same amount of the distance. However, one of them (Henry) 
saw his horse keep a constant distance behind the leading horse all the way from the 
beginning of the race while the other person (John) saw his horse started the race 
weak but then catch up rapidly. The previous research suggested that people’s 
perception of “almost” and probability judgment regarding the unrealized outcome 
could be derived from people’s perceived propensity towards a focal outcome. In our 
story, although the two horses stumbled with the same distance from the leading horse 
and then both finished the game in the second place, we posit that john’s horse 
displayed a stronger propensity towards winning compared to Henry’ horse in the 
sense that John’s horse was gaining on the leading horse at a higher rate. So we 
predict that people would perceive John’s horse had the higher chance of winning 
than Henry’s horse. We also predict that people would judge John to be more likely to 
think about the alternatives to the reality after the race (thoughts like “I almost won” 
or “I could have won”) than Henry. 
 
The second question of concern is that how those imaginations about the alternative 
outcomes as well as probability judgments would influence people’s emotional 
reactions. In our experiment, some of you were informed that there was going to be 
two races and the gamblers could have won their money if their horse had won either 
of the two races. The other participants were told that there was going to be only one 
race. We predict that in the former circumstance, where people feel that they still of 
chance to win, thinking about what could have happen could lift one’s future 
expectations of winning and thus makes one feel better. On the other hand, in the 
latter circumstance, when chance of winning has been closed, thinking about what 
could have happen would mainly make people feel worse because people would make 
comparison between the reality and possible worlds.        
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Appendix F Experimental Materials for Experiment 6 
Information Sheet for Participants 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Understanding People’s perception of closeness 
This experiment is conducted by a research postgraduate in the Department of 
Psychology as part of the requirements for the doctoral degree.  
Experimenter: Qiyuan Zhang 
Supervisor: Dr Judith Covey 
The participants are asked to read all of the following information  
 This experiment is designed to investigate gambling behaviours.  
 You will be given some credits at the beginning of the experiment 
(which can later be traded for real money) and use those credits to 
bet in a number of trials of a computer-simulated coin-flipping 
game. You are also going to answer some questions after each trial. 
 Please be advised that your participation in the experiment is 
absolutely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at anytime 
without having to give a reason for withdrawing or affecting your 
position in the University. 
 If you withdraw before completing the experiment, you will not be 
able to trade your credits for money but still entitled to receive the 
participant time you’ve worked for or monetary compensation, 
whichever has been promised by the experimenter.   
 All the data collected during the process of the experiment will be 
treated with full confidentiality and used for academic purpose only. 
 If you consent to take part in this study please leave your name 
and signature on the CONSENT FORM overleaf. 
 
Qiyuan Zhang                                     Dr Judith Covey 
Department of Psychology                  Department of Psychology 
Durham University                              Durham University 
Queen's Campus                                Queen's Campus 
Stockton-on-Tees TS17 6BH              Stockton-on-Tees TS17 6BH 
Tel: 0191 334 0102                             Tel: 0191 334 0104 
Email address:                                     Email address:   
qiyuan.zhang@durham.ac.uk              j.a.covey@durham.ac.uk
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Consent Form 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Understanding how people respond to success and 
failure  
This experiment is conducted by a research postgraduate in Department of 
Psychology as part of the requirements for the doctoral degree.  
Experimenter: Qiyuan Zhang 
Supervisor: Dr Judith Covey 
The participants are asked to answer all of the questions below independently and 
sign where appropriate. 
 Have you fully read the information sheet for participants? 
(Yes / No) 
 Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and to discuss 
about the study? (Yes / No) 
 Have you received enough information about the study? (Yes 
/ No) 
 Do you consent to participate in the study? (Yes / No) 
 Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the 
study at any time without having to give a reason for 
withdrawing or affecting your position in the University? (Yes 
/ No) 
Signed …………………………………………………Date………………………………….. 
NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS……………………………………………………………… 
Signature of witness……………………………Date………………………………… 
NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS……………………………………………………………… 
298 
 
Filler Question Pool 
1. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “I should change 
the current strategy for pressing buttons.” Please indicate by pressing a 
number from 1-9 (1=extremely disagree, 9=extremely agree). 
2. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “I should stick to 
the current strategy for pressing buttons.” Please indicate by pressing a 
number from 1-9 (1=extremely disagree, 9=extremely agree). 
3. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “I’ve been very 
lucky so far.” Please indicate by pressing a number from 1-9 (1=extremely 
disagree, 9=extremely agree). 
4. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “I’ve been very 
unlucky so far.” Please indicate by pressing a number from 1-9 (1=extremely 
disagree, 9=extremely agree). 
5. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “I’ve seen more 
heads than tails so far.” Please indicate by pressing a number from 1-9 
(1=extremely disagree, 9=extremely agree). 
6. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “I’ve seen more 
tails than heads so far.” Please indicate by pressing a number from 1-9 
(1=extremely disagree, 9=extremely agree). 
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Debriefing Sheet for Participants 
Thanks for your contribution to the study! 
This experiment investigates how the temporal order of incidents would 
affect people’s retrospective probability judgment about the past (e.g. 
Could I have won?) as well as the expectations for the future (e.g. Can I 
win next time?). 
The participants were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions. 
In sequential condition, participants press the space key once and all 
three coins start flipping. Then participants press the space key for 
another 3 times to stop the coins flipping one by one. In contrast, in 
simultaneous condition, participants press the space key 3 times to flip 
the coins one by one and then press “space” for a forth time to stop the 
3 coins flipping all at once.  
In sequential condition, we predict that participants’ estimation on 
counterfactual probability (Could I have won that trial?) will be affected 
by the order with which the outcomes of the flipping of the 3 coins are 
revealed. That is, if the revelations of the outcomes imply a progression 
towards winning (e.g Head, Head, Tail; Tail Tail Head), one’s perception 
that “I could have won” and “I will win next time” will be inflated, in 
comparison with the situation when the revelations of the outcomes of 
the three coins doesn’t imply such trend (e.g. Head, Tail, Head or Head, 
Tail, Tail), even though participants are always one coin away from 
winning in both cases.  
This effect however, should be minimized in simultaneous condition 
because the outcomes of the flipping were revealed at the same time and 
thus the order effect should not be potent.  
 
 
 
 
 
